Writ(h)ing Images: Imagination, the Human Form, and the Divine in William Blake, Salman Rushdie, and Simon Louvish

In this paper, we address issues in segmentation Of remotely sensed LIDAR (LIght Detection And Ranging) data. The LIDAR data, which were captured by airborne laser scanner, contain 2.5 dimensional (2.5D) terrain surface height information, e.g. houses, vegetation, flat field, river, basin, etc. Our aim in this paper is to segment ground (flat field)from non-ground (houses and high vegetation) in hilly urban areas. By projecting the 2.5D data onto a surface, we obtain a texture map as a grey-level image. Based on the image, Gabor wavelet filters are applied to generate Gabor wavelet features. These features are then grouped into various windows. Among these windows, a combination of their first and second order of statistics is used as a measure to determine the surface properties. The test results have shown that ground areas can successfully be segmented from LIDAR data. Most buildings and high vegetation can be detected. In addition, Gabor wavelet transform can partially remove hill or slope effects in the original data by tuning Gabor parameters

Explaining Myanmar's Regime Transition: The Periphery is Central

In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22 years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian ‘regime breakdown’ and ‘regime maintenance’. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalise once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar’s always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalising in 2010, the regime sought to create a ‘disciplined democracy’ to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via ‘ceasefire capitalism’, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total ‘victory’ for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace

Developing strategies to toughen bio-inspired adhesives

Mussels and other marine creatures adhere very well in underwater environments, having the ability to withstand the force of the sea. These animals have inspired synthetic biomimetic adhesives for wet systems, presenting potential for biomedical applications. However, most current commercial adhesives tend to be brittle, not resisting repetitive movements. This study assesses toughening strategies to improve the mussel-inspired adhesives’ ductility while maintaining its strength. The strategies included altering the polymer’s chemical structure by changing the percentage of polyethylene glycol (PEG) in the molecule and by adding fillers, such as calcium carbonate, silica and nacre - a calcium carbonate compound found in shells. The dry adhesion of the glues was tested by shear lap tests on standard aluminum samples. The addition of PEG increased the ductility of the polymer considerably, creating a viscous paste rather than a solid. Future advances include analyzing the tensile strength and adhesion of the systems, as well as their resistance in wet environments. Furthermore, the toxicity of both the polymer and potential fillers should be investigated

Strong armies, slow adaptation: civil-military relations and diffusion of military power

Why are some states more willing to adopt military innovations than others? Why, for example, were the great powers of Europe able to successfully reform their military practices to better adapt to and participate in the so-called military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while their most important extra-European competitor, the Ottoman Empire, failed to do so? This puzzle is best explained by two factors: civil-military relations and historical timing. In the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of an institutionally strong and internally cohesive army during the early stages of state formation—in the late fourteenth century—equipped the military with substantial bargaining powers. In contrast, the great powers of Europe drew heavily on private providers of military power during the military revolution and developed similar armies only by the second half of the seventeenth century, limiting the bargaining leverage of European militaries over their rulers. In essence, the Ottoman standing army was able to block reform efforts that it believed challenged its parochial interests. Absent a similar institutional challenge, European rulers initiated military reforms and motivated officers and military entrepreneurs to participate in the ongoing military revolution

Who punishes the leader? Leader culpability and coups during civil war

Who punishes leaders via coups during civil war? By distinguishing between different types of internal audiences within the government and their attempts to remove a leader forcefully, I illuminate the mechanisms that explain variation in who punishes the leader during wartime. I claim that whether leaders are culpable for the initiation of the war has an important implication for whether they are punished by members of the ruling coalition (i.e., those with access to decision-making and political power), or by those outside the ruling coalition. Empirical evidence supports my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely to experience coup attempts led by those outside the leaders' ruling coalition, should the war go poorly; and (ii) nonculpable leaders are more likely to experience coups executed by members of their ruling coalition. The findings have important implications for how leaders respond to audience pressures as they consider whether to fight or settle

The Third wave in globalization theory

This essay examines a proposition made in the literature that there are three waves in globalization theory—the globalist, skeptical, and postskeptical or transformational waves—and argues that this division requires a new look. The essay is a critique of the third of these waves and its relationship with the second wave. Contributors to the third wave not only defend the idea of globalization from criticism by the skeptics but also try to construct a more complex and qualified theory of globalization than provided by first-wave accounts. The argument made here is that third-wave authors come to conclusions that try to defend globalization yet include qualifications that in practice reaffirm skeptical claims. This feature of the literature has been overlooked in debates and the aim of this essay is to revisit the literature and identify as well as discuss this problem. Such a presentation has political implications. Third wavers propose globalist cosmopolitan democracy when the substance of their arguments does more in practice to bolster the skeptical view of politics based on inequality and conflict, nation-states and regional blocs, and alliances of common interest or ideology rather than cosmopolitan global structures

Elections and Ethnic Civil War

Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratization to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect ethnic groups’ inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over territory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce the risk of conflict. </jats:p