Further Results of the Cryptographic Properties on the Butterfly Structures

Recently, a new structure called butterfly introduced by Perrin et at. is attractive for that it has very good cryptographic properties: the differential uniformity is at most equal to 4 and algebraic degree is also very high when exponent $e=3$. It is conjecture that the nonlinearity is also optimal for every odd $k$, which was proposed as a open problem. In this paper, we further study the butterfly structures and show that these structure with exponent $e=2^i+1$ have also very good cryptographic properties. More importantly, we prove in theory the nonlinearity is optimal for every odd $k$, which completely solve the open problem. Finally, we study the butter structures with trivial coefficient and show these butterflies have also optimal nonlinearity. Furthermore, we show that the closed butterflies with trivial coefficient are bijective as well, which also can be used to serve as a cryptographic primitive.Comment: 20 page

Fundamental Plane of Black Hole Activity in Quiescent Regime

A correlation among the radio luminosity ($L_{\rm R}$), X-ray luminosity ($L_{\rm X}$), and black hole mass ($M_{\rm BH}$) in active galactic nuclei (AGNs) and black hole binaries is known to exist and is called the "Fundamental Plane" of black hole activity. Yuan & Cui (2005) predicts that the radio/X-ray correlation index, $\xi_{\rm X}$, changes from $\xi_{\rm X}\approx 0.6$ to $\xi_{\rm X}\approx 1.2-1.3$ when $L_{\rm X}/L_{\rm Edd}$ decreases below a critical value $\sim 10^{-6}$. While many works favor such a change, there are also several works claiming the opposite. In this paper, we gather from literature a largest quiescent AGN (defined as $L_{\rm X}/L_{\rm Edd} < 10^{-6}$) sample to date, consisting of $75$ sources. We find that these quiescent AGNs follow a $\xi_{\rm X}\approx 1.23$ radio/X-ray relationship, in excellent agreement with the Yuan \& Cui prediction. The reason for the discrepancy between the present result and some previous works is that their samples contain not only quiescent sources but also "normal" ones (i.e., $L_{\rm X}/L_{\rm Edd} > 10^{-6}$). In this case, the quiescent sources will mix up with those normal ones in $L_{\rm R}$ and $L_{\rm X}$. The value of $\xi_{\rm X}$ will then be between $0.6$ and $\sim1.3$, with the exact value being determined by the sample composition, i.e., the fraction of the quiescent and normal sources. Based on this result, we propose that a more physical way to study the Fundamental Plane is to replace $L_{\rm R}$ and $L_{\rm X}$ with $L_{\rm R}/L_{\rm Edd}$ and $L_{\rm X}/L_{\rm Edd}$, respectively.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figures, accepted for publication in The Astrophysical Journa

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games with Stochastic Opting-Out

This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the possibility of unforeseen circumstances, each player has a fixed probability of being unable to participate in the game, unlike similar models which assume voluntary participation. We first study how prescribed stochastic opting-out affects cooperation in finite populations. Moreover, in the model, cooperation is favored by natural selection over both neutral drift and defection if return on investment exceeds a threshold value defined solely by the population size, game size, and a player's probability of opting-out. Ultimately, increasing the probability that each player is unable to fulfill her promise of participating in the public goods game facilitates natural selection of cooperators. We also use adaptive dynamics to study the coevolution of cooperation and opting-out behavior. However, given rare mutations minutely different from the original population, an analysis based on adaptive dynamics suggests that the over time the population will tend towards complete defection and non-participation, and subsequently, from there, participating cooperators will stand a chance to emerge by neutral drift. Nevertheless, increasing the probability of non-participation decreases the rate at which the population tends towards defection when participating. Our work sheds light on understanding how stochastic opting-out emerges in the first place and its role in the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 30 pages, 4 figures. This is one of the student project papers arsing from the Mathematics REU program at Dartmouth 2017 Summer. See https://math.dartmouth.edu/~reu/ for more info. Comments are always welcom

Influence of initial distributions on robust cooperation in evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma

We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on scale-free networks for different initial distributions. We consider three types of initial distributions for cooperators and defectors: initially random distribution with different frequencies of defectors; intentional organization with defectors initially occupying the most connected nodes with different fractions of defectors; intentional assignment for cooperators occupying the most connected nodes with different proportions of defectors at the beginning. It is shown that initial configurations for cooperators and defectors can influence the stationary level of cooperation and the evolution speed of cooperation. Organizations with the vertices with highest connectivity representing individuals cooperators could exhibit the most robust cooperation and drive evolutionary process to converge fastest to the high steady cooperation in the three situations of initial distributions. Otherwise, we determine the critical initial frequencies of defectors above which the extinction of cooperators occurs for the respective initial distributions, and find that the presence of network loops and clusters for cooperators can favor the emergence of cooperation.Comment: Submitted to EP