Spatial Analysis Of Human Capital Structures

An in-depth analysis of the occupational structure of the labour market in a spatial cross-section is an important theoretical and practical area of study necessary for the development of effective labour market policies and the education system

Single Crossing Lorenz Curves and Inequality Comparisons

Since the order generated by the Lorenz criterion is partial, it is a natural question to wonder how to extend this order. Most of the literature that is concerned with that question focuses on local changes in the income distribution. We follow a different approach, and define uniform $\alpha$-spreads, which are global changes in the income distribution. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for an Expected Utility or Rank-Dependent Expected Utility maximizer to respect the principle of transfers and to be favorable to uniform $\alpha$-spreads. Finally, we apply these results to inequality indices.Inequality measures, Intersecting Lorenz Curves, Spreads

The ignorant observer

We propose an extension of Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions over individuals. We obtain a characterization of the observer's preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a convex combination of Harsanyi's utilitarian and Rawls' egalitarian criteria. This representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals' utilities are cardinally measurable and fully comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls' and Harsanyi's positions.Impartiality, Justice, Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Decision under ignorance.

Fairness under Uncertainty

Ever since its introduction by Foley (1967) and Varian (1974), the notion of fairness has been one of the most extensively used notion to evaluate allocations on an ethical basis. Whereas thereis an extensive literature on the efficiency properties of allocations in economies with uncertainty the concept of an envy-free allocation has not been widely studied in economies with uncertainty. We introduce two very natural notions of equity in an economy under uncertainty, namely ex ante and ex post equity, show they can contradict efficiency requirements. In particular, the set of ex ante efficient and ex post envy-free allocations may be empty. We nevertheless show that, under special circumstances, one may prove the existence of allocations that are both ex ante efficient and ex post envy-free. Such is the case, in particular, in an economy with individual risk and no aggregate risk.

Skilled Personnel Supply and the Prospects for Regional Innovative Development in Poland

The aim of this paper is to analyze the supply of highly qualified personnel in the context of prospects for the future innovative development of voivodships in Poland. Analysis of these problems and the relationship between them will be based on the studies on the educational profile of regions and on the analysis of potential trends and possibilities of creating a highly skilled labor force coming from higher education system, as well as on the research on the innovation level and profile of particular voivodships. Furthermore, analysis of possibilities and the level of knowledge diffusion will be conducted.Celem niniejszego opracowania jest analiza podaży wykwalifikowanej kadry w kontekście perspektyw przyszłego rozwoju innowacyjnego województw w Polsce. Analiza powyższych zjawisk oraz związku między nimi przeprowadzona zostanie m.in. na podstawie badania profilu edukacyjnego województw oraz analizy potencjalnych kierunków i możliwości kreowania zasobów pracy wysoko wykwalifikowanej, pochodzących ze szkolnictwa wyższego, a także badania profilu innowacyjnego oraz poziomu innowacyjności poszczególnych województw. Jednym z elementów analizy będzie również badanie możliwości i poziomu dyfuzji wiedzy ze środowisk naukowych do gospodarki

Fairness under Uncertainty

Ever since its introduction by Foley [1967] and Varian [1974], the notion of fairness has been one of the most extensively used notion to evaluate allocations on an ethical basis. Whereas there is an extensive literature on the efficiency properties of allocations in economies with uncertainty the concept of an envy-free allocation has not been widely studied in economies with uncertainty. We introduce two very natural notions of equity in an economy under uncertainty, namely ex ante and ex post equity, show they can contradict efficiency requirements. In particular, the set of ex ante efficient and ex post envy-free allocations may be empty. We nevertheless show that, under special circumstances, one may prove the existence of allocations that are both ex ante efficient and ex post envy-free. Such is the case, in particular, in an economy with individual risk and no aggregate risk.Fairness, uncerainty, envy

The Principle of Strong Diminishing Transfer

We reconsider the principles of diminishing transfer (introduced by Kolm [1976]) and dual diminishing transfer (introduced by Mehran [1976]). It appears that if a Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) maximizer respects the principle of diminishing (resp. dual diminishing) transfer, then he behaves in accordance with the Expected Utility model (resp. Yaari's dual model).This leads us to define the principle of strong diminishing transfer, which is a combination of the principles of diminishing and dual diminishing transfer. We give necessary conditions for a RDEU maximizer to respect this principle.These results are applied to the problem of inequality measurement.Inequality Measurement, Principle of Diminishing Transfers

Social rationality, separability, and equity under uncertainty

Harsanyi (1955) proved that, in the context of uncertainty, social ratio- nality and the Pareto principle impose severe constraints on the degree of priority for the worst-off that can be adopted in the social evaluation. Since then, the literature has hesitated between an ex ante approach that relaxes rationality (Diamond (1967)) and an ex post approach that fails the Pareto principle (Hammond (1983), Broome (1991)). The Hammond-Broome ex post approach conveniently retains the separable form of utilitarianism but does not make it explicit how to give priority to the worst-off, and how much disre- spect of individual preferences this implies. Fleurbaey (2008) studies how to incorporate a priority for the worst-off in an explicit formulation, but leaves aside the issue of ex ante equity in lotteries, retaining a restrictive form of consequentialism. We extend the analysis to a framework allowing for ex ante equity considerations to play a role in the ex post approach, and find a richer configuration of possible criteria. But the general outlook of the Harsanyian dilemma is confirmed in this more general setting.risk, inequality, social welfare, ex ante, ex post, fairness, Harsanyi theorem

The Ignorant Observer

Most prominent models of economic justice (and especially those proposed by Harsanyi and Rawls) are based on the assumption that impartiality is required for making moral decisions. However, although Harsanyi and Rawls agree on that, and furthermore agree on the fact that impartiality can be obtained under appropriate conditions of ignorance, they strongly disagree on the consequences of these assumptions. According to Harsanyi, they provide a justification for the utilitarian doctrine, whereas Rawls considers that they imply egalitarianism. We propose here an extension of Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem, that is based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions. We obtain a characterization of the observer's preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a linear combination of Harsanyi's and Rawls' criteria. Furthermore, this representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals' utilities are cardinally measurable and unit comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls' and Harsanyi's positions. Finally, we defend the view that a (strict) combination of Harsanyi's and Rawls' criteria provides a reasonable rule for social decisions.Impartiality, justice, decision under ignorance.