Preventing Violence in Seven Countries: Global Convergence in Policies

Do governments take the measures that are supported by the best scientific evidence available? We present a brief review of the situation in: Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Our findings show surprisingly similar developments across countries. While all seven countries are moving towards evidence-based decision making regarding policies and programs to prevent violence, there remain a number of difficulties before this end can be achieved. For example, there continue to be few randomized controlled trials or rigorous quasi-experimental studies on aggression and violence. Results from experimental research are essential to both policy makers and researchers to determine the effectiveness of programs as well as increase our knowledge of the problem. Additionally, all noted that media attention for violence is high in their country, often leading to management by crisis with the result that policies are not based on evidence, but instead seek to appease public outrage. And perhaps because of attendant organizational problems (i.e., in many countries violence prevention was not under the guise of one particular agency or ministry), most have not developed a coordinated policy focusing on the prevention of violence and physical aggression. It is hypothesized that leaders in democratic countries, who must run for election every 4 to 6 years, may feel a need to focus on short-term planning rather than long-term preventive policies since the costs, but not the benefits for the latter would be incurred while they still served in office. We also noted a general absence of expertise beyond those within scientific circles. The need for these ideas to be more widely accepted will be an essential ingredient to real and sustaining change. This means that there must be better communication and increased understanding between researchers and policy makers. Toward those ends, the recent establishment of the Campbell Collaboration, formed to provide international systematic reviews of program effectiveness, will make these results more available and accessible to politicians, administrators and those charged with making key policy decision

Between mediatisation and politicisation: The changing role and position of Whitehall press officers in the age of political spin

Despite widespread critiques of ‘political spin’, the way governments engage with the mass media has attracted relatively little empirical attention. There is a small but growing body of research into bureaucracies’ responses to mediatisation from within which have identified tensions between bureaucratic and party political values, but this has not included the United Kingdom. There are concerns that the traditional dividing line between government information and political propaganda has come under increasing pressure as a higher premium is placed on persuasion by both journalists and politicians battling for public attention in an increasingly competitive market. Within Whitehall, the arrival of Labour in 1997 after 18 years in opposition was a watershed for UK government communications, allowing the government to reconfigure its official information service in line with the party political imperative to deploy strategic communications as a defence against increasingly invasive media scrutiny. Public relations, in government as elsewhere, has grown in scale, scope and status, becoming institutionalised and normalised within state bureaucracies, but how has this affected the role, status and influence of the civil servants who conduct media management? Within the system of executive self-regulation of government publicity that is characteristic of Whitehall, government press officers must negotiate a difficult path between the need to inform citizens about the government’s programme, and demands by ministers to deploy privileged information to secure and maintain personal and party advantage in the struggle for power. Taking 1997 as a turning point, and through the voices of the actors who negotiate government news – mainly press officers, but also journalists and special advisers – this article examines the changing role and position of Whitehall press officers in what has become known as the age of political spin, finding that profound and lasting change in the rules of engagement has taken place and is continuing

'Full spectrum dominance': Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense, and US irregular warfare strategy 2001-2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake

Cost-analysis of XELOX and FOLFOX4 for treatment of colorectal cancer to assist decision-making on reimbursement

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>XELOX (capecitabine + oxaliplatin) and FOLFOX 4 (5-FU + folinic acid + oxaliplatin) have shown similar improvements in survival in patients with metastatic colorectal cancer (MCRC). A US cost-minimization study found that the two regimens had similar costs from a healthcare provider perspective but XELOX had lower costs than FOLFOX4 from a societal perspective, while a Japanese cost-effectiveness study found XELOX had superior cost-effectiveness. This study compared the costs of XELOX and FOLFOX4 in patients with MCRC recently treated in two oncology departments in Hong Kong.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Cost data were collected from the medical records of 60 consecutive patients (30 received XELOX and 30 FOLFOX4) from two hospitals. Drug costs, outpatient visits, hospital days and investigations were recorded and expressed as cost per patient from the healthcare provider perspective. Estimated travel and time costs were included in a societal perspective analysis. All costs were classed as either scheduled (associated with planned chemotherapy and follow-up) or unscheduled (unplanned visits or admissions and associated tests and medicines). Costs were based on government and hospital sources and expressed in US dollars (US$).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>XELOX patients received an average of 7.3 chemotherapy cycles (of the 8 planned cycles) and FOLFOX4 patients received 9.2 cycles (of the 12 planned cycles). The scheduled cost per patient per cycle was$2,046 for XELOX and $2,152 for FOLFOX4, while the unscheduled cost was$240 and $421, respectively. Total treatment cost per patient was$16,609 for XELOX and $23,672 for FOLFOX4; the total cost for FOLFOX4 was 37$17,836 for XELOX and $27,455 for FOLFOX4. Sensitivity analyses showed XELOX was still less costly than FOLFOX4 when using full drug regimen costs, incorporating data from a US model with costs and adverse event data from their clinical trial and with the removal of oxaliplatin from both treatment arms. Capecitabine would have to cost around four times its present price in Hong Kong for the total resource cost of treatment with XELOX to equal that of FOLFOX4.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>XELOX costs less than FOLFOX4 for this patient group with MCRC from both the healthcare provider and societal perspectives.</p

Libertarian paternalism: Policy and everyday translations of the rational and the affective

Following the financial collapse in 2008 many commentators went onto pronounce the end of neoliberalism as a credible system for managing welfare state capitalism. The narrow economic belief in individuals as rational utility maximizers (the linchpin of neoliberal governance) was proved to be uncomfortably inaccurate. In light of these claims, British governments and think tanks have published various research and pol-icy documents promoting the use of soft forms of state power to ‘nudge’ citizens into behaving responsibly and rationally. Through an analysis of key policy documents and academic texts, I examine the repertoires and formulations informing this emerging governmental rationality (‘libertarian paternalism’) and draw together these perspectives to explore their effects in terms of framing policy understandings of the rational and the emotional. I conclude the article by utilizing a discursive psychology approach with the aim to problematize existing policy (mis)understandings of emotion as automated and unreflexive