Out of weakness: the ‘educational good’ in late antiquity

This paper explores the nature of the educational good as it appears in late antiquity, arguing that the ‘good’ variously promised by education is in a state of perpetual deferral. This extends the tradition of ancient Greek philosophy where wisdom is to be forever approached but never realised. Three exemplary cases are considered: the educational good as it appears under the auspices of the Roman tutor; as it is manifested in Christian baptismal practices; and as it is practiced in early Christian monasticism. To lure willing subjects into an educational relationship whose fruits will ultimately never be realised, the educator must respectively employ techniques of seduction, suspicion and diversion

Why practice philosophy as a way of life?

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement mitigate the factors that prevent us from living in accord- ance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life