A Theory of Money and Banking

We construct a simple environment that combines a limited communication friction and a limited information friction in order to generate a role for money and intermediation. We ask whether there is any reason to expect the emergence of a banking sector (i.e., institutions that combine the business of money creation with the business of intermediation). In our model the unique equilibrium is characterized, in part, by the existence of an agent that: (1) creates money (a debt instrument that circulates as a means of payment); (2) lends it out (swapping it for less liquid forms of debt); (3) is responsible for monitoring those agents in control of the capital backing the illiquid debt; and (4) collects on money loans as they come due. Furthermore, the bank money in our model is a debt instrument that embeds within it important stipulations that are found in actual private money instruments. Thus, our model goes some way in addressing the questions of why private money takes the form that it does, as well as why private money is typically supplied by banks.Money, Banking

A simple model of money and banking

This article presents a simple environment that has banks creating and lending out money. The authors define money to be any object that circulates widely as a means of payment and a bank to be an agency that simultaneously issues money and monitors investments. While their framework allows private nonbank liabilities to serve as the economy's medium of exchange, they demonstrate that the cost-minimizing structure has a bank creating liquid funds. In practice, the vast bulk of the money supply consists of private debt instruments that are issued by banks. Thus, their model goes some way in addressing the questions of why private money takes the form it does, and why private money is typically supplied by banks.Monetary theory ; Banks and banking

Collaborative Caring: Stories and Reflections on Teamwork in Health Care

[Excerpt] There are many theoretical and conceptual books and countless articles that have explored issues of teamwork in general and teamwork in health care in particular. The editors, and many of the authors in this book, have read most, and have even written some of them. To tackle the issue of teamwork, we have, however, taken a different approach. Rather than write a theoretical book about what teamwork is, what it is not, where it exists in health care, what barriers prevent its implementation and how they can be removed, we have chosen instead to address these questions through narratives and reflections that vividly describe good teamwork as well as problems in creating, leading, and working on genuine teams. What we believe is too often lacking in the literature is a clear and compelling picture of what teamwork looks like on the ground, in the institutions where health care work is delivered and where teams play well, or don\u27t play well, on a daily basis. The question we ask here is thus: What is the state of play in most health care institutions? To describe the state of play, we have asked clinicians to write what we think of as where the rubber hits the road stories or reflections about the nature of teamwork in their own particular work setting. To gather these stories, we talked to many people in different health care disciplines. In the invitation for submissions we wrote the following: We are seeking short, concise narratives that describe a concrete example in which you personally have been involved. The idea here is not to focus so much on the individual doctor-patient, nurse-patient, therapist-patient communication but the teamwork that was involved in ensuring that the standard of care was met or exceeded. If the patient or family was involved, so much the better. Stories can deal with interprofessional or intraprofessional teamwork. On balance, we would prefer to have more stories about interprofessional or occupational teamwork. Nonetheless, we recognize that interprofessional work depends on the ability to create teamwork within an occupation or profession. Stories involving support staff, such as housekeepers who spoke up about a patient safety issue, are definitely within the purview of this book. We would also welcome personal reflections that would enhance our understanding of either how to produce genuine teamwork or the obstacles that stand in its way

Afterglows of Gamma-Ray Bursts: Short vs. Long GRBs

We compiled a large sample of Swift-era photometric data on long (Type II) and short (Type I) GRB afterglows. We compare the luminosity and energetics of the different samples to each other and to the afterglows of the pre-Swift era. Here, we present the first results of these studies.Comment: Conference Proceedings, "Gamma-Ray Bursts 2007", Santa Fe, shortened poster presentation; 4 pages, 3 figures; for full updated papers, go here to arXiv:0712.2186 and also here to arXiv:0804.195

Polydactylous limbs in Strong's Luxoid mice result from ectopic polarizing activity

Strong's Luxoid (1st^D) is a semidominant mouse mutation in which heterozygotes show preaxial hindlimb polydactyly, and homozygotes show fore- and hindlimb polydactyly. The digit patterns of these polydactylous limbs resemble those caused by polarizing grafts, since additional digits with posterior character are present at the anterior side of the limb. Such observations suggest that 1st^D limb buds might contain a genetically determined ectopic region of polarizing activity. Accordingly, we show that mutant embryos ectopically express the pattern-determining genes fibroblast growth factor 4 (fgf-4), sonic hedgehog (shh), and Hoxd-12 in the anterior region of the limb. Further, we show that anterior mesoderm from mutant limbs exhibits polarizing activity when grafted into host chicken limbs. In contrast to an experimentally derived polydactylous transgenic mouse, forelimbs of homozygotes show a normal pattern of Hoxb-8 expression, indicating that the duplication of polarizing tissue here occurs downstream or independently of Hoxb-8. We suggest that the 1st gene product is involved in anteroposterior axis formation during normal limb development

Strong spectral evolution during the prompt emission of GRB 070616

Swift has revealed features in GRB early light curves, such as steep decays and X-ray flares, whose properties are consistent with an internal origin though they are far from understood. The steep X-ray decay is often explained using the curvature effect; however a significant number of GRBs display strong spectral evolution during this phase, and a new mechanism must be invoked to explain this. Of particular interest are the longest duration GRBs in which the early emission can be studied in most detail. Here we present data for GRB 070616, in which the prompt emission shows a complex multipeaked structure, leading to one of the longest prompt emission durations ever recorded. We take advantage of extensive coverage of such a long burst by all Swift instruments. Combining data from Swift and Suzaku we study the evolution of the prompt emission spectrum, following the temporal variability of the peak energy and spectral slope.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures (Fig 1 in colour), contributed talk, submitted to the proceedings of Gamma Ray Bursts 2007, Santa Fe, New Mexico, November 5-9 200

Moral hazard in the Diamond-Dybvig model of banking

We modify the Diamond-Dybvig model studied in Green and Lin to incorporate a self-interested banker who has a private record-keeping technology. A public record-keeping device does not exist. We find that there is a trade-off between sophisticated contracts that possess relatively good risk-sharing properties but allocate resources inefficiently for incentive reasons, and simple contracts that possess relatively poor risk-sharing properties but economize on the inefficient use of resources. While this trade-off depends on model parameters, we find that simple contracts prevail under a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. Although moral hazard in banking may simplify the optimal structure of deposit liabilities, this simple structure does not enhance the prospect of bank runs.Contracts ; Financial crises ; Banks and banking

Moral Hazard in the Diamond-Dybvig Model of Banking

We modify the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model studied in Green and Lin [5] to incorporate a self-interested banker who has a private record-keeping technology. A public record-keeping device does not exist. We find that there is a trade-off between sophisticated contracts that possess relatively good risk-sharing properties but allocate resources inefficiently for incentive reasons, and simple contracts that possess relatively poor risk-sharing properties but economize on the inefficient use of resources. While this trade-off depends on model parameters, we find that simple contracts prevail under a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. Although moral hazard in banking may simplify the optimal structure of deposit liabilities, this simple structure does not enhance the prospect of bank runs.Banking; Private record-keeping; Moral hazard; Mechanisms; Bank runs