Deep Brain Stimulation in Anorexia Nervosa: Hope for the Hopeless or Exploitation of the Vulnerable? The Oxford Neuroethics Gold Standard Framework

Neurosurgical interventions for psychiatric disorders have a long and troubled history (1, 2) but have become much more refined in the last few decades due to the rapid development of neuroimaging and robotic technologies (2). These advances have enabled the design of less invasive techniques, which are more focused, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) (3). DBS involves electrode insertion into specific neural targets implicated in pathological behavior, which are then repeatedly stimulated at adjustable frequencies. DBS has been used for Parkinson's disease and movement disorders since the 1960s (4-6) and over the last decade has been applied to treatment-refractory psychiatric disorders, with some evidence of benefit in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), major depressive disorder, and addictions (7). Recent consensus guidelines on best practice in psychiatric neurosurgery (8) stress, however, that DBS for psychiatric disorders remains at an experimental and exploratory stage. The ethics of DBS-in particular for psychiatric conditions-is debated (1, 8-10). Much of this discourse surrounds the philosophical implications of competence, authenticity, personality, or identity change following neurosurgical interventions, but there is a paucity of applied guidance on neuroethical best practice in psychiatric DBS, and health-care professionals have expressed that they require more (11). This paper aims to redress this balance by providing a practical, applied neuroethical gold standard framework to guide research ethics committees, researchers, and institutional sponsors. We will describe this as applied to our protocol for a particular research trial of DBS in severe and enduring anorexia nervosa (SE-AN) (https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01924598, unique identifier NCT01924598), but believe it may have wider application to DBS in other psychiatric disorders

Deep Brain Stimulation in Anorexia Nervosa: Hope for the Hopeless or Exploitation of the Vulnerable? The Oxford Neuroethics Gold Standard Framework

Neurosurgical interventions for psychiatric disorders have a long and troubled history (1, 2) but have become much more refined in the last few decades due to the rapid development of neuroimaging and robotic technologies (2). These advances have enabled the design of less invasive techniques, which are more focused, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) (3). DBS involves electrode insertion into specific neural targets implicated in pathological behavior, which are then repeatedly stimulated at adjustable frequencies. DBS has been used for Parkinson's disease and movement disorders since the 1960s (4-6) and over the last decade has been applied to treatment-refractory psychiatric disorders, with some evidence of benefit in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), major depressive disorder, and addictions (7). Recent consensus guidelines on best practice in psychiatric neurosurgery (8) stress, however, that DBS for psychiatric disorders remains at an experimental and exploratory stage. The ethics of DBS-in particular for psychiatric conditions-is debated (1, 8-10). Much of this discourse surrounds the philosophical implications of competence, authenticity, personality, or identity change following neurosurgical interventions, but there is a paucity of applied guidance on neuroethical best practice in psychiatric DBS, and health-care professionals have expressed that they require more (11). This paper aims to redress this balance by providing a practical, applied neuroethical gold standard framework to guide research ethics committees, researchers, and institutional sponsors. We will describe this as applied to our protocol for a particular research trial of DBS in severe and enduring anorexia nervosa (SE-AN) (https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01924598, unique identifier NCT01924598), but believe it may have wider application to DBS in other psychiatric disorders

Depression, possibilities, and competence: A phenomenological perspective

Competent decision-making is required for informed consent. In this paper, I aim, from a phenomenological perspective, to identify the specific facets of competent decision-making that may form a challenge to depressed patients. On a phenomenological account, mood and emotions are crucial to the way in which human beings encounter the world. More precisely, mood is intimately related to the options and future possibilities we perceive in the world around us. I examine how possibilities should be understood in this context, and how, in depression, decision-making might be compromised. I suggest that, based on this analysis, a specific emphasis and alertness in assessments of competence in depressed patients is called for. In fact, close attention should be paid to the range of future possibilities depressed patients are able to perceive. In addition, providing environmental cues to these patients might be one way of enhancing their decision-making capacity. The practical suggestions arrived at are open to empirical research

The ethics of psychopharmacological research in legal minors

Research in psychopharmacology for children and adolescents is fraught with ethical problems and tensions. This has practical consequences as it leads to a paucity of the research that is essential to support the treatment of this vulnerable group. In this article, we will discuss some of the ethical issues which are relevant to such research, and explore their implications for both research and standard care. We suggest that finding a way forward requires a willingness to acknowledge and discuss the inherent conflicts between the ethical principles involved. Furthermore, in order to facilitate more, ethically sound psychopharmacology research in children and adolescents, we suggest more ethical analysis, empirical ethics research and ethics input built into psychopharmacological research design