On the Complexity and Behaviour of Cryptocurrencies Compared to Other Markets

We show that the behaviour of Bitcoin has interesting similarities to stock and precious metal markets, such as gold and silver. We report that whilst Litecoin, the second largest cryptocurrency, closely follows Bitcoin's behaviour, it does not show all the reported properties of Bitcoin. Agreements between apparently disparate complexity measures have been found, and it is shown that statistical, information-theoretic, algorithmic and fractal measures have different but interesting capabilities of clustering families of markets by type. The report is particularly interesting because of the range and novel use of some measures of complexity to characterize price behaviour, because of the IRS designation of Bitcoin as an investment property and not a currency, and the announcement of the Canadian government's own electronic currency MintChip.Comment: 16 pages, 11 figures, 4 table

Scotch Pine Deterioration in Michigan Caused by Pine Root Weevil Complex

Pine root tip weevil, Hylobius rhizophagus, and pine root collar weevil, H. radicis, attack certain Scotch pine stands simultaneously causing more mortality than expected from either insect alone. Recommendations for curtailing this insect complex include favoring red pine, planting Scotch pine far from brood sources, and avoiding stump culture of Christmas trees

Can Lower Tax Rates be Bought? Business Rent-Seeking and Tax Competition among U.S. States

The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. We depart from this assumption by allowing for the possibility that policymakers also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses. This extension to the standard strategic tax competition model implies that business contributions may affect not only the levels of equilibrium tax rates but also the slope of the tax reaction function between jurisdictions, thus enhancing or retarding the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. The model is estimated with panel data for 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions. Among other results, we document a significant direct effect of business contributions on tax policy; the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution in terms of lower state corporate taxes is approximately$6.65.business campaign contributions, state business tax policy, rent-seeking, capital mobility

Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among U.S. states

The standard model of strategic tax competition – the non-cooperative tax-setting behavior of jurisdictions competing for a mobile capital tax base – assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. We depart from this assumption by allowing for the possibility that policymakers, given the political and electoral environments in which they operate, also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses. Firms recognize the factors affecting policymakers’ welfare and may make campaign contributions to influence tax policy. These changes to the standard strategic tax competition model imply that business contributions affect not only the levels of equilibrium tax rates but also the slope of the tax reaction function between jurisdictions. Thus, business campaign contributions may affect tax competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. ; Based on a panel of 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, our empirical work uncovers four key results. First, we document a significant direct effect of business contributions on tax policy. Second, the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution in terms of lower state corporate taxes is nearly$4. Third, the slope of the reaction function between tax policy in a given state and the tax policies of its competitive states is negative. Fourth, we highlight the sensitivity of the empirical results to state effects.Taxation

A STATIC POLICY FOR A DYNAMIC INDUSTRY: THE CALIFORNIA YOUNG ACT OF 1935

An economic history of the development of California dairy policies from 1935 to 1965 is used to support the hypothesis that the incompatibility of discrete policy changes for a dynamic industry generates deadweight losses. Combining quantitative industry data with legal and personal narratives provides evidence in support of the hypothesis.dairy policy, quota, agricultural history, Agricultural and Food Policy,

Fiscal spending multipliers: evidence from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

This paper estimates the “jobs multiplier” of fiscal spending using the state-level allocations of federal stimulus funds from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Specifically, I estimate the relationship between state-level federal ARRA spending and state employment outcomes from the time the Act was passed (February 2009) through the latest month of data (currently May 2010). Because actual state allocations of stimulus spending may be endogenous with respect to state economic outcomes, I instrument for stimulus spending using the state allocations that were anticipated immediately after the ARRA was passed, according to the Wall Street Journal and the Center for American Progress. To control for the counterfactual – what would have happened without the stimulus – I include several variables likely to be strong predictors of state employment growth. The results point to substantial heterogeneity in the impact of ARRA spending over time, across sectors, and across types of spending. The estimated jobs multiplier for total nonfarm employment is large and statistically significant for ARRA spending through March 2010, but falls considerably and becomes insignificant in April and May. The implied number of jobs created or saved by the spending is about 2.0 million as of March, but drops to 0.8 million as of May. Across sectors, the estimated impact of ARRA spending on construction employment is especially large, implying a 18.4% increase in employment (as of May 2010) relative to what it would have been without the ARRA. Lastly, I find that spending on infrastructure and other general purposes has a large positive impact, while spending on safety-net programs such as unemployment insurance and Medicaid reduces employment.American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ; Fiscal policy - United States ; Employment

State Investment Tax Incentives: A Zero-Sum Game?

Though the U.S. federal investment tax credit (ITC) was permanently repealed in 1986, state-level ITCs have proliferated over the last few decades. Are these tax incentives effective in increasing investment within the state? How much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states? Based on a panel dataset for all 50 states, we find a significant channel for state tax incentives on own-state economic activity and document the importance of interstate capital flows. Whether state investment incentives are a zero-sum game is less certain and depends on the definition of the set of competitive states.state tax incentives, interstate tax competition, business taxes