Environmental occurrence, analysis, and toxicology of toxaphene compounds.

Toxaphene production, in quantities similar to those of polychlorinated biphenyls, has resulted in high toxaphene levels in fish from the Great Lakes and in Arctic marine mammals (up to 10 and 16 microg g-1 lipid). Because of the large variabiliity in total toxaphene data, few reliable conclusions can be drawn about trends or geographic differences in toxaphene concentrations. New developments in mass spectrometric detection using either negative chemical ionization or electron impact modes as well as in multidimensional gas chromatography recently have led researchers to suggest congener-specific approaches. Recently, several nomenclature systems have been developed for toxaphene compounds. Although all systems have specific advantages and limitations, it is suggested that an international body such as the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry make an attempt to obtain uniformity in the literature. Toxicologic information on individual chlorobornanes is scarce, but some reports have recently appeared. Neurotoxic effects of toxaphene exposure such as those on behavior and learning have been reported. Technical toxaphene and some individual congeners were found to be weakly estrogenic in in vitro test systems; no evidence for endocrine effects in vivo has been reported. In vitro studies show technical toxaphene and toxaphene congeners to be mutagenic. However, in vivo studies have not shown genotoxicity; therefore, a nongenotoxic mechanism is proposed. Nevertheless, toxaphene is believed to present a potential carcinogenic risk to humans. Until now, only Germany has established a legal tolerance level for toxaphene--0.1 mg kg-1 wet weight for fish

Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?

Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal policies, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success