On the Role of Inhibition Processes in Modeling Control Strategies for Composting Plants

We introduce a mathematical model for the composting process in biocells where several chemical phenomena, like the aerobic biodegradation, the hydrolysis of insoluble substrate and the biomass decay, occur. We investigate the best aeration strategies in presence of inhibition processes due to high concentrations of oxygen. Optimal stategries are obtained as result of a suitable optimal control problem. The dynamics exhibits an enhanced level of the oxygen concentration that guarantees the aerobic feature of the biodegradation process. Then, a nonlinear bioeconomic term is included in the objective functional to take into account of the external operational cost. The role of the economic cost in the control policy is analyzed and discussed

Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players

This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations

On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous agents. We use the concept of exchanging agents to give necessary conditions for internal stability and show that refraction is a sufficient condition for the failure of an enlargement of the coalition. With heterogeneous agents we can get a situation where a group of members of an unstable coalition does not deviate, neither within the coalition nor within the extended coalition. Hence, the possibilities of agreement are richer than in the standard analysis with homogeneous agents. Examples of industrial economics are used for illustration, and an application to climate change negotiations is discussed in more detail