Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice

We highlight and explain eight lessons from optimal tax theory and compare them to the last few decades of OECD tax policy. As recommended by theory, top marginal income tax rates have declined, marginal income tax schedules have flattened, redistribution has risen with income inequality, and commodity taxes are more uniform and are typically assessed on final goods. However, trends in capital taxation are mixed, and capital income tax rates remain well above the zero level recommended by theory. Moreover, some of theory's more subtle prescriptions, such as taxes that involve personal characteristics, asset-testing, and history-dependence, remain rare in practice. Where large gaps between theory and policy remain, the difficult question is whether policymakers need to learn more from theorists, or the other way around.

Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice

The optimal design of a tax system is a topic that has long fascinated economic theorists and flummoxed economic policymakers. This paper explores the interplay between tax theory and tax policy. It identifies key lessons policymakers might take from the academic literature on how taxes ought to be designed, and it discusses the extent to which these lessons are reflected in actual policy.Economic

Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice

We highlight and explain eight lessons from optimal tax theory and compare them to the last few decades of OECD tax policy. As recommended by theory, top marginal income tax rates have declined, marginal income tax schedules have flattened, redistribution has risen with income inequality, and commodity taxes are more uniform and are typically assessed on final goods. However, trends in capital taxation are mixed, and capital income tax rates remain well above the zero level recommended by theory. Moreover, some of theory's more subtle prescriptions, such as taxes that involve personal characteristics, asset-testing, and history-dependence, remain rare in practice. Where large gaps between theory and policy remain, the difficult question is whether policymakers need to learn more from theorists, or the other way around.

Capitalists in the twenty-first century

Have passive rentiers replaced the working rich at the top of the U.S. income distribution? Using income tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners, this paper finds that private business owners who actively manage their firms are key for top income inequality. Private business income accounts for most of the rise of top incomes since 2000 and the majority of top earners receive private business income|most of which accrues to active owner-managers of mid-market firms in relatively skill-intensive and unconcentrated industries. Profit falls substantially after premature owner deaths. Top-owned firms are twice as profitable per worker as other firms despite similar risk, and rising profitability without rising scale explains most of their profit growth. Together, these facts indicate that the working rich remain central to rising top incomes in the twenty-first century

2001 Convocation

Prelude: Kathleen King, 2001 IMSA Graduate Pledge of Allegiance: Danny Yagan, Student Council President Welcome: Danny Yagan, Student Council President; Dr. Stephanie Pace Marshall, President; Eric McLaren, Principal Music Selection: Kathleen King, 2001 IMSA Graduate Keynote Speaker: B. Scott Gaudi, 1991 Graduat

How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect Your Earnings? Evidence From Project STAR

In Project STAR, 11,571 students in Tennessee and their teachers were randomly assigned to classrooms within their schools from kindergarten to third grade. This paper evaluates the long-term impacts of STAR by linking the experimental data to administrative records. We first demonstrate that kindergarten test scores are highly correlated with outcomes such as earnings at age 27, college attendance, home ownership, and retirement savings. We then document four sets of experimental impacts. First, students in small classes are significantly more likely to attend college and exhibit improvements on other outcomes. Class size does not have a significant effect on earnings at age 27, but this effect is imprecisely estimated. Second, students who had a more experienced teacher in kindergarten have higher earnings. Third, an analysis of variance reveals significant classroom effects on earnings. Students who were randomly assigned to higher quality classrooms in grades K-3 – as measured by classmates' end-of-class test scores – have higher earnings, college attendance rates, and other outcomes. Finally, the effects of class quality fade out on test scores in later grades but gains in non-cognitive measures persist.

Do Corporate Tax Cuts Increase Investments?

This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we investigate the 2008 tax reform that cut corporate taxes by 10 percentage points. We expect heterogeneous investment responses across firms, since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms. Using a matching difference-in-differences approach, we show that, following the corporate tax cut, domestically owned firms increased investments to a larger extent than foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but have heterogeneous investment responses across firms

Owner-Level Taxes and Business Activity

In some classes of models, taxes at the owner level are "neutral" and have no effect on firm activity. However, this tax neutrality is sensitive to assumptions and no longer holds in more complex models. We review recent research that incorporates greater complexity in studying the link between taxes and business activity - particularly entrepreneurship. Dividend taxes on owners of large firms affect firm activity in models that include agency conflicts between owners and managers. Similarly, after incorporating entrepreneurs' occupational choice into the model, taxes are no longer neutral. By forsaking lucrative alternative careers, skilled entrepreneurs tend to have high opportunity costs, which make the choice of attempting to start a business of first order importance. Moreover, in models where it is assumed that capital flows across borders without cost, taxes on domestic business owners do not alter business activity because foreign capital seamlessly compensates for tax-induced declines in investments. This theoretical notion is contradicted by the strong "home bias" observed in business ownership, in particular for small firms and startups without easy access to international capital markets. Recent empirical work has emphasized that taxes have heterogeneous effects on mature firms, entrepreneurial startups, and owner-managed small firms. Lowering dividend taxes on firms with dispersed ownership has been shown to shift capital from mature firms into rapidly growing firms. Moreover, capital gains taxation tends to reduce the number of innovative startups and diminish venture capital activity, while high owner-level taxes encourage small business activity and non-entrepreneurial self-employment because such firms have more opportunities to avoid or evade taxes. To obtain efficient incentives in entrepreneurial startups, contractual terms are required that ex ante guarantee that all providers of critical inputs, especially equity constrained entrepreneurs, are entitled to a share of the resulting capital value firm. Unless properly designed, owner-level taxes prevent such ex ante contracting and thus lower the likelihood of eventual success

Is the Great Recession Really Over?

Many have argued that the Great Recession is over and that the U.S. labor market is back to where it would have been in the absence of the recession and the shocks that gave rise to it. By the end of 2015, the U.S. unemployment rate had returned to its 2007 level, below 5 percent. Yet the U. S. labor force participation rate and thus the U.S. employment rate (employment-population ratio) remained three percentage points below their 2007 levels. Only half or less of the decline is explained by demographic change. What caused the remaining decline in labor force participation? I attempt to address this question in a recent paper, “Is the Great Recession Really Over? Longitudinal Evidence of Enduring Employment Impacts”. Using micro-data on two million retail workers, I show that local variation in the employment impact of the Great Recession had enduring effects across local areas. Workers in areas that were severely hit in 2007-09 were less likely to be employed in 2014 than similar workers from less affected areas, regardless of where they lived in 2014. This enduring employment impact of a worker’s location at the onset of the Recession cannot be fully explained by nationwide skill-biased technical or trade changes