Who Gets What from International Organizations? The Case of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Technical Cooperation

What affects the allocation of aid by international organizations to their member states? Using data on nuclear assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), I demonstrate that political considerations affect the likelihood of receiving aid, and the amount of aid countries receive. Specifically, I find that membership in the IAEA Board of Governors or acceptance of tougher IAEA inspections increase the likelihood of IAEA assistance, and in some cases the amounts of assistance, but only for countries that do not share policy preferences with the US. This finding is consistent with theories that foreign aid is given in exchange for cooperation and concessions to recipients that are not likely to be cooperative without aid. I also examine whether nuclear assistance is given to countries that need it the most and that can make effective use of this aid, and find only partial support for need-based explanations of aid allocation