Lampropeltis mexicana

Number of Pages: 2Integrative BiologyGeological Science

Taxability and Low-Productivity Traps

When governments care about tax revenues, the taxability of different forms of economic activity will influence the decisions of governments about what activity to support. If factors of production are mobile across sectors which differ in their taxability, political economies will organize themselves into equilibria where governments support activity because resources are allocated to it, which in turn encourages that resource allocation. When resources and government support are organized in support of an “old” equilibrium, and the possibility of a “new,” possibly more efficient equilibrium beckons, the relative taxability of the old and new sectors will determine the likelihood of such a shift. In postcommunist Europe, such factors were influential in the creation of two general political-economic configurations: one where new economic activity is supported by the government and is common, and one where such support is lacking and new businesses are rare. Differences in relative taxability of new and old economic activity contribute to the prevalence of the first configuration in Eastern Europe, and the second in the former Soviet Union.

Ambystoma tigrinum

Number of Pages: 4Integrative BiologyGeological Science

Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments

We initiate examination of the political boundaries of the firm by exploring the phenomenon of “businessman candidates”: business owners and managers who bypass conventional means of political influence to run for public office themselves. We argue that in-house production of political influence will be more likely in institutional environments where candidates find it difficult to make binding campaign promises. When campaign promises are binding, then a businessman may always pay a professional politician to run on the platform that political competition would otherwise compel the businessman to adopt. In contrast, when commitment to a campaign platform is impossible, then candidate identity matters for the policies that will be adopted ex post, implying that a businessman may choose to run for office if the stakes are sufficiently large. We illustrate our arguments through discussion of gubernatorial elections in postcommunist Russia, where businessmen frequently run for public office, institutions to encourage elected officials to keep their campaign promises are weak, and competition for rents is intense.Businessman candidates, elections, citizen candidates, institutions, political economy

Businessman Candidates

In immature democracies, businessmen run for public office to gain direct control over policy, whereas in mature democracies they typically rely on other means of influence. We develop a simple model to show that businessmen run for office only when two conditions hold. First, as in many immature democracies, institutions which make reneging on campaign promises costly must be poorly developed. In such environments, office holders have monopoly power which can be used to extract rents, and businessmen may run to capture those rents. Second, however, the returns to businessmen from policy influence must not be too large, as otherwise the endogenous rents from holding office draw professional politicians into the race, crowding out businessmen candidates. Analysis of data on Russian gubernatorial elections supports these predictions, showing that 1) businessman candidates are less likely in regions with high media freedom and government transparency, institutions which raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises, and 2) businessman candidates are less likely in regions where returns to policy influence (measured by regional resource abundance) are large, but only where media are unfree and government nontransparent.

A New Perspective on Perspective Taking: A Multidimensional Approach to Conceptualizing an Aptitude

Social perspective taking (SPT) is thought to be important in its own right and is often associated with other important skills, such as interpersonal conflict resolution. Thus, it is critical for researchers to systematically understand SPT and how it relates to other valued educational outcomes. In particular, a complete understanding of SPT might assist educational psychologists to apply this knowledge in school settings to improve the effectiveness of students’ social interactions. Previous research on SPT, however, has conceptualized it as a unidimensional construct leaving scholars with an insufficient understanding of this aptitude. To best understand SPT, a multidimensional approach should include assessments of personal characteristics (including the propensity and the ability to engage in SPT) and features of the situation (including features of the SPT task and the larger context). Using Snow’s conceptualization of aptitudes as a framework, this article illustrates the problems with treating SPT as a unidimensional construct, defines SPT as a complex aptitude, and provides a taxonomy to develop our understanding of SPT and to guide future research in this area. The taxonomy organizes and reviews the existing literature that relates personal and situational characteristics to SPT aptitude. Where research has not yet been conducted, this article hypothesizes how these characteristics will relate to SPT aptitude

Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments

We initiate examination of the political boundaries of the firm by exploring the phenomenon of “businessman candidates”: business owners and managers who bypass conventional means of political influence to run for public office themselves. We argue that in-house production of political influence will be more likely in institutional environments where candidates find it difficult to make binding campaign promises. When campaign promises are binding, then a businessman may always pay a professional politician to run on the platform that political competition would otherwise compel the businessman to adopt. In contrast, when commitment to a campaign platform is impossible, then candidate identity matters for the policies that will be adopted ex post, implying that a businessman may choose to run for office if the stakes are sufficiently large. We illustrate our arguments through discussion of gubernatorial elections in postcommunist Russia, where businessmen frequently run for public office, institutions to encourage elected officials to keep their campaign promises are weak, and competition for rents is intense.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40119/3/wp733.pd

Government Control of the Media

We present a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time, with particular application to less democratic states. The extent of media freedom depends critically on two variables: the mobilizing character of the government and the size of the advertising market. Media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the need for mobilization is large; however, the distinction between state and private media is smaller. Large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private media, but increase the incentive for the government to nationalize private media. We illustrate these arguments with a case study of media freedom in postcommunist Russia, where media bias has responded to the mobilizing needs of the Kremlin and government control over the media has grown in tandem with the size of the advertising market.Media, special-interest politics, nondemocratic politics

Businessman Candidates

Students of politics are familiar with two common forms of influence exercised by special interests over politicians: the provision of financial support to favored candidates during election campaigns, and the application of lobbying power when dealing with elected politicians. However, in certain political environments, representatives of special interests -- in particular, business owners and managers -- choose to run for office themselves, rather than simply relying on the political system to protect their interests. This paper addresses the question of why and in what circumstances businesses will follow this alternative path of influence. In so doing, it aims to contribute to an understanding of the role of institutional environment in determining the nature of special-interest politics. Expanding upon existing models of electoral competition and special-interest politics, we show that two features of weakly institutionalized environments contribute to the emergence of "businessman candidates." First, when political parties and other reputational mechanisms are weak, professional politicians will often be tempted to renege on promises made during an election campaign. In such an environment, businesses may prefer to run owners or managers of the firm for public office, knowing that the interests of such individuals will be aligned with those of the firm after the election. Second, when political competition for rents among businesses is large (due to the absence of checks on arbitrary exercise of political power, and perhaps due to a high concentration of economic power among businesses), having somebody in office who can protect the firm's interests is imperative. Coupled with professional politicians' commitment problem, this implies the prevalence of businessman candidates. We illustrate the results of our model by drawing upon the experience of a recent gubernatorial election in Krasnoyarskii Krai -- a large Siberian region dominated by two industrial interests, with the winner of the election the former general director of one of the two firms -- which in its particulars exemplifies a more general trend in Russian politicsspecial interest politics; businessman candidates; Russia

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? State Bureaucracy and Privatization Effectiveness

Why have economic reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state been successful in some cases but not others? Are reform failures the consequence of leviathan states that hinder private economic activity, or of weak states unable to implement policies effectively and provide a supportive institutional environment? We explore these questions in a study of privatization in postcommunist Russia. Taking advantage of large regional variation in the size of public administrations, and employing a multilevel research design that controls for pre-privatization selection in the estimation of regional privatization effects, we examine the relationship between state bureaucracy and the impact of privatization on firm productivity. We find that privatization is more effective in regions with relatively large bureaucracies. Our analysis suggests that this effect is driven by the impact of bureaucracy on the post-privatization business environment, with better institutional support and less corruption when bureaucracies are large.privatization, bureaucracy, economic reform, Russia