The moral obligations of trust

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ‘all the way down’. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ‘all the way down’

Reparations for American Chattel Slavery

An analysis of the case for reparations for American chattel slavery

PLACE: PRESENCE AS SECOND-PERSONAL SPACE

The concept of place is ultimately a matter of ethical significance—of where something fits in a nexus or structure of meaning. Often this meaning is quite personal, involving a sense of presence we associate with a place. This essay investigates this connection through a study of Wordsworth’s poem, “Tintern Abbey.” It argues that the notion of a presence-infused place is ultimately that of a second-personal space. Presence is a matter of second-personal openness. Therefore, when presence infuses place, it makes its space second-personal also

Introduction

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43162/1/10982_2005_Article_BF01000522.pd

Agent-centered restrictions from the inside out

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43400/1/11098_2004_Article_BF00353835.pd

Empathy, Sympathy, Care

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43412/1/11098_2004_Article_152364.pd

Abolishing morality

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43834/1/11229_2004_Article_BF00413816.pd