TTG-type plutonic rocks formed in a modern arc batholith by hydrous fractionation in the lower arc crust

We present the geochemistry and intrusion pressures of granitoids from the Kohistan batholith, which represents, together with the intruded volcanic and sedimentary units, the middle and upper arc crust of the Kohistan paleo-island arc. Based on Al-in-hornblende barometry, the batholith records intrusion pressures from ~0.2 GPa in the north (where the volcano-sedimentary cover is intruded) to max. ~0.9 GPa in the southeast. The Al-in-hornblende barometry demonstrates that the Kohistan batholith represents a complete cross section across an arc batholith, reaching from the top at ~8–9 km depth (north) to its bottom at 25–35 km (south-central to southeast). Despite the complete outcropping and accessibility of the entire batholith, there is no observable compositional stratification across the batholith. The geochemical characteristics of the granitoids define three groups. Group 1 is characterized by strongly enriched incompatible elements and unfractionated middle rare earth elements (MREE)/heavy rare earth element patterns (HREE); Group 2 has enriched incompatible element concentrations similar to Group 1 but strongly fractionated MREE/HREE. Group 3 is characterized by only a limited incompatible element enrichment and unfractionated MREE/HREE. The origin of the different groups can be modeled through a relatively hydrous (Group 1 and 2) and of a less hydrous (Group 3) fractional crystallization line from a primitive basaltic parent at different pressures. Appropriate mafic/ultramafic cumulates that explain the chemical characteristics of each group are preserved at the base of the arc. The Kohistan batholith strengthens the conclusion that hydrous fractionation is the most important mechanism to form volumetrically significant amounts of granitoids in arcs. The Kohistan Group 2 granitoids have essentially identical trace element characteristics as Archean tonalite–trondhjemite–granodiorite (TTG) suites. Based on these observations, it is most likely that similar to the Group 2 rocks in the Kohistan arc, TTG gneisses were to a large part formed by hydrous high-pressure differentiation of primitive arc magmas in subduction zones.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant EAR 6920005

Partisan preference divides regarding welfare chauvinism and welfare populism – Appealing only to radical right voters or beyond?

Welfare chauvinism and welfare populism as characteristic features of radical right parties’ welfare stances have become challenges to the welfare state. However, in order to understand how these claims may indeed affect welfare politics, it is essential to study whether welfare chauvinism and welfare populism attract voters beyond the radical right, especially among the mainstream right or even parts of the left. Results based on original public opinion data in eight Western European countries show that, contrary to widespread assumptions, welfare chauvinism and welfare populism divide the right more than the left. Electorates of not only green, but also most social democratic and radical left parties are consistently most opposed to discriminating welfare rights between natives and immigrants, although this opposition is weaker among left working-class voters than among left middle-class voters. Even voters of most mainstream right parties show only moderate support for welfare populism and welfare chauvinism, leaving the fervent support of radical right voters for welfare chauvinism and populism unmatched by any other electorate. These findings have important implications for the strategic situation of left parties and for understanding how welfare chauvinism and welfare populism may challenge welfare states

The micro-foundations of social democratic welfare chauvinism and inclusion: class demand and policy reforms in Western Europe, 1980−2018

In Western European welfare states, research shows that support for welfare chauvinism, or the notion that welfare benefits for immigrants should be restricted, is highest among white, blue-collar working-class voters. On the other hand, higher-educated, middle-class voters are more likely to reject welfare chauvinism and support the inclusion of immigrants into the welfare state. For social democratic parties, this might pose an electoral dilemma between generous welfare states and open borders: They rely on both middle- and working-class constituencies and are ideologically tied both to a universal welfare state and the protection of (national) workers. To what extent does such an electoral dilemma between classes exist for social democratic parties? How do social democratic parties solve this dilemma when in government? In this paper, we postulate that a class divide around welfare chauvinism exists within the electorate for social democratic parties and that these parties’ policies in government reflect these divides: If the social democratic electorate has a high share of working-class voters, they should act more welfare chauvinist than if their electorate is mostly middle class. We test these hypotheses by combining survey and macro-level policy data in 14 Western European countries from 1980 to 2018. We find consistent evidence of the existence of a working-class/middle-class divide regarding welfare chauvinism, even within social democratic electorates. On the macro-level, we find partial evidence that social democratic parties in power respond to the class demands of their electorate: They are less welfare chauvinist when they have a higher proportion of middle-class voters, whereas their working-class vote share does not significantly condition their policies at all, contrary to assumptions in the literature. We therefore conclude that as social democratic parties become parties of the middle classes, the likelihood that they will retrench immigrant welfare rights reduces

The COVID-crisis as an opportunity for welfare recalibration? Panel-data evidence on the effect of the COVID-crisis on welfare preferences in Spain, Germany, and Sweden

The reform capacity of welfare states to adapt to the needs of post-industrial labour markets has been a key question of the welfare literature for the last two decades. In a context of austerity, such adaptations (retrenchment or recalibration) are notoriously difficult because of extremely high levels of support for existing policies, particularly old age pensions. We investigate how the recent economic shock caused by the COVID-pandemic has changed social policy preferences in three West European countries (Germany, Sweden, Spain). Relying on original panel data observing the relative support for social policies before and during the crisis, we show that support for old age pensions has dropped substantially relative to other social policies. This drop can be observed in all three countries and among all ideological and age groups. The drop is strongest among current and soon-to-be pensioners who in turn increased support for benefits to the working-age population. At the expense of pensions, the economic shock has especially boosted support for active labour market policies and (in Germany) childcare services. This shift of support from pensions to social investment policies might have opened up a window of opportunity for recalibrating welfare reforms

The COVID-crisis as an opportunity for welfare recalibration? Panel-data evidence on the effect of the COVID-crisis on welfare preferences in Spain, Germany, and Sweden

The reform capacity of welfare states to adapt to the needs of post-industrial labour markets has been a key question of the welfare literature for the last two decades. In a context of austerity, such adaptations (retrenchment or recalibration) are notoriously difficult because of extremely high levels of support for existing policies, particularly old age pensions. We investigate how the recent economic shock caused by the COVID-pandemic has changed social policy preferences in three West European countries (Germany, Sweden, Spain). Relying on original panel data observing the relative support for social policies before and during the crisis, we show that support for old age pensions has dropped substantially relative to other social policies. This drop can be observed in all three countries and among all ideological and age groups. The drop is strongest among current and soon-to-be pensioners who in turn increased support for benefits to the working-age population. At the expense of pensions, the economic shock has especially boosted support for active labour market policies and (in Germany) childcare services. This shift of support from pensions to social investment policies might have opened up a window of opportunity for recalibrating welfare reforms