Uhlenbeck's decomposition in Sobolev and Morrey-Sobolev spaces

We present a self-contained proof of Uhlenbeck's decomposition theorem for $\Omega\in L^p(\mathbb{B}^n,so(m)\otimes\Lambda^1\mathbb{R}^n)$ for $p\in (1,n)$ with Sobolev type estimates in the case $p \in[n/2,n)$ and Morrey-Sobolev type estimates in the case $p\in (1,n/2)$. We also prove an analogous theorem in the case when $\Omega\in L^p( \mathbb{B}^n, TCO_{+}(m) \otimes \Lambda^1\mathbb{R}^n)$, which corresponds to Uhlenbeck's theorem with conformal gauge group

Epistemic Modal Credence

Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account of updating: conditionalization with normalization

The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in China: The Case of Aircraft Manufacturing

Since 1960, only one new country, Brazil, has succeeded in delivering more than one civil jet per month. Otherwise, all the countries now offering world-class planes were established in aviation by the end of World War I. This being said, low-cost producers within several of the newly emerging markets have already acquired front-end manufacturing expertise as a direct result of industrial offset contracts and/or other forms of technology transfer. In all such cases, government intervention, notably through state ownership, has been predominant, but failures have been numerous in view of the difficulty of aligning ownership structure to financial, managerial, and technological requirements and of garnering the support of domestic interest groups. In this paper the focus is China’s efforts to build a world-class aircraft manufacturing industry. In the first half of the 1990s the potential of the Chinese industry to mount a competitive challenge to Western aircraft builders was largely discounted. Nowadays, as China strives to bear the ARJ-21 project to execution and even considers entering the market for wide-bodies, the threat is taken more seriously. The growth in the Chinese air transport market has reinforced the bargaining power of national aircraft producers and authorities are giving priority to building science and technology capacity in this area. Progress in creating military/civilian synergies has proven much more modest – especially when compared to the shipbuilding industry – and better coordination in the overall industry comes a distant fourth in the explanations’ peaking order.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40165/3/wp779.pd