On the existence and implications of nonbelieved memories

In this article, we review the state of knowledge about a previously-assumed-to-be-rare memory phenomenon called nonbelieved memories. Nonbelieved memories are a counterintuitive phenomenon in which vivid autobiographical memories are no longer believed to have happened even though vivid recollective features remain present. Such memories stand in contrast to the more typical situation that when events are recollected they are also believed to have genuinely occurred. We review data on the frequency, characteristics, and factors that contribute to the development of naturally occurring and laboratory-induced nonbelieved memories and discuss the relationships of nonbelieved memories with theories of autobiographical remembering and the study of remembering in applied domains

The production of spontaneous false memories across childhood.

We found evidence that the usual developmental trends in children's spontaneous false memories were eliminated using novel stimuli containing obvious themes. That is, children created more false memories than adults when scenes needed to be remembered. In Experiment 1, 7- and 8-year-olds had higher false memory rates than adults when using visual scenes. Experiment 2 showed that gist cuing could not account for this effect. In Experiment 3, children and adults received visual scenes and story contexts in which these scenes were embedded. For both types of stimuli, we found that children had the highest false memory rates. Our results indicate that the underlying theme of these scenes is easily identified, resulting in our developmental false memory trend

Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour

Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants’ beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants’ belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving

What kind of memory has evolution wrought?: Introductory Article for the Special Issue of Memory: Adaptive memory: The emergence and nature of proximate mechanisms

It is without question that our memory system evolved through a process of natural selection. However, basic research into the evolutionary foundations of memory has begun in earnest only recently. This is quite peculiar as the majority, perhaps even all, of memory research relates to whether memory is adaptive or not. In this Special Issue of Memory we have assembled a variety of papers that represent the cutting edge in research on the evolution of memory. These papers are centred on issues about the ultimate and proximate explanations of memory, the development of the adaptive functions of memory, as well as the positive consequences that arise from the current evolutionary form that our memory has taken. In this introductory article we briefly outline these different areas and indicate why they are vital for a more complete theory of memory. Further we argue that, by adopting a more applied stance in the area of the evolution of memory, one of the many future directions in this field could be a new branch of psychology that addresses questions in evolutionary legal psychology

What if you went to the police and accused your uncle of abuse? Misunderstandings concerning the benefits of memory distortion: A commentary on Fernandez (2015)

In a recent paper, Fernández (in press) argues that memory distortion can have beneficial outcomes. Although we agree with this, we find his reasoning and examples flawed to such degree that they will lead to misunderstandings rather than clarification in the field of memory (distortion). In his paper, Fernández uses the terms belief and memory incorrectly, creating a conceptual blur. Also, Fernández tries to make the case that under certain circumstances, false memories of abuse are beneficial. We argue against this idea as the reasoning behind this claim is based on controversial assumptions such as repression. Although it is true that memory distortions can be beneficial, the examples sketched by Fernández are not in line with recent documentation in this area

Exploring the Consequences of Nonbelieved Memories in the DRM Paradigm

In the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories (NBMs) using the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. After the recognition task, participants’ statements were contradicted by giving them feedback about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our individual differences measures and the formation of NBMs

A Self-Reference False Memory Effect in the DRM Paradigm: Evidence from Eastern and Western Samples

It is well established that processing information in relation to oneself (i.e., selfreferencing) leads to better memory for that information than processing that same information in relation to others (i.e., other-referencing). However, it is unknown whether self-referencing also leads to more false memories than other-referencing. In the current two experiments with European and East Asian samples, we presented participants the Deese-Roediger/McDermott (DRM) lists together with their own name or other people’s name (i.e., “Trump” in Experiment 1 and “Li Ming” in Experiment 2). We found consistent results across the two experiments; that is, in the self-reference condition, participants had higher true and false memory rates compared to those in the other-reference condition. Moreover, we found that selfreferencing did not exhibit superior mnemonic advantage in terms of net accuracy compared to other-referencing and neutral conditions. These findings are discussed in terms of theoretical frameworks such as spreading activation theories and the fuzzytrace theory. We propose that our results reflect the adaptive nature of memory in the sense that cognitive processes that increase mnemonic efficiency may also increase susceptibility to associative false memories

Expert witnesses, dissociative amnesia, and extraordinary remembering:response to Brand et al.

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Developmental trends in lineup performance:Adolescents are more prone to innocent bystander misidentifications than children and adults

We tested developmental trends in eyewitness identification in biased and unbiased lineups. Our main interest was adolescent's lineup performance compared with children and adults. 7-10-year-olds, 11-13-year-olds, 14-16-year-olds, and adults (N = 431) watched a wallet-theft-video and subsequently identified the thief, victim, and witness from simultaneous target-present and target-absent six-person photo lineups. The thief-absent lineup included a bystander previously seen in thief proximity. Research on unconscious transference suggested a selection bias toward the bystander in adults and 11-13-year-olds, but not in younger children. Confirming our hypothesis, adolescents were more prone to bystander bias than all other age groups. This may be due to adolescents making more inferential errors than children, as predicted by fuzzy-trace theory and associative-activation theory, combined with lower inhibition control in adolescents compared with adults. We also replicated a clothing bias for all age groups and age-related performance differences in our unbiased lineups. Consistent with previous findings, participants were generally overconfident in their decisions, even though confidence was a better predictor of accuracy in older compared with younger participants. With this study, we show that adolescents have an increased tendency to misidentify an innocent bystander. Continued efforts are needed to disentangle how adolescents in comparison to other age groups perform in forensically relevant situations