Aristippus and Xenophon as Plato’s contemporary literary rivals and the role of gymnastikè (γυμναστική)

Plato was a Socrates’ friend and disciple, but he wasn’t the only one. No doubt, Socrates had many followers, however, the majority of their work is lost. Was there any antagonism among his followers? Who succeeded in interpreting Socrates? Who could be considered as his successor? Of course, we don’t know if these questions emerged after the death of Socrates, but the Greek doxography suggests that there was a literary rivalry. As we underlined earlier, most unfortunately, we can’t examine all of them thoroughly due to the lack of their work, but we can scrutinize Xenophon’s and Aristippus’ work. All of them, Plato, Xenophon and Aristippus, presented to a certain extent their ideas concerning education. Furthermore, they have not neglected the matter of gymnastikè, but what is exactly the role of physical education in their work? Are there any similarities or any differences between them? Since, Xenophon and Aristippus (as well as Plato) seem to be in favor of gymnastikè, it is necessary to understand its role

On the benefits of philosophy as a way of life in a general introductory course

Philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) places investigations of value, meaning, and the good life at the center of philosophical investigation, especially of one’s own life. I argue PWOL is compatible with general introductory philosophy courses, further arguing that PWOL-based general introductions have several philosophical and pedagogical benefits. These include the ease with which high impact practices, situated skill development, and students’ ability to ‘think like a disciplinarian’ may be incorporated into such courses, relative to more traditional introductory courses, as well as the demonstration of philosophy’s value to students by explicitly tying philosophical investigation to students own lives

Out of weakness: the ‘educational good’ in late antiquity

This paper explores the nature of the educational good as it appears in late antiquity, arguing that the ‘good’ variously promised by education is in a state of perpetual deferral. This extends the tradition of ancient Greek philosophy where wisdom is to be forever approached but never realised. Three exemplary cases are considered: the educational good as it appears under the auspices of the Roman tutor; as it is manifested in Christian baptismal practices; and as it is practiced in early Christian monasticism. To lure willing subjects into an educational relationship whose fruits will ultimately never be realised, the educator must respectively employ techniques of seduction, suspicion and diversion

Why practice philosophy as a way of life?

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement mitigate the factors that prevent us from living in accord- ance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life

Organization (Theory) As A Way of Life

To the extent that ‘classical organization theory’ is seen to possess any enduring interest it is mainly as a historic artefact. The idea that the principles, axioms, adages and devices elaborated by its proponents any longer possess traction in the present is rarely countenanced. In contrast to this customary view, the present article seeks to indicate the continuing significance of classical organization theory, for both analysing and intervening in organizational life. This necessitates a reconstruction of the conventional understanding of this received term, one in which classical organization theory is viewed less as ‘theory’ in the conventional sense, but rather as a geographically dispersed, institutionally disconnected and historically discontinuous ‘stance’, characterized, inter alia, by a pragmatist call to experience, an antithetical attitude to ‘high’ or transcendental theorizing, and, not least, an ethical focus on organizational effectiveness born of a close connection to ‘the work itself’ or ‘the situation at hand’. Deploying the term ‘classic organization theory’ in this way, to refer to a stance, attitude or comportment, and an associated persona that bears it, we are able to highlight the significant differences between this comportment and the increasingly ‘metaphysical’ attitude characterizing many contemporary approaches to organization and organizing, not simply in organization studies, but also more widely in sociology and cultural economy

Enhancing health and wellbeing through immersion in nature: A conceptual perspective combining the stoic and Buddhist traditions

A growing body of evidence from a wide range of fields indicates that physical activity in nature improves psychological health and wellbeing (Pretty et al., 2005; Howell et al., 2013; Passmore and Howell, 2014)

Stoics against stoics in Cudworth's "A Treatise of Freewill"

In his 'A Treatise of Freewill', Ralph Cudworth argues against Stoic determinism by drawing on what he takes to be other concepts found in Stoicism, notably the claim that some things are ‘up to us’ and that these things are the product of our choice. These concepts are central to the late Stoic Epictetus and it appears at first glance as if Cudworth is opposing late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic determinism. This paper argues that in fact, despite his claim to be drawing on Stoic doctrine, Cudworth uses these terms with a meaning first articulated only later, by the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias

Mobilizing the emergence of Phronetic TechnoScienceSocieties:low-carbon e-mobility in China

TechnoScienceSociety (TSS) spells the wholesale reorganization of the constellation of related concepts that together make up the very common-sense meaning of ‘politics’ and ‘government’, not least of which today are knowledge, science, technology and society, all of which are currently founded on essentially literal, dualistic not pragmatic, processual grounds. We argue that grappling with TSS and a politics of TSS demands a shift broadly from a universalist (if possibly critical) epistemo-politics of critique or criticism to an onto-politics of situated practical wisdom (phronesis). Important pointers in this direction come from existing work in actor network theory (ANT)-inspired STS. But while useful starting points, this work is also insufficient in some key regards, to the point that we must now move beyond it. In particular, the need for a shift to a situated, processual and practically engaged perspective applies no less to discussions such as this in STS. We here trace out some of the argument for, and consequences of, that move. The argument proceeds as follows. First we consider the after-ANT argument of ontological politics and how this demands a break with the familiar epistemological and ‘one world’ politics still dominating contemporary discourse, mainstream and critical. Then we consider some of the key problems with this conception of ontological politics vis-à-vis the predicament of an emerging TSS. This includes a brief discussion of an alternative perspective, of complex power/knowledge systems (CP/KS) within a phronetic onto-politics. Finally, we illustrate the arguments by analysing, using this CP/KS and onto-political perspective, a key case study of contemporary TSS: the ongoing attempts of innovation towards a transition in urban mobility system in China