Beam loading

We begin by giving a description of the radio-frequency generator-cavity-beam coupled system in terms of basic quantities. Taking beam loading and cavity detuning into account, expressions for the cavity impedance as seen by the generator and as seen by the beam are derived. Subsequently methods of beam-loading compensation by cavity detuning, radio-frequency feedback and feedforward are described. Examples of digital radio-frequency phase and amplitude control for the special case of superconducting cavities are also given. Finally, a dedicated phase loop for damping synchrotron oscillations is discussed.Comment: 25 pages, contribution to the CAS - CERN Accelerator School: Course on High Power Hadron Machines; 24 May - 2 Jun 2011, Bilbao, Spai

Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games

We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to competitive equilibria of markets that are induced by an NTU game. We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993). We extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed subset of its inner core. This market represents the game and further has the given set as the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not determined uniquely and thus we obtain a class of markets with the desired property.Market Games, Competitive Payoffs, Inner Core

Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs

We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining games with complete information. We show that the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive. Furthermore, we prove that every bargaining game is a market game. By using the results of Qin (1993) we conclude that for every possible vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists an economy that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector. We relate the literature of Trockel (1996, 2005) with the ideas of Qin (1993). Our result can be seen as a market foundation for every asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in analogy to the results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games.Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution, Competitive Payoffs, Market Games

Search, Differentiated Products, and Obfuscation

Consumers buy products even if they find it too time-consuming to evaluate products carefully. I present a simple market model with sequential consumer search and differentiated products in which consumers may purchase products without evaluation. In a market with evaluation cost heterogeneity and endogenous consumer participation, market prices and profits may fall with increasing product diversity. Resulting concerns that the market may fail to provide the welfare optimal variety of products are gratuitous if product diversity is endogenized. Firms find it nonetheless individually rational to offer niche products. I endogenize evaluation costs and interpret this as the firms opportunity to aggravate the acquisition of information by obfuscation. A firm s equilibrium strategy whether to obfuscate product information is monotonic in product diversity: while obfuscation is individually rational for high product diversity, firms simplify information acquisition if product diversity is low

Essays in Behavioral Industrial Organization

How do consumers make consumption decisions if the acquisition of product information is difficult? What determines their search behavior and ultimately their choices? In three essays I examine the way in which the answers to these questions affect market outcomes and the incentives of firms to obfuscate product information

TEMPERATURE AND LEVEL DENSITY PARAMETER OF EVAPORATION RESIDUES PRODUCED IN THE REACTION 165Ho + 600 MeV 20Ne

Evaporative and preequilibrium neutrons emitted from evaporation residues in the reaction Ho + 600 MeV neon are exploited to deduce the thermal excitation energy E* and temperature T of the residues. From these quantities the level density parameter is deduced at a temperature of 4.1 MeV