153,980 research outputs found

    A Biogeographic History of the Plains Bison Focusing on Population and Range Dynamics

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    Early bison originated in Asia and migrated to North America by means of the Bering Land Bridge, which opened around 600,000 years ago. Just after the Wisconsin glaciation (11, 700 years ago), there were two allopatric species of bison residing in North American - the plains bison (Bos bison bison), and the woodland bison (Bos bison athabasce). European explorers and settlers recorded incredible numbers of bison in most parts of the present day United States. Bison thrived in North America until the mid-19th century, but experienced a drastic decline in population from about 60 million to only 1,000 as European settlers headed west. Currently, 95% of extant bison are part of industrial corporations that raise them for their meat and other byproducts. This paper explores the natural history, geographic distribution, near extinction, recovery, and current status of the bison within the United States

    If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It

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    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one’s rational character, whether or not those activities are under one’s voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle

    Privacy as personal resistance: exploring legal narratology and the need for a legal architecture for personal privacy rights

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    Different cultures produce different privacies – both architecturally and legally speaking – as well as in their different legal architectures. The ‘Simms principle’ can be harnessed to produce semi-constitutional privacy protection through statute; building on the work already done in ‘bringing rights home’ through the Human Rights Act 1998. This article attempts to set out a notion of semi-entrenched legal rights, which will help to better portray the case for architectural, constitutional privacy, following an examination of the problems with a legal narrative for privacy rights as they currently exist. I will use parallel ideas from the works of W.B. Yeats and Costas Douzinas to explore and critique these assumptions and arguments. The ultimate object of this piece is an argument for the creation of a legal instrument, namely an Act of Parliament, in the United Kingdom; the purpose of which is to protect certain notions of personal privacy from politically-motivated erosion and intrusion

    Gemini

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