Support of the collaborative inquiry learning process: influence of support on task and team regulation

Regulation of the learning process is an important condition for efficient and effective learning. In collaborative learning, students have to regulate their collaborative activities (team regulation) next to the regulation of their own learning process focused on the task at hand (task regulation). In this study, we investigate how support of collaborative inquiry learning can influence the use of regulative activities of students. Furthermore, we explore the possible relations between task regulation, team regulation and learning results. This study involves tenth-grade students who worked in pairs in a collaborative inquiry learning environment that was based on a computer simulation, Collisions, developed in the program SimQuest. Students of the same team worked on two different computers and communicated through chat. Chat logs of students from three different conditions are compared. Students in the first condition did not receive any support at all (Control condition). In the second condition, students received an instruction in effective communication, the RIDE rules (RIDE condition). In the third condition, students were, in addition to receiving the RIDE rules instruction, supported by the Collaborative Hypothesis Tool (CHT), which helped the students with formulating hypotheses together (CHT condition). The results show that students overall used more team regulation than task regulation. In the RIDE condition and the CHT condition, students regulated their team activities most often. Moreover, in the CHT condition the regulation of team activities was positively related to the learning results. We can conclude that different measures of support can enhance the use of team regulative activities, which in turn can lead to better learning results

Investigating ‘Churnalism’ in real time news

Language Use in Past and Presen

A comparison of methods for converting DCE values onto the full health-dead QALY scale

Cardinal preference elicitation techniques such as time trade-off (TTO) and Standard Gamble (SG) receive criticism for their complexity and difficulties in using them in more vulnerable populations. Ordinal techniques such as discrete choice experiment (DCE) and Best Worst Scaling (BWS) are easier, but values generated by them are not anchored onto the full health-dead 1-0 QALY scale required for use in economic evaluation. This paper explores new methods for converting modelled DCE latent values onto the full health-dead QALY scale: (1) anchoring assuming worst state is equal to being dead; (2) anchoring DCE values using dead as valued in the DCE; (3) anchoring DCE values using TTO value for worst state; (4) mapping DCE values onto TTO; (5) combining DCE and TTO data in a hybrid model. We use postal DCE data (n=263) and TTO data (n=307) collected by interview in a general population valuation study of an asthma condition-specific measure (AQL-5D). Methods (4) and (5) using mapping and hybrid models perform best; the anchor-based methods perform relatively poorly. These new methods have a useful role for producing values on the QALY scale from ordinal techniques such as DCE and BWS for use in cost utility analyses

Application of Operator Splitting Methods in Finance

Financial derivatives pricing aims to find the fair value of a financial contract on an underlying asset. Here we consider option pricing in the partial differential equations framework. The contemporary models lead to one-dimensional or multidimensional parabolic problems of the convection-diffusion type and generalizations thereof. An overview of various operator splitting methods is presented for the efficient numerical solution of these problems. Splitting schemes of the Alternating Direction Implicit (ADI) type are discussed for multidimensional problems, e.g. given by stochastic volatility (SV) models. For jump models Implicit-Explicit (IMEX) methods are considered which efficiently treat the nonlocal jump operator. For American options an easy-to-implement operator splitting method is described for the resulting linear complementarity problems. Numerical experiments are presented to illustrate the actual stability and convergence of the splitting schemes. Here European and American put options are considered under four asset price models: the classical Black-Scholes model, the Merton jump-diffusion model, the Heston SV model, and the Bates SV model with jumps

Putting Political Economy to Use in Aid Policies

Political economy analysis has been a favourite instrument among donors of development aid since roughly the turn of the century. Donors have emphasised the usefulness of such forms of analysis because they realised that their focus on the formal aspects of the social and political organisation of countries had caused them to overlook important elements of the “political economy” of these countries. As a result, political and governance reform programmes, which had become part and parcel of the agenda of development under the post-Washington consensus, turned out to be much less effective than anticipated.The call for donor agencies to “look behind the façade” of formal institutions in developing countries has thus come as part of the aid effectiveness agenda. It was argued that the effectiveness of development assistance policies would be enhanced if the realities of social and political power structures in developing countries were mapped and fed into the design of governance reforms targeting those countries. A more or less tacit assumption was that political economy analysis would enable donors to identify potential pockets of resistance to the reforms that they were advocating – hence improving the chances of getting reforms accepted

The Anti-Politics of Development: donor agencies and the political economy of governance

Abstract This article discusses the attempt undertaken by several development aid agencies since the turn of the century to integrate political economy assessments into their decision making on development assistance. The article discusses three such attempts: the Drivers of Change adopted by the UK’s Department for International Development, the Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA) developed by the Dutch Directorate General for International Cooperation and the new thinking on political economy analysis, policy reform and political risk advanced by the World Bank. On the basis of a political-economic interpretation of development agencies, two main factors are found to hinder the successful application of political economy assessment. In the first place, the agencies’ professional outlook leads them to see development in primarily technical terms. In the second place, the nature of incentives for development professionals leads them to resist the implementation o

Aid, Political Economy and Governance Reform

Intro: The Rise of Political-Economy Analysis for Development Assistance Political-economy analysis has been a favourite instrument among donors of development aid since roughly the turn of the century. The usefulness of such forms of analysis has been emphasised because donors realised that their focus on formal aspects of the social and political organisation of countries caused them to overlook important elements of the ‘political economy’ of these countries. As a result of this, political and governance reform programmes, which had become part and parcel of the agenda of development under the Post-Washington Consensus, turned out to be much less effective than anticipated.The call for donor agencies to ‘look behind the façade’ of formal institutions in developing countries has thus come as part of the aid effectiveness agenda. It was argued that the effectiveness of development assistance policies would be enhanced if the realities of social and political power structures indeveloping countries were mapped and fed into the design of governance reforms targeting those countries. A more or less tacit assumption in this approach was that political-economy analysis would enable donors to identify potential pockets of resistance against the reforms that donors were advocating –hence improving the chances of getting reforms accepted