La impureza de la filosofía

The main purpose of this article is to revise the question of whether or not philosophical truths exist and if so, what is their status, what makes them specific and sets them apart from other truths. Following an analysis of the two tendencies that appear as answers to this question, characterized by the thoughts of Hegel and Schopenhauer, the author argues that there are no philosophical truths and furthermore, claims that philosophy is an impure activity, which cannot be reconciled the empirical and formal disciplines. Thus, the paper concludes that philosophy should not be a servant of any other discipline or activity.El presente artículo supone una revisión de la pregunta de si hay o no verdades filosóficas y, de haberlas, en qué consisten, qué las hace específicas, distintas a otras verdades. Tras un análisis de las dos tendencias que se presentan como respuesta a tal pregunta, caracterizadas por los pensamientos de Hegel y Schopenhauer el autor afirma y argumenta que no hay verdades filosóficas y además que la filosofías es una actividad impura irreductible a las disciplinas empíricas y formales. Por tanto, concluye el autor que la filosofía no debe ser tampoco la servidora de ninguna otra disciplina o actividad

Ortega and Wittgenstein: Not so far

En este artículo se pretende analizar hasta qué punto las filosofías de Ortega y Wittgenstein compartirían un horizonte filosófico común. En este sentido se presentan, aunque con matices distintos, los siguientes elementos comunes: el rechazo del realismo metafísico y el cientismo, el abandono de la concepción sustancialista del sujeto, la irrupción en la discusión filosófica del significado o el sentido como algo que necesita comprensión o aclaración, la urgencia de solucionar el problema de la autenticidad.This article aims to analyze to what extent the philosophies of Ortega and Wittgenstein share a common philosophical horizon. In this sense we note, although with different nuances, the following common elements: the rejection of metaphysical realism and scientism, the abandonment of the substantialist conception of the subject, the emergence in philosophical discussion of meaning or sense as something that needs understanding or clarification, the urgency of solving the problem of authenticity

Religión y misticismo en Russell

Russell, pese a ser un furibundo anticlerical, fue un agnóstico capaz de apreciar los aspectos positivos del misticismo. En este artículo se analizan sus opiniones sobre la religión, el misticismo y la creencia religiosa, presentando además cuáles serían las insuficiencias e incongruencias de su planteamiento.Aalthough Russell was a frenzied anticlerical, he was an agnostic capable to value the positive aspects of mysticism. In this paper his views on religion, mysticism and religious belief are analysed. Special attention is paid as well to the insufficiencies and incongruities of his positions

Unamuno, Descartes y la hipótesis del sueño

In this article is analysed both the epistemological use that Descartes did of the so-call “the hypothesis of the dream” and the metaphysical and existential treatment that Unamuno gave to this problem. Both approaches are presented as variants of the metaphysical realism, being the conclusion that nothing in a philosophical sense can be said to prove its falshood, although yes a lot to advocate its abandonment.En este artículo se analiza tanto el uso epistemológico que hiciera Descartes de la llamada “hipótesis del sueño” como el tratamiento metafísico y existencial que Unamuno dio a este problema. Ambas aproximaciones son presentadas como variantes del realismo metafísico, siendo la conclusión que nada filosófico puede ser dicho para demostrar su falsedad, aunque sí mucho para propugnar su abandono

Creença i realitat en William James

This paper is devoted to analyse both the epistemology and ontology of James's pragmatism and his metaphysical proposals. The conclusions are: first, that James did not defend a metaphysical realism, but a antirealist realism; and secondly that this position was what he needed to defend the possibility of human freedom and religious experience

Numerical Solutions of Matrix Differential Models using Cubic Matrix Splines II

This paper presents the non-linear generalization of a previous work on matrix differential models. It focusses on the construction of approximate solutions of first-order matrix differential equations Y'(x)=f(x,Y(x)) using matrix-cubic splines. An estimation of the approximation error, an algorithm for its implementation and illustrative examples for Sylvester and Riccati matrix differential equations are given.Comment: 14 pages; submitted to Math. Comp. Modellin