Equivalence-based Security for Querying Encrypted Databases: Theory and Application to Privacy Policy Audits

Motivated by the problem of simultaneously preserving confidentiality and usability of data outsourced to third-party clouds, we present two different database encryption schemes that largely hide data but reveal enough information to support a wide-range of relational queries. We provide a security definition for database encryption that captures confidentiality based on a notion of equivalence of databases from the adversary's perspective. As a specific application, we adapt an existing algorithm for finding violations of privacy policies to run on logs encrypted under our schemes and observe low to moderate overheads.Comment: CCS 2015 paper technical report, in progres

Middle-Out Reasoning for Logic Program Synthesis

We propose a novel approach to automating the synthesis of logic programs: Logic programs are synthesized as a by-product of the planning of a verification proof. The approach is a two-level one: At the object level, we prove program verification conjectures in a sorted, first-order theory. The conjectures are of the form 8args \Gamma\Gamma\Gamma\Gamma! : prog(args \Gamma\Gamma\Gamma\Gamma! ) $ spec(args \Gamma\Gamma\Gamma\Gamma! ). At the meta-level, we plan the object-level verification with an unspecified program definition. The definition is represented with a (second-order) meta-level variable, which becomes instantiated in the course of the planning

Runtime Verification of Temporal Properties over Out-of-order Data Streams

We present a monitoring approach for verifying systems at runtime. Our approach targets systems whose components communicate with the monitors over unreliable channels, where messages can be delayed or lost. In contrast to prior works, whose property specification languages are limited to propositional temporal logics, our approach handles an extension of the real-time logic MTL with freeze quantifiers for reasoning about data values. We present its underlying theory based on a new three-valued semantics that is well suited to soundly and completely reason online about event streams in the presence of message delay or loss. We also evaluate our approach experimentally. Our prototype implementation processes hundreds of events per second in settings where messages are received out of order.Comment: long version of the CAV 2017 pape

Monitoring the GDPR:European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has substantially strengthened the requirements for data processing systems, requiring audits at scale. We show how and to what extent these audits can be automated. We contribute an analysis of which parts of the GDPR can be monitored, a formalisation of these parts in metric first-order temporal logic, and an application of the MonPoly system to automatically audit these parts. We validate our ideas on a case study using log data from industry, detecting actual violations. Altogether, we demonstrate both in theory and practice how to automate GDPR compliance checking

Labour Market and Social Policy in Italy: Challenges and Changes. Bertelsmann Policy Brief #2016/02

vEight years after the outbreak of the financial crisis, Italy has still to cope with and overcome a plethora of economic and social challenges. On top of this, it faces an unfavourable demographic structure and severe disparities between its northern and southern regions. Some promising reforms have recently been enacted, specifically targeting poverty and social exclusion. However, much more remains to be done on the way towards greater economic stability and widely shared prosperity

Efficient Large-scale Trace Checking Using MapReduce

The problem of checking a logged event trace against a temporal logic specification arises in many practical cases. Unfortunately, known algorithms for an expressive logic like MTL (Metric Temporal Logic) do not scale with respect to two crucial dimensions: the length of the trace and the size of the time interval for which logged events must be buffered to check satisfaction of the specification. The former issue can be addressed by distributed and parallel trace checking algorithms that can take advantage of modern cloud computing and programming frameworks like MapReduce. Still, the latter issue remains open with current state-of-the-art approaches. In this paper we address this memory scalability issue by proposing a new semantics for MTL, called lazy semantics. This semantics can evaluate temporal formulae and boolean combinations of temporal-only formulae at any arbitrary time instant. We prove that lazy semantics is more expressive than standard point-based semantics and that it can be used as a basis for a correct parametric decomposition of any MTL formula into an equivalent one with smaller, bounded time intervals. We use lazy semantics to extend our previous distributed trace checking algorithm for MTL. We evaluate the proposed algorithm in terms of memory scalability and time/memory tradeoffs.Comment: 13 pages, 8 figure

Non-collaborative Attackers and How and Where to Defend Flawed Security Protocols (Extended Version)

Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and allows honest agents to continue to use it until a corrected version is released. Our approach is based on the knowledge of the network topology, which we model as a graph, and on the consequent possibility of creating an interference to an ongoing attack of a Dolev-Yao attacker, by means of non-collaboration actuated by ad-hoc benign attackers that play the role of network guardians. Such guardians, positioned in strategical points of the network, have the task of monitoring the messages in transit and discovering at runtime, through particular types of inference, whether an attack is ongoing, interrupting the run of the protocol in the positive case. We study not only how but also where we can attempt to defend flawed security protocols: we investigate the different network topologies that make security protocol defense feasible and illustrate our approach by means of concrete examples.Comment: 29 page

Middle-out reasoning for synthesis and induction

We develop two applications of middle-out reasoning in inductive proofs: Logic program synthesis and the selection of induction schemes. Middle-out reasoning as part of proof planning was first suggested by Bundy et al [Bundy et al 90a]. Middle-out reasoning uses variables to represent unknown terms and formulae. Unification instantiates the variables in the subsequent planning, while proof planning provides the necessary search control. Middle-out reasoning is used for synthesis by planning the verification of an unknown logic program: The program body is represented with a meta-variable. The planning results both in an instantiation of the program body and a plan for the verification of that program. If the plan executes successfully, the synthesized program is partially correct and complete. Middle-out reasoning is also used to select induction schemes. Finding an appropriate induction scheme during synthesis is difficult, because the recursion of the program, which is un..

Lapex: A Phoswich balloon experiment for hard X-ray astronomy

Satellite and balloon observations have shown that several classes of celestial objects are hard ( 15 keV) energy band with a sensitivity of approx 10 mCrab has been performed with the UCSD/MIT instrument (A4) on board the HEAO 1 satellite. About 70 X-ray sources were detected, including galactic and extragalactic objects. Hard X-ray emission has been detected in the Galaxy from X-ray pulsars. Extragalactic sources of hard X-ray emission include clusters of galaxies, QSOs, BL Lac objects, Seyfert galaxies. The essential characteristics of the Large Area Phoswich Experiment (LAPEX) for crowded sky field observations are described. It has: (1) a broad energy band of operation (20-300 keV); (2) a 3 sigma sensitivity of about 1 mCrab in 10,000 s of live observing time; and (3) imaging capabilities with an angular resolution of about 20'

Proof Theory, Transformations, and Logic Programming for Debugging Security Protocols

We define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of principals and the current global state of the session. Hereby, we can describe the operational semantics of principals and of an intruder in a simple and modular way. Furthermore, using proof theoretic tools like the analysis of permutability of rules, we are able to find efficient proof strategies that we prove complete for special classes of security protocols including Needham-Schroeder. Based on the results of this preliminary analysis, we have implemented a Prolog meta-interpreter which allows for rapid prototyping and for checking safety properties of security protocols, and we have applied it for finding error traces and proving correctness of practical examples