Pricing and bandwidth allocation problems in wireless multi-tier networks

International audienceFuture cellular networks are facing crucial architecture changes to cope with high throughput, energy and cost-efficiency demands. Emerging solutions are small-cells and femto-cells which will coexist with classical macro-cells technology. In these heterogeneous networks, we study the joint service pricing and bandwidth allocation problem at the operator level. Each user selfishly adopts the service that optimizes its satisfaction. The user-level problem is formulated as a general non-atomic game. The Wardrop equilibrium is proven to exist and an analytical expression is provided for arbitrary number of services. The equilibria multiplicity, the influence of pricing and bandwidth allocation policies are investigated numerically

The evolutionary economic implications of constitutional designs: lessons from the constitutional morphogenesis of New England and New Zealand

This paper examines the constitutional morphogenesis of New England and New Zealand to determine the effects on their respective economic development—specifically in terms of economic complexity. New England had revolted against a dominion that limited the local autonomy of its colonies; alternatively, almost 200 years later, New Zealand abolished a quasi-federal provincial system in favour of a unitary state. Constitutional economics, through the works of its founding father, James Buchanan, is employed to explain the effects of these constitutional choices. The paper argues that empowering local government is the key to economic prosperity in a globalising world, where the role of the nation-state is increasingly marginalised. Nourishing local autonomy is important for constitutional aspirations

On the Constitutionality of Hard State Border Closures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

I investigate the constitutionality of hard state border closures in the United States as a prophylactic response to a pandemic. This type of border closure prevents people from entering a State, except for exempt travelers, a category that includes, for example, military, judicial and government officers, and people granted entry on compassionate grounds. Those allowed to enter usually have to then go through a quarantine regime before being released into the community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, no State has attempted such closures. However, epidemiological experts suggest that, in comparison to other border and non-border measures, such closures are more effective. Given the World Health Organization prediction of more pandemics in the foreseeable future, it is imperative that the constitutionality of such hard closures is investigated. I use structural analysis to argue that a recent challenge to hard border closures in Australia suggests that, under a strict scrutiny review, the Supreme Court is likely to uphold such closures in the United States. While actual implementation requires investigating issues that go beyond a constitutional analysis, these findings highlight the need for a wider conversation around a federal goldilocks zone when responding to the next pandemic

A comparative analysis of constitutional recognition of Aboriginal peoples

This article furnishes a comparative analysis on the constitutional recognition of Indigenous peoples in four jurisdictions. The analysis looks at two jurisdictions that share a similar colonial heritage with Australia, namely New Zealand and Canada; and two jurisdictions at the forefront of plurinational constitutional recognition of Indigenous rights (Ecuador and Bolivia). Experience in these countries suggests that constitutional recognition (of Indigenous peoples) occurs in a variety of ways, including the protection and promotion of Indigenous cultures, their land titles and their political representation. This variety stems largely from a common denominator: the need for protecting the political, collective rights of marginalised groups. This protection is generally intended to alleviate these groups’ economic and social disadvantages. The analysis identifies two dimensions for constitutional recognition: a wide-versus narrow dimension and a dynamic-versus-static dimension. Both dimensions break along colonial lines, with recognition in the two postcolonial countries exhibiting a wide and static approach and recognition in the two plurinational countries exhibiting a narrow but dynamic approach. These jurisdictions could provide guidance in the Australian context, where resolving the tension between our colonial heritage and our postcolonial aspirations holds the key to alleviating the disadvantages facing Indigenous Australians

Notes on Continental Constitutional Identities

Geo-constitutional analysis examines the reciprocal effect of geography on constitutions. Within this analysis, a continental constitutional identity focuses on the intersection between institutional geographies and institutional identities, where constitutions are understood as meta-institutions. In some constitutions, belonging to a continent is part of the national identity, while other constitutions only signal a non-geographic, usually an ethnic, identity. The US Constitution is an example of the former. The quintessential example of a non-geographic constitution is the Constitution of the Russian Federation. A similar disregard of continental identities can be found in Israel and the Arab League countries east of the Sinai Peninsula, in contrast to North African constitutions west of this peninsula. The potential for armed conflict due to the presence or absence of these identities can be mitigated by continental nesting (i.e., by aligning the geographic and socio-political characterization of a continent). The Article illustrates this approach in the context of Africa, arguably the least geopolitically misaligned among Old World continents, by explaining why a post-colonial Africa includes Israel and all Arab League countries. Similar analysis of other continents can explain how to mitigate intra- and intercontinental conflict by explicitly nesting constitutional identities within continents based on evolving geopolitical exigencies

2016 Coase-Sandor Summer Institute in Law and Economics: Research Methods in Law and Economics

Heartened by Aaron Director’s formation of a law-and-economics cluster at the University of Chicago, this paper proposes a new cluster that shares a post nation-state, city-centered, vision for constitutional organisation. To this end, the paper introduces an economic model to illustrate the role of polycentricity in the stability and prosperity of polities. The model is inspired by Tinbergen’s gravity model of international trade, and two-dimensional lattice models used in theoretical physics. The model suggests that constitutional constructs weave an evolutionary dialectic between different organisational scales (the local, national, and global). This dialectic continues to wreak havoc at the local scale, and can be interrupted only through explicit constitutional constraints on the size of ‘jurisdictional footprints’. Polycentricity is interpreted in the spirit of (non-contiguous) charter cities, and through the scholarship of Baruch Spinoza’s constitutional orders, as exemplified by the Dutch Republic (1581-1795). This rendition of sovereignty is imperative as much for countries facing the strife of civil war (including Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and the Ukraine) as it is for maturing economies. In a globalizing world that is more and more imbued with nation-state morbidity, there is a pressing need for a city-centric, ‘Olympic world system’. A Chicago cluster bringing together scholars such as Gerald Frug, Paul Romer, Benjamin Barber, Yishai Blank, and Saskia Sassen, could see this vision come to fruition

2016 Annual Conference of the Australian Law and Economics Association

In some constitutional designs, federation is based on the doctrine of ‘residuum of powers,’ where one level of government is privileged vis-à-vis the other, and where a concomitant enumeration of powers gives rise to a presumption of a restricted capacity to legislate outside powers so specified. The quintessential examples of this approach are the Federal Constitutions of the United States, Canada and Australia. The Coase theorem explains how and why efficiency in the allocation of these powers emerges regardless of the initial allocation of residuum powers. The analysis confirms this Coasean proposition in an evolutionary context. In all three jurisdictions, regardless of the initial allocation of powers, there is a neo-Bagehotian (evolutionary) shift from the canonical constitution and towards an ‘efficient constitution’—an institution that avoids (transaction) costs. Bargaining between general and special purpose governments allocates powers such that transaction costs are avoided. The paper provides an efficiency definition based on the distinction between symmetric federalism (as seen in the United States and Australia) and asymmetric federalism (as seen in Canada). On aggregate, the locus of this efficiency is either central (as in the case of the United States and Australia), or distributed (as in the case of Canada). Specific examples from all three jurisdictions provide further illustrations. Normatively, further efficiency gains could come from developing (constitutional) legal doctrines that dialogue directly with this evolution