Is Kazakhstan a Market Economy Yet? Getting warmer….

Transition from planned to a market economy is an evolutionary process. Evolutions do not have finite beginning and ending points. We may look to the beginning of transition in 1991 when the Soviet Union broke up, or we may see it as beginning earlier, when the Soviet Union began to allow its firms to engage in private sales of output that exceeded state plans and to independently take part in international trade agreements. At what point do we say that transition is complete? Hence, it is quite difficult to say when any country begins and completes its transition. The United States and the European Union have categorized Kazakhstan differently with regard to its degree of transition. The United States removed “non market economy” status from Kazakhstan, whereas the EU gave Kazakhstan an intermediate status. The first question that this work asks is how do these political bodies rank a country’s market orientation, and how did they arrive at different conclusions? These results are then compared to what transitional economists have to say on the evolution from a planned to a market economy. The second question is, how do theoretical, academic economists differ in their analysis of the transition process? By creating unique criteria sets from several papers, can one say that, according to any set, Kazakhstan is a market economy? We conclude that the reform process in Kazakhstan is still underway. The government and the economy have experienced many radical reforms, but none completely satisfies the necessary conditions for being categorized as a market economy.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40059/3/wp673.pd

WHAT CAUSES BANK ASSET SUBSTITUTION IN KAZAKHSTAN? EXPLAINING CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION IN A TRANSITION ECONOMY

Dollarization comes in several forms. The type that this paper examines is asset substitution, when savers hold dollar assets in bank accounts, instead of local currency. It is limited to the transition economy of Kazakhstan. This paper estimates demand for dollar accounts and shows that avoidance of inflation risk, rather than avoidance of exchange rate devaluation of savings, is the most important in explaining dollarization. This result is unexpected. This study examines data from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is seen as having a strong banking system and a healthy economy for a former Soviet Republic. It is seen as one of the most market-oriented, FSU countries. However, Kazakhstan also has a large demand for a means of storing savings in dollars, rather than in the local currency. This is particularly curious, when the local currency is appreciating relative to the U.S. dollar. This demand in less prosperous FSU countries is likely to be even greater. The paper combines data and statistical methods with anecdotal information in order to improve our understanding of a paradoxical occurrence.

Is Kazakhstan a Market Economy Yet? Getting warmer….

Transition from planned to a market economy is an evolutionary process. Evolutions do not have finite beginning and ending points. We may look to the beginning of transition in 1991 when the Soviet Union broke up, or we may see it as beginning earlier, when the Soviet Union began to allow its firms to engage in private sales of output that exceeded state plans and to independently take part in international trade agreements. At what point do we say that transition is complete? Hence, it is quite difficult to say when any country begins and completes its transition. The United States and the European Union have categorized Kazakhstan differently with regard to its degree of transition. The United States removed “non market economy” status from Kazakhstan, whereas the EU gave Kazakhstan an intermediate status. The first question that this work asks is how do these political bodies rank a country’s market orientation, and how did they arrive at different conclusions? These results are then compared to what transitional economists have to say on the evolution from a planned to a market economy. The second question is, how do theoretical, academic economists differ in their analysis of the transition process? By creating unique criteria sets from several papers, can one say that, according to any set, Kazakhstan is a market economy? We conclude that the reform process in Kazakhstan is still underway. The government and the economy have experienced many radical reforms, but none completely satisfies the necessary conditions for being categorized as a market economy.Market economy, non-market economy, Kazakhstan, CIS, Kornai, Svejnar

AFRICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS: BUILDING SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SYSTEMS

This paper addresses four questions: · What lessons can be drawn from the "rise and decline" of NARS in Africa? · What can African research managers learn from some of the successful reforms of NARS in Asia and Latin America over the past 10 to 15 years? · What are the major challenges facing the NARS in the ASARECA region in the coming 10-20 years? · What are the critical reforms and the incentives needed to develop pluralistic, accountable, productive and financially self-sustaining NARS in AFRICA?Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

One Money, One Market: A Revised Benchmark

The introduction of the euro generated substantial interest in measuring the impact of currency unions (CUs) on trade flows. Rose’s (2000) initial estimates suggested a tripling of trade and created a literature in search of “more reasonable” CU effects. A recent meta-analysis of this literature shows that subsequent papers quantify CU trade impacts at 30–90 percent. However, most recent studies use shorter time series and fewer countries than Rose in his original work. We revisit Rose’s original benchmark, extend the dataset, and address Baldwin’s (2006) critiques of gravity implementation in large panels by simultaneously accounting for multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. This produces a robust average CU trade effect of 45 percent. Yet, the trade impacts of individual CUs vary substantially and are generally lower than those of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Our revised benchmark can be used as a yardstick for future studies to delineate how estimates differ due to new data or differences in econometric specifications.

Politics and Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper we examine the empirical relevance of three prominent endogenous protection models. Is protection for sale, or do altruistic policy makers worry about political support? We find strong evidence that protection is indeed "for sale." The important new result is, however, that not only the existence of lobbies matters, but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions. All variables of both the Influence Driven (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) models are significant at the one percent level. Novel is our application of a single, unified theoretical framework to take strict interpretations of the three theoretical models to the data. We thus extend the previous tests of the Influence Driven approach by comparing its performance to well specified alternatives. Using J tests to compare the power of the models directly, we find significant misspecification in the Political Support Function approach. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct specification of the Influence Driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the Tariff Function model.Endogenous protection, lobbying, political economy of tariffs

Sources of the German Productivity Demise – Tracing the Effects of Industry-Level ICT Investment

While the US experienced two successive labor productivity surges in 1995 and 2000, Germany’s productivity declined dramatically during the same period. We examine the sources of Germany’s productivity demise using the ifo industry growth accounting database that provides detailed industry-level investment information. While much attention has focused on the reduction in German labor hours, our data show that Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) investment in Germany was deeply lacking in the mid 1990’s as compared to the US. The transition to the new economy mitigated the German productivity slowdown, but did not reverse it. After 2000, we find that a recovery in Non-ICT investment was offset by a widespread collapse in German total factor productivity. Over half of German industries (accounting for almost 50 percent of German output) experienced negative TFP growth. This second major difference between the US and German industry performance explains Germany’s secular departure from the technological frontier.growth accounting, industry productivity analysis, information and communication technology