Adoption incentives and environmental policy timing under asymmetric information and strategic firm behaviour

We consider the incentives of a single firm to invest in a cleaner technology under emission quotas and emission taxation. We assume asymmetric information about the firm's cost of employing the new technology. Policy is set either before the firm invests (commitment) or after (time consistency). Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that with commitment (time consistency), quotas give higher (lower) investment incentives than taxes. With quotas (taxes), commitment generally leads to higher (lower) welfare than time consistency. Under commitment with quadratic abatement costs and environmental damages, a modified Weitzman rule applies and quotas usually lead to higher welfare than taxes

Liberalizing trade in environmental goods and services

We examine the effects of trade liberalization in environmental goods in a model with one domestic downstream polluting firm and two upstream firms (one domestic, one foreign). The upstream firms offer their technologies to the downstream firm at a flat fee. The domestic government sets the emission tax rate after the outcome of R&D is known. The effect of liberalization on the domestic upstream firm's R&D incentive is ambiguous. Liberalization usually results in cleaner production, which allows the country to reach higher welfare. However this increase in welfare is typically achieved at the expense of the environment (a backfire effect)

On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a differential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of firms in the commons is also addressed

ecoOcean - games in Fisheries education, communication and science

There is growing realization of the potential for games and experiments as powerful tools for education, outreach and research in many fields of science. Particularly in fisheries management we face a growing demand for stakeholder involvement, which requires new ways in reaching informed decision making. Games and experiments can be used for (i) teaching economic and ecological principles to pupils, students and the general public, (ii) outreach and communication with stakeholders in participatory assessment or management environments, and (iii) collecting scientific data in controlled research experiments. We developed a conceptual approach and realized the fisheries simulation game ecoOcean. This tool has so far primarily been used for dissemination purposes. The great success of the current version of the game is a strong motivation to proceed on these lines. The game shall be further developed to include a higher complexity and enable the simulation of management measures, i.e. the stakeholder can play through management measures. The paper shall rise awareness of the strengths of this new approach to stakeholder involvement. We will describe past and current approaches and draw a vision on future use of games in education, communication and science, using the conceptual approach we have taken with ecoOcean

Redealing the Cards: How the Presence of an Eco-Industry Modifies the Political Economy of Environmental Policies

An incumbent government maximizes its chances of being reelected. Its objective function encompasses both social welfare and political contributions. Its only instrument is a pollution tax. In an open-economy context, we introduce an eco-industry in addition to lobbies of polluting firms and environmentalists. Not only does the eco-industry lobby add a new political contribution toward a higher environmental tax, it also modifies the incentives of the usual lobbies. When the foreign environmental policy is constant, environmentalists can be in favor of a decrease in the local tax in order to reduce foreign pollution. It could also be in the interest of a vertical industrial pressure group to lobby toward more stringent environmental policy. In general, the impact of lobbying activities on the politically optimal tax is ambiguous as pressure groups push in different directions

'Windfall Profits 2.0' During the Third Phase of the EU-ETS

The first two phases of the EU-ETS were characterized by a profit increase, which was primarily due to free allowances given through grandfathering. To avoid these windfall profits and to decrease leakage, two major modifications have been implemented for the third phase: electric companies no longer receive free allowances, while energy intensive and trade exposed sectors are granted free allowances that are calculated based on firm production capacity. This paper theoretically shows a new type of profit increase in sectors that are not exposed to international competition. This paper also illustrates the profit increase for the third phase of the EU-ETS and shows that profits in the electricity sector may increase by approximately 2% when free allowances are given to the other sectors

Do short-term laboratory experiments provide valid descriptions of long-term economic interactions? A study of Cournot markets

One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric Cournot duopoly, we conduct internet treatments lasting more than a month. Subjects make the same number of decisions as in the short-term counterparts, but they decide once a day. We compare these treatments to corresponding standard laboratory treatments and also to short-term internet treatments lasting one hour. We do not observe differences in behavior between the short- and long-term in the symmetric treatments, and only a small difference in the asymmetric treatments. We overall conclude that behavior is not considerably different between the short- and long-term