18 research outputs found

    Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism

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    Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing electorate. We argue that rewards not only influence actions of the electorate, but can also shape its composition. Across the world, machines employ “voter buying” to import outsiders into their districts. Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and it offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil. A regression discontinuity design suggests that voter audits—which undermined voter buying—decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these effects are significantly greater in municipalities with large voter inflows, and where neighboring municipalities had large voter outflows. Findings are robust to an alternative research design using a different data set

    Digest of decisions of the United States courts.

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    Includes decisions reported in: United States reports, vols. 106-265; United States reports, Lawyers' edition, vols. 27-68; Appeal cases, District of Columbia, vols 49-55; Circuit courts of appeals reports, vols. 1-171.Later vols. edited by editorial staff of American digest system.Continued as: Federal digest covering decisions of the United States courts reported in Federal reporter. Second series.Title varies slightly.Reported in v. 1- of the Federal reporter and in v. 1- of the Supreme court reporter, 1900-14; also reported in v. 226- of United States reports, and others, 1915-Mode of access: Internet
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