Different functions, different histories. Modal particles and discourse markers from a diachronic point of view

One of the main concerns of recent research in discourse markers, modal particles and related elements has been the problem of a neat categorical delimitation between the major classes involved. Comparing the Spanish discourse particle bien and its French cognate modal particle bien, we show that the functional difference between discourse markers and modal particles can be accounted for in diachronic terms. In other words, discourse markers and modal particles arise in different diachronic pathways, and ultimately from different pragmatic strategies. Strategies which eventually yield discourse markers are related to the joint coordination of human interaction. In contrast, strategies which give rise to modal particles make reference to the status of a given proposition for the ensuing discourse. Our results suggest that there are levels of generalization on semantic change below the overarching tendencies of subjectification (Traugott and Dasher 2002). More importantly, we provide specific motivations for these levels of generalization, and ultimately for subjectification itself

Insubordinated puisque in French. Grammaticalization, De-Grammaticalization, Reanalysis?

In Modern French, main-clause initial puisque is a discourse-marker which coexists with a homonymous subordinating causal connective. Diachronically, it has emerged from the latter through a process of insubordination. It is often assumed that the diachronies of discourse makers can be meaningfully described as grammaticalization processes. This view has been challenged by Detges & Waltereit­ (2009, 2016) on the grounds that grammar in the narrow sense (e.g. inflectional mor­phology) on the one hand and discourse markers and modal particles on the other are the outcome of different kinds of diachronic processes. For sentence-initial puisque, this question is further complicated by the fact that insubordination has been claimed to be a counter-example to basic assumptions of established grammaticalization theo­ries. Against this backdrop, this article pursues two objectives. Firstly, an account will be given of the diachronic mechanisms that turned the subordinating connective puis­que into a main-clause-initial item. It will be shown that the emergence of main-clause-initial puisque is brought about by a pragmatically motivated reanalysis whereby a frequent usage-effect was conventionalized as the construction's new meaning. This change took place in elaborative discourse contexts (see D’Hertefelt / Verstraete 2014) where subordinating puisque was used to negotiate the next move in discourse building. Secondly (and more importantly), I will discuss the question of whether this process can be meaningfully classified as an instance of grammaticalization

Contact as catalyst: The case for Coptic influence in the development of Arabic negation

This article discusses similar developments in the expression of negation in the histories of Egyptian-Coptic and Arabic and explores the evidence for these respective developments being related by language contact. Both Coptic and Arabic have undergone a development known as Jespersen’s Cycle (JC), whereby an original negative marker is joined by some new element to form a bipartite negative construction. The original marker then becomes optional while the new element becomes the primary negator. We present the results of a corpus study of negation in late Coptic, showing that, at the time when Arabic speakers began to settle in Egypt, the bipartite negative construction still predominated. This being the case, we argue that native speakers of Coptic learning Arabic as a second language played a key role in the genesis of the Arabic bipartite negative construction. More generally, we give reasons to doubt the a priori preference for internal explanations of syntactic change over those involving contact, as well as the assumption that the two are mutually exclusive. Rather, we suggest that not only purely internal but also (partially) contactinduced change can profitably be accounted for in terms of child language acquisition leading to a change in the grammars of individual speakers

Securitisation through the schoolbook? On facilitating conditions for and audience dispositions towards the securitisation of climate change

This article contributes to the literature on securitisation in a twofold way. Firstly, it argues that school textbooks reveal the consolidated discursive realms of a given society and convey them to the next generation. Focusing on school textbooks can thus enrich the analysis of facilitating conditions for securitisation processes. The second and main contribution of this article is that it addresses the lack of empirical studies on the audience in securitisation research. After an analysis of climate change discourses in Germany, we test whether or not students exposed to vastly different positions in the same consolidated discursive realm are more prone to accept the securitisation of climate change. In order to do so, we use a quasi-experimental research design and a closed questionnaire. Results show that young people who read school textbooks using an alarmist logic are indeed more likely to conceive climate change as an urgent threat necessitating extraordinary measures, and are thus more likely to accept the securitisation of climate change

Drought, Infrastructure and Conflict Risk in Sub-Saharan Africa

Recent years have seen a surge in the number of scientific studies, reports and newspaper articles portraying possible connections between climate variability and violent conflict. As sudden changes in temperature and precipitation are expected to become more frequent in certain areas due to climate change, researchers and decision-makers alike have become increasingly worried about the security implications of extreme events such as droughts and floods. Concerns are that such events could undermine people’s livelihoods, exacerbate social tensions and eventually contribute to political instability and violence, with crises in Syria, Darfur and the Western Sahel being frequently mentioned as examples. Yet, despite the vocal nature of those linking climate variability and violent conflict risk and the plausibility of some of their arguments, the empirical connection between the two phenomena is far from evident. Overall, we observe that violence is a far less common reaction to climatic shocks than peaceful adaptation or just silent suffering. Where it emerges, the relationship between climate variability and violent conflict is complex and contingent on further conflict-enabling societal conditions. Systematic knowledge about these conditions and the way in which they shape climate-conflict dynamics remains currently limited, which restricts our ability to understand climate-conflict linkages and assess potential climate-security risks. The present dissertation addresses this gap. Particular emphasis is placed on road and water infrastructures and on the way in which they influence the relationship between drought and conflict risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. Extreme precipitation shortfalls and their disastrous consequences for rain-fed agriculture and pastoralism are frequently discussed in the literature as possible threats to the peace and stability of African states. At the same time, there are reasons to believe that key infrastructures, such as roads and water delivery systems, would mediate the relationship between drought and conflict risk: a) they facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, give access to alternative sources of water and thereby reduce the vulnerability of drought-affected rural communities b) they signal the government’s commitment to protect its constituents from climatic hazards and thereby help maintaining more harmonious relations between drought-stricken communities and public authorities c) they create particular strategic opportunities and constraints for armed groups and thereby influence military planning and action. Yet, little systematic research has been conducted hitherto on an explicit connection between drought, infrastructures and conflict risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. The present dissertation addresses this lacuna both theoretically and empirically. From a theoretical perspective, it identifies possible mechanisms linking drought, infrastructures and conflict risk. Particular emphasis is placed on identifying motivations and opportunities for violence under conditions of climatic stress and on understanding how these are influenced by the presence or absence of relevant infrastructure. The empirical implications of this work are tested in three research articles that shed light on different facets of the supposed relationship between drought, infrastructures and conflict risk. The first analysis emphasises the strategic role of road and water infrastructures and the way in which they can provide incentives or disincentives for violence in a drought-prone environment. The second analysis is concerned with the possible influence of infrastructures on political attitudes and support for political violence among drought-stricken people, while the third analysis emphasises issues of distributional justice in the provision of essential infrastructures and how those are likely to affect conflict risk in times of drought. Collectively, the results of the dissertation show that infrastructures make a difference when it comes to the conflict-exacerbating potential of droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Roads and water infrastructures are found to play a key strategic role in armed contests over climate-sensitive natural resources in Kenya’s drought-prone North. Here, major roads act as a constraint to livestock raiding and communal clashes over grazing land by allowing police and security forces to quickly intervene in local disputes, while deep wells are key assets in territorial conflicts and are also a privileged spot for livestock raiding (Article I). Similarly, I find that structurally neglected administrative regions in Sub-Saharan Africa with poor overall access to improved water sources and paved roads are more likely to experience violent conflicts following drought (Article III). These results corroborate previous arguments that climate variability per se is unlikely to augment the risk of violence, unless it interacts with other issues, such as low levels of economic development, high dependence on rain-fed agriculture, ineffective institutions and major social inequalities. They also show that climate-conflict linkages in African countries are shaped by factors and decisions at the discretion of national elites and international donors, and thereby encourage climate-conflict analyst to emphasise not only the ‘natural’ but also the social, economic and political dimensions of the climate-security nexus. The results of the dissertation also give some indication as to the mechanisms connecting drought, infrastructures and conflict risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. Article I supports an opportunity narrative, whereby violent actors seeking access to climate-sensitive natural resources act rationally according to situational opportunities and constraints for violence. Seen through this lens, infrastructures matter for climate-conflict connections if they determine the feasibility and likely benefits of military actions, given the means and goals of local armed groups. The results of the dissertation also support a grievance narrative that connects climate variability and conflict risk. Together, Article II and III suggest that the drought-conflict-infrastructure nexus in Africa can be understood through the lens of popular dissatisfaction with biased development policies and unequal access to essential services; in particular if lack of access results in an impediment to cope with extreme weather events among disadvantaged people. Then again, the results of the dissertation vary greatly depending on the spatial scale and the indicators of conflict risk used in the analysis, as well as depending on the type of infrastructure that is considered. It also remains unclear how far they can be generalised to explain possible linkages between climate variability and conflict risk outside Africa. Caution is thus warranted when assessing their external validity. The dissertation concludes with a set of recommendations about how to build upon its findings and advance climate conflict research. The dissertation echoes the demands of other researchers in calling for a further conceptualisation and specification of the causal mechanisms underlying observed pattern of concordance between climate variability and conflict risk. In particular, it encourages researchers to delve deeper into the economic and political motivations of people affected by climatic extremes and into the environmental conditions that influence their behaviour. This implies further involvement with situational opportunities and constraints created by factors such as terrain, distance, infrastructure and relative military capacity, but also with the structural conditions that facilitate political radicalisation and the emergence of violent attitudes. Closely related to this point, the dissertation also calls for a further specification of the spatial and temporal aspects of possible connections between climate variability and violent conflict, and of how these relate to third factors, such as poor economic development, incoherent policies or social inequalities. As part of its conclusion, the dissertation also discusses possible policy implications. While my findings strongly suggest that infrastructural development can serve as entry point for curbing drought-related security risks in African countries, they also highlight the diversity and complexity of ways in which infrastructures moderate possible connections between drought and conflict risk. A cautious, context-sensitive approach to infrastructural development is thus needed, in order to avoid negative externalities and harness its peace-building potential.Immer mehr wissenschaftliche Studien machen auf einen möglichen Zusammenhang zwischen Klimavariabilität und gewaltsamen Konflikten aufmerksam. Infolge der globalen Erderwärmung ist vielerorts mit größeren Schwankungen in Temperaturen und Niederschlägen zu rechnen, was zu extremen Ereignissen wie Dürren und Überschwemmungen führen kann. Eine wesentliche Sorge unter Politikern und Experten ist, dass solche Ereignisse und ihre oftmals katastrophalen Folgen für die betroffenen Menschen zu einer Verschärfung sozialer Konflikte und letztlich zu Gewalt führen können. Krisen in Syrien, Darfur und im westlichen Sahel dienen hierbei häufig als Beispiele. Trotz plausibler Argumente für einen Zusammenhang zwischen Klimavariabilität und Konfliktrisiko und der wachsenden Popularität des Themas in Politik und Medien, ist es der Wissenschaft bisher nicht gelungen, diesen Zusammenhang empirisch eindeutig nachzuweisen. Im Allgemeinen beobachten wir, dass Menschen, die von klimatischen Schocks betroffen sind, diese viel eher friedlich überwinden oder einfach nur stillschweigend ertragen, als dass sie gewalttätig werden. Dort, wo ein Zusammenhang zwischen Klimavariabilität und gewaltsamen Konflikten auftaucht, ist dieser meist komplex und von weiteren konfliktfördernden gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen abhängig. Unser Wissen über diese Bedingungen ist zurzeit jedoch begrenzt, was unsere Möglichkeiten einschränkt, mögliche Zusammenhänge zwischen Klima und Konflikt zu verstehen und damit verbundene Sicherheitsrisiken einzuschätzen. Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit dieser Forschungslücke. Insbesondere setzt sie sich mit Straßen und Wasserinfrastrukturen auseinander und mit der Art und Weise, wie diese eine mögliche Beziehung zwischen Dürre und Konfliktrisiko in Sub-Sahara Afrika beeinflussen. Extreme Trockenperioden und ihre katastrophalen Folgen für den mit Regen bewässerten Ackerbau und die Viehzucht werden in der Fachliteratur häufig als mögliche Bedrohungen für den Frieden und die politische Stabilität Afrikanischer Staaten diskutiert. Gleichzeitig gibt es Gründe anzunehmen, dass wesentliche Infrastrukturen wie Straßen und Wasserversorgungssysteme einen Einfluss darauf haben, inwieweit gewaltsame Konflikte im Zusammenhang mit Dürren auftreten können: a) sie erleichtern die Bereitstellung humanitärer Hilfsgüter, ermöglichen den Zugang zu alternativen Wasserquellen, wenn Regenwasser knapp ist, und reduzieren somit die Vulnerabilität ländlicher Bevölkerungen gegenüber extremen Trockenperioden; b) sie signalisieren die Bereitschaft der Regierung, ihre Bürger vor klimatisch bedingten Gefahren zu schützen und helfen somit dabei, in Dürreperioden das Vertrauen zwischen Bürgern und Regierung aufrechtzuerhalten; c) sie schaffen besondere strategische Gelegenheiten und Einschränkungen für bewaffnete Gruppen und beeinflussen somit militärische Handlungen. Dennoch mangelt es bisher an Studien, die einen möglichen Zusammenhang zwischen Dürren, Infrastrukturen und Konfliktrisiken in Sub-Sahara Afrika explizit und systematisch erforschen. Die vorliegende Arbeit setzt hier sowohl theoretisch wie empirisch an. Aus theoretischer Sicht befasst sie sich mit möglichen Mechanismen, die Trockenperioden, Infrastruktur und Konfliktrisiko miteinander verbinden. Insbesondere werden Motivationen (motivations/grievances) und Gelegenheiten (opportunities) für Gewalt unter klimatischen Stressbedingungen identifiziert und darüber reflektiert, inwiefern diese durch die An- oder Abwesenheit relevanter Infrastrukturen beeinflusst werden. Die empirischen Implikationen dieser Arbeit werden in drei wissenschaftlichen Studien erforscht, welche den vermeintlichen Zusammenhang zwischen Dürre, Infrastruktur und Konfliktrisiko aus verschiedenen Winkeln beleuchten. Die erste Studie befasst sich mit der strategischen Bedeutung von Straßen und Wasserinfrastrukturen und wie diese positive und negative Anreize für Gewalt in dürregefährdeten Gebieten schaffen können. Die zweite Studie erforscht den Einfluss von Infrastrukturen auf das Risiko der Bildung radikaler und gewaltfördernder politischer Einstellungen unter Personen, die von extremer Trockenheit betroffenen sind. Die dritte Studie setzt sich schließlich mit Fragen der Vergabe und (un)gleichmäßigen Bereitstellung wichtiger Infrastrukturen auseinander und damit, wie diese das Risiko von Konflikten in Dürrezeiten beeinflussen. Zusammengenommen zeigen die Ergebnisse der Dissertation, dass Infrastrukturen durchaus einen Einfluss auf das konfliktverschärfende Potential von Dürren haben. So finde ich heraus, dass Straßen und Wasserinfrastrukturen in Kenias dürregefährdeten Norden eine wesentliche strategische Rolle in gewaltsamen Konflikten um klimasensible natürliche Ressourcen spielen. Hauptverkehrsstraßen haben hierbei eine abschreckende Wirkung, da sie von Polizei und anderen Sicherheitskräften genutzt werden können, um mögliche Ausschreitungen zwischen rivalisierende Gruppen zu unterbinden, während tiefe Brunnen sowohl für Viehdiebe, wie auch in Konflikten über umliegendes Weideland ein bevorzugtes Angriffsziel sind (Artikel I). Ebenso finde ich heraus, dass strukturell vernachlässigte Gebiete mit vergleichsweise schlechtem Zugang zu verbesserten Wasserversorgungsinfrastrukturen und gepflasterten Straßen infolge von extremen Trockenperioden mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit von gewaltsamen Konflikten heimgesucht werden (Artikel III). Diese Ergebnisse bestätigen frühere Argumente, dass gewaltsame Konflikte im Zuge erhöhter Klimavariabilität unwahrscheinlich sind, sofern klimatische Stressfaktoren nicht mit weiteren gesellschaftlichen Problemen interagieren, wie etwa einer stagnierenden wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, unwirksamen Institutionen oder wesentlichen sozialen Ungleichheiten. Sie zeigen auch, dass die Beziehung zwischen Klima und Konflikt in Afrikanischen Staaten maßgeblich von Faktoren bestimmt wird, die im Ermessen nationaler Eliten und internationaler Geldgeber liegen. Somit ermutigen sie dazu, Klima-Konflikt-Zusammenhänge nicht allein auf ihre vermeintlich „natürliche“ Dimension zu reduzieren, sondern auch soziale, wirtschaftliche und politische Faktoren mit in Betracht zu ziehen. Die Ergebnisse der Dissertation weisen auch darauf hin, welche Mechanismen Dürren, Infrastrukturen und Konfliktrisiken in Sub-Sahara-Afrika miteinander verbinden. Die Ergebnisse von Artikel I stützen ein opportunity-Narrativ, wobei Gewaltakteure, die den Zugang zu klimasensiblen Ressourcen anstreben, entsprechend situationsbedingter Gelegenheiten und Einschränkungen für Gewalt rational handeln. So gesehen spielen Infrastrukturen insofern eine Rolle im Klima-Konflikt-Nexus, als dass sie die Machbarkeit und den potentiellen Nutzen militärischer Handlungen beeinflussen können. Die Ergebnisse der Dissertation stützen aber auch ein Narrativ, welches vermeintliche Zusammenhänge zwischen Dürren und gewaltsamen Konflikten unter dem Gesichtspunkt von kollektiv empfundenen Missständen oder grievances erklärt. Den Ergebnissen von Artikel II und III zufolge ist der Klima-Konflikt-Nexus in Afrika vor allem unter dem Gesichtspunkt kollektiver Unzufriedenheit mit als ungerecht empfundenen Entwicklungspolitiken und der ungleichen Verteilung essentieller Dienstleistungen zu verstehen; vor allem wenn diese benachteiligte Gruppen daran hindern, mit extremen klimatischen Bedingungen fertig zu werden. Dennoch variieren die Ergebnisse der Dissertation stark, je nachdem welche geographische Skala verwendet-, welche Typen von Infrastrukturen untersucht- und welche Konfliktindikatoren verwendet werden. Unklar bleibt auch, inwieweit sie verallgemeinert werden können, um mögliche Zusammenhänge zwischen Klimavariabilität und Konfliktrisiko außerhalb Afrikas zu erklären. Bei der Beurteilung ihrer externen Validität ist daher Vorsicht geboten. Die Dissertation endet mit einer Reihe von Empfehlungen, wie ihre Erkenntnisse fruchtbar gemacht werden können, um die Klima-Konflikt-Forschung voranzubringen. Die Dissertation schließt sich der Forderung anderer Forscher an, die vermeintlichen kausalen Mechanismen, welche empirischen Konkordanzmustern zwischen Klimavariabilität und Konfliktrisiko zugrunde liegen, weiter zu konzeptualisieren und zu spezifizieren. Insbesondere ermutigt sie dazu, sich eingehender mit den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Motiven von Menschen auseinanderzusetzen, die von extremen klimatischen Bedingungen betroffen sind, sowie mit weiteren Umweltbedingungen, die ihr Verhalten beeinflussen. Dies setzt voraus, dass sich Forscher eingehender mit Faktoren wie Terrain, Entfernung, Infrastruktur und relativen militärischen Kapazitäten auseinandersetzen, welche militärisches Handeln situationsbedingt erleichtern oder erschweren können. Gleichzeitig bedarf es aber auch einer genaueren Bestimmung der Bedingungen, unter denen es zur Entstehung gewaltfördernder politischer Einstellungen kommen kann. Eng damit verbunden, ruft die Dissertation auch dazu auf, die räumlichen und zeitlichen Aspekte möglicher Zusammenhänge zwischen Klimavariabilität und Gewalt zu spezifizieren und deren Beziehung zu dritten Faktoren wie etwa dem Bestehen sozialer Ungleichheiten genauer zu ergründen. Im Rahmen ihrer Fazits diskutiert die Dissertation auch mögliche politische Implikationen. Obwohl meine Ergebnisse teilweise darauf hindeuten, dass Sicherheitsrisiken im Zusammenhang mit Dürren durch die Bereitstellung entsprechender Infrastrukturen vermindert werden könnten, weisen sie aber auch darauf hin, dass Dürren und Infrastrukturen auf vielfältige Weise und mit sehr unterschiedlichen Folgen für die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Konflikten interagieren können. Sollen Infrastrukturen tatsächlich als Mittel der Konfliktprävention genutzt werden, so muss deren Bereitstellung mit Blick auf den sozialen Kontext und mögliche unbeabsichtigte negative Folgen für Frieden und Sicherheit erfolgen

Te lo tengo dicho muchas veces. Resultatives between coercion, relevance and reanalysis

This paper deals with the question of how and why resultative constructions change into anteriors. This discussion will be based on synchronic data concerning tener + past participle, a resultative construction used in modern Spanish. One of the latter's most frequent is te lo tengo dicho 'I have (already) told you'. This is remarkable since decir 'to tell' is a non-transitional verb;te lo tengo dicho thus violates the requirement that resultatives should only combine with transitional verbs. In the literature, such mismatches between the semantics of a given construction and the meaning of its lexical filler have been claimed to normally trigger coercion, i.e. an inferential repair mechanism giving rise to special meaning effects. Thus, coercion - despite being conceived as a purely synchronic mechanism - is a prime candidate for an explanation of the change from resultative to anterior. In line with this hypothesis, occurrences of te lo tengo dicho are attested in my corpus where the latter is specified by quantifying adverbials such as muchas veces 'many times'. However, speaker judgements indiacte that even te lo tengo dicho muchas veces is not an iterative anterior construction, but still a resultative. Based on synchronic data taken from the CREA-corpus, it will be shown that in the vast majority of its occurrences, te lo tengo dicho is part of an dialogal discourse pattern where certain argumentative effects based on its resultative meaning are highly relevant. Crucially, therefore, in such "strong" uses a coercive shift towards an anterior meaning is excluded. On a more abstract level, it will be shown that coercion is controlled by pragmatic factors;in the case of te lo tengo dicho muchas veces, conceptual/semantic plausibility is systematically overridden by pragmatic relevance

The role of pragmatics for grammatical change: the case of preverbal non

What is the role of pragmatics in the evolution of grammatical paradigms? It is to maintain marked candidates that may come to be the default expression. This perspective is validated by the Jespersen cycle, where the standard expression of sentential negation is renewed as pragmatically marked negatives achieve default status. How status changes are effected, however, remains to be documented. This is what is achieved in this paper that looks at the evolution of preverbal negative non in Old and Middle French. The negative, which categorically marks pragmatic activation (Dryer 1996) with finite verbs in Old French, loses this value when used with non-finite verbs in Middle French. This process is accompanied by competing semantic reanalyses of the distribution of infinitives negated in this way, and by the co-occurrence with a greater lexical variety of verbs. The absence of pragmatic contribution should lead the marker to take on the role of default, which is already fulfilled by a well-established ne ... pas, pushing non to decline. Hard empirical evidence is thus provided that validates the assumed role of pragmatics in the Jespersen cycle, supporting the general view of pragmatics as supporting alternative candidates that may or may not achieve default status in the evolution of a grammatical paradigm

Europe's cross-border trade, human security and financial connections: A climate risk perspective

As the impacts of climate change begin to take hold, increased attention is being paid to the consequences that might occur remotely from the location of the initial climatic impact, where impacts and responses are transmitted across one or more borders. As an economy that is highly connected to other regions and countries of the world, the European Union (EU) is potentially exposed to such cross-border impacts. Here, we undertake a macro-scale, risk-focused literature and data review to explore the potential impact transmission pathways between the EU and other world regions and countries. We do so across three distinct domains of interest - trade, human security and finance - which are part of complex socio-economic, political and cultural systems and may contribute to mediate or exacerbate risk exposure. Across these domains, we seek to understand the extent to which there has been prior consideration of aspects of climate-related risk exposure relevant to developing an understanding of cross-border impacts. We also provide quantitative evidence of the extent and strength of connectivity between the EU and other world regions. Our analysis reveals that - within this nascent area of research - there is uncertainty about the dynamics of cross-border impact that will affect whether the EU is in a relatively secure or vulnerable position in comparison with other regions. However, we reveal that risk is likely to be focused in particular ‘hotspots’; defined geographies, for example, that produce materials for EU consumption (e.g. Latin American soybean), hold financial investments (e.g. North America), or are the foci for EU external action (e.g. the Middle East and North Africa region). Importantly, these domains will also interact, and - via the application of a conceptual example of soybean production in Argentina based on a historical drought event - we illustrate that impact and response pathways linked to EU risk exposure may be complex, further heightening the challenge of developing effective policy responses within an uncertain climatic and socioeconomic future

Europe's cross-border trade, human security and financial connections: A climate risk perspective

As the impacts of climate change begin to take hold, increased attention is being paid to the consequences that might occur remotely from the location of the initial climatic impact, where impacts and responses are transmitted across one or more borders. As an economy that is highly connected to other regions and countries of the world, the European Union (EU) is potentially exposed to such cross-border impacts. Here, we undertake a macro-scale, risk-focused literature and data review to explore the potential impact transmission pathways between the EU and other world regions and countries. We do so across three distinct domains of interest - trade, human security and finance - which are part of complex socio-economic, political and cultural systems and may contribute to mediate or exacerbate risk exposure. Across these domains, we seek to understand the extent to which there has been prior consideration of aspects of climate-related risk exposure relevant to developing an understanding of cross-border impacts. We also pro-vide quantitative evidence of the extent and strength of connectivity between the EU and other world regions. Our analysis reveals that - within this nascent area of research - there is uncer-tainty about the dynamics of cross-border impact that will affect whether the EU is in a relatively secure or vulnerable position in comparison with other regions. However, we reveal that risk is likely to be focused in particular ‘hotspots’; defined geographies, for example, that produce materials for EU consumption (e.g. Latin American soybean), hold financial investments (e.g. North America), or are the foci for EU external action (e.g. the Middle East and North Africa region). Importantly, these domains will also interact, and - via the application of a conceptual example of soybean production in Argentina based on a historical drought event - we illustrate that impact and response pathways linked to EU risk exposure may be complex, further heightening the challenge of developing effective policy responses within an uncertain climatic and socioeconomic future

Critical intervention points for European adaptation to cascading climate change impacts

In an interconnected world, climate change impacts can cascade across sectors and regions, creating systemic risks. Here we analyse cascading climate change impacts on the EU, originating from outside the region, and identify critical intervention points for adaptation. Using network analysis, we integrate stakeholder-co-produced impact chains with quantitative data for 102 countries across foreign policy, human security, trade and finance. Our archetypal impact cascade model reveals critical intervention points related to water, livelihoods, agriculture, infrastructure and economy, and violent conflict. Livelihood instability, with violence exacerbating conditions in conflict-prone regions, tends to amplify risks of cascading impacts emerging from low-income countries. High-income countries can trigger cascading impacts through, for example, reduced crop exports. Our findings highlight the importance of policy coherence in addressing interconnected vulnerabilities rather than isolated risks. Thus, agricultural intensification without integrated water management may exacerbate scarcity, whereas safeguarding livelihoods alleviates cascading risks related to forced migration, violent conflict and instability