Honneth on Social Pathologies: A Critique

Over the last two decades, Axel Honneth has written extensively on the notion of social pathology. He has presented it as a distinctive critical resource of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, in which tradition he places his own work; and as an alternative to the mainstream liberal approaches in political philosophy. In this paper, I review the developments in Honneth's writing about this notion and offer an immanent critique, with a particular focus on his recent major work Freedom's Right. Both his early context-transcendent approach and his more recent immanent approach are found wanting, and his increasing reformism is exposed and criticized. The central distinction in Freedom's Right between social pathologies and misdevelopments is also shown to be unworkable. In addition, I demonstrate that Zurn's influential proposal to characterize the phenomena Honneth identified as social pathologies in terms of a cognitive disconnect does not fit (with Zurn's own description of) these phenomena. While some such phenomena, like what Honneth describes as “Organized Self-Realization,” call out for conceptualization in terms of the notion of social pathology, an alternative characterization of this notion is necessary

Misdevelopments, Pathologies, and Normative Revolutions: Normative Reconstruction as Method of Critical Theory

In this article I argue that the method of normative reconstruction underlying Freedom's Right undermines Critical Theory's aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive. I start out by giving a brief account of the four premises of the method of normative reconstruction and unpack their implications for how Honneth conceptualizes social pathologies and misdevelopments, specifically that these notions are no longer linked to radical critique and normative revolution. In the second part, I demonstrate that abandoning forms of radical critique and normative revolution is internally linked to adopting this method, before arguing that Freedom's Right contains no resources to account for why abandoning them does not amount to a deficiency. In the final part, I point out two problematic implications of turning away from radical critique and normative revolution for the very project Honneth pursues in Freedom's Right. I show that Honneth's own view about the limited scope of application of the method of normative reconstruction and his account of the dangers associated with social misdevelopments give us (additional) reasons to consider this method to be incomplete. Finally, I contend that the explanatory power of Freedom's Right is dubious because methodological premises that form part of normative reconstruction lead Honneth to ignore relevant alternative explanations of processes of deviation and disassociation from norms of social freedom, which he characterizes as social misdevelopments

Is the Market a Sphere of Social Freedom?

In this paper I examine Axel Honneth's normative reconstruction of the market as a sphere of social freedom in his 2014 book, Freedom's Right. Honneth's position is complex: on the one hand, he acknowledges that modern capitalist societies do not realize social freedom; on the other hand, he insists that the promise of social freedom is implicit in the market sphere. In fact, the latter explains why modern subjects have seen capitalism as legitimate. I will reconstruct Honneth's conception of social freedom and investigate how it is realized in the sphere in which Honneth sees it most successfully at work, the sphere of interpersonal relations. I then move on to the sphere of the market economy and discuss two related problems of this view that stem from his interpretation of Hegel. Next, I consider Honneth's method of “normative reconstruction” and his reconstructions of the sphere of consumption and, finally, the labor market. My conclusion will be that market institutions cannot realize social freedom, and that this insight should orient the philosophical direction of critical social theory

Conceptualisations of children’s wellbeing at school: the contribution of recognition theory

A large study in Australian schools aimed to elucidate understandings of ‘wellbeing’ and of factors in school life that contribute to it. Students and teachers understood wellbeing primarily, and holistically, in terms of interpersonal relationships, in contrast to policy documents which mainly focused on ‘problem areas’ such as mental health. The study also drew on recognition theory as developed by the social philosopher Axel Honneth. Results indicate that recognition theory may be useful in understanding wellbeing in schools, and that empirical research in schools may give rise to further questions regarding theory

Individual Rights, Economic Transactions, and Recognition: A Legal Approach to Social Economics

Modernity brought the idea of individual property rights as a com- plex phenomenon. However, economics adopted a simplistic view of property as a fundamental institution, understating the complex interaction of different rights and obligations that frame the legal environment of economic processes with an insufficiently elaborated tool. Here, a more elaborate view of legal elements will be propose

Bullying and the need to belong: Early adolescents’ bullying-related behavior and the acceptance they desire and receive from particular classmates

Based on the notion that one of the motives underlying children's antisocial behavior is their need to belong to particular peers, it was examined how each of four types of bullying-related behavior would be related to the acceptance that 10 to 13-year-old children desired and received from same- and other-sex children with different bullying-related behavioral styles. Bullying-related behavior was assessed using a peer nomination procedure. Children rated the importance of being accepted by each particular classmate and their own acceptance of these same classmates. Among boys, antisocial involvement in bullying was related to a desire to be accepted by other antisocial boys and to actually being rejected by boys in general. Among girls, antisocial involvement in bullying was related to a desire to be accepted by boys in general. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007

Social Freedom and Self-Actualization: “Normative Reconstruction” as a Theory of Justice

In Freedom's Right Axel Honneth seeks to provide a theory of justice by appropriatingHegel's account of ethical substance in the Philosophy of Right, but hewants to do sowithout endorsingHegel'smore robust idealist commitments. I argue that this project can only succeed if Honneth can offer an alternative, comparatively robust demonstration of the rationality and normative coherence of existing social institutions. I contend that the grounds Honneth provides for this claimare insufficient for his purposes. In particular, I argue that Honneth's claim that "justice and individual self-determination are mutually referential," even were it to be accepted, would be insufficient to underwrite hismore robust identification between the normative foundations of justice, autonomy and reciprocal self-realization. In the final section of the paper, I turn to Honneth's analysis of the "social institution" of friendship,which he, followingHegel, holds up as a paradigmatic instantiation of social freedom understood as, in Hegel's words, "being with oneself in another" (Beisichselbstsein in einem Anderen). I argue that an analysis of the normative import of friendship wholly in terms of mutual recognition misses an important aspect of the kind of self-realization that friendship makes possible

Love, rights and solidarity: studying children's participation using Honneth's theory of recognition

Recent attempts to theorize children’s participation have drawn on a wide range of ideas, concepts and models from political and social theory. The aim of this article is to explore the specific usefulness of Honneth’s theory of a ‘struggle for recognition’ in thinking about this area of practice. The article identifies what is distinctive about Honneth’s theory of recognition, and how it differs from other theories of recognition. It then considers the relevance of Honneth’s conceptual framework to the social position of children, including those who may be involved in a variety of ‘participatory’ activities. It looks at how useful Honneth’s ideas are in direct engagement with young people’s praxis, drawing on ethnographic research with members of a children and young people’s forum. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of this theoretical approach and the further questions which it opens up for theories of participation and of adult–child relations more generally

Expanding the Taxonomy of (Mis-)Recognition in the Economic Sphere

This paper makes a contribution to debates in recognition theory by expanding the taxonomy of (mis-)recognition in the economic sphere. We argue that doing justice to the variety of ways in which recognition is engaged in economic relationships requires: (1) to take into consideration not just the recognition principle of esteem, but also (various aspects of) need and respect; (2) to distinguish a productive from a consumptive dimension with regards to each principle of recognition (need, esteem and respect); (3) and to identify the specific economic relationship at stake (e.g. between consumers and producers, or between employers and employees). In this way, we can account for the diversity of demands for recognition made in the economic sphere, explain what underpins them, and bring structure into these diverse phenomena. What is more, our expanded taxonomy is a useful tool for social pathology theorists. They have to appreciate the full range of variants of misrecognition when diagnosing pathologies of misrecognition in the economic sphere