The Rule of Law in the Reform of Legal Education : Teaching the Legal Mind in Japanese Law Schools

a. The Rule of Law is at the heart of the present legal reform. b. There is an international consensus about basic elements of the Rule of Law. c. Legal methods are central to the Rule of Law. But different legal methods are used to realize the Rule of Law. d. Teaching legal methods, i.e., teaching to think like a lawyer, is at the heart of that which is professional in legal education. e. The present legal reform invites Japanese law schools to teach legal methods

The New Japanese Law Schools

Japan is in the process of implementing a comprehensive reform of its justice system. At the heart of the reform is a complete overhaul of the system of legal education. The new system is intended to increase substantially the number of lawyers in the country. On April 1, 2004 as many as 72 new law schools are to come into existence. Japanese legal education is shifting from a German-inspired law faculty approach to an American-style law school system. Based on first-hand observations, this article discusses the present and future system of Japanese legal education with reference to its foreign counterparts

Freedom of Information and the EU Data Protection Directive

Because of advancements in information technology, the tension between protection of privacy and freedom of information has intensified. In the United States this tension is addressed with sector specific laws, like the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Conversely, in Europe, data protection laws of general applicability have existed for two decades. Recently, the Council of Ministers adopted a Common Position in a data protection directive. The Author analyzes specific provisions of the Directive, primarily focusing on the provisions that address the tension between the right of privacy and the free flow of information within the European Union. Ultimately, the Directive strikes a balance between privacy and the free flow of information in three ways. First, the Directive is limited to personal data and does not apply to information about corporate or governmental bodies. Next, the Directive allows Member States to create their own exceptions in certain categories like journalism. Finally, it requires Member States to prohibit processing of racial, ethnic, political, or religious data although allows processing in five enumerated instances

Freedom of Information and the EU Data Protection Directive

Because of advancements in information technology, the tension between protection of privacy and freedom of information has intensified. In the United States this tension is addressed with sector specific laws, like the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Conversely, in Europe, data protection laws of general applicability have existed for two decades. Recently, the Council of Ministers adopted a Common Position in a data protection directive. The Author analyzes specific provisions of the Directive, primarily focusing on the provisions that address the tension between the right of privacy and the free flow of information within the European Union. Ultimately, the Directive strikes a balance between privacy and the free flow of information in three ways. First, the Directive is limited to personal data and does not apply to information about corporate or governmental bodies. Next, the Directive allows Member States to create their own exceptions in certain categories like journalism. Finally, it requires Member States to prohibit processing of racial, ethnic, political, or religious data although allows processing in five enumerated instances

Educating Lawyers Now and Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the Case Method

In Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching has again turned its attention to legal education. Much as it did in the early years of the last century, in the first years of this century in its Preparation for the Professions Program (“PPP”), the Carnegie Foundation is examining professional education generally. In the early twentieth century, the Carnegie Foundation published its first report in law, The Common Law and the Case Method in American University Law Schools, prepared in 1914 by Josef Redlich, an Austrian law professor. The two reports are referred to here as the PPP Legal Education Report and as the Redlich Report respectively. This Article takes three of the four principal themes of the PPP Legal Education Report—the case method, education for practice, and education for the public dimension of law—and contrasts their treatment in the PPP Legal Education Report with that in the Redlich Report. While the two reports are eerily similar, their differences inform us about the course that American legal education took in the last century

Educating Lawyers Now and Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the Case Method

In Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching has again turned its attention to legal education. Much as it did in the early years of the last century, in the first years of this century in its Preparation for the Professions Program (“PPP”), the Carnegie Foundation is examining professional education generally. In the early twentieth century, the Carnegie Foundation published its first report in law, The Common Law and the Case Method in American University Law Schools, prepared in 1914 by Josef Redlich, an Austrian law professor. The two reports are referred to here as the PPP Legal Education Report and as the Redlich Report respectively. This Article takes three of the four principal themes of the PPP Legal Education Report—the case method, education for practice, and education for the public dimension of law—and contrasts their treatment in the PPP Legal Education Report with that in the Redlich Report. While the two reports are eerily similar, their differences inform us about the course that American legal education took in the last century

Scalia & Garner’s Reading Law: A Civil Law for the Age of Statutes?

In Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and American legal lexicographer Bryan A. Garner challenge Americans to start over in dealing with statutes in the Age of Statutes. They propose “textualism,” i.e., “that the words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey in their context is what the text means.” Textualism is meant to remedy the American lack of “a generally agreed-on approach to the interpretation of legal texts.” That deficiency makes American law unpredictable, unequal, undemocratic and political. In the book’s Foreword, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook calls the book “a great event in American legal culture.” It is a remarkable book because it challenges common law traditions. This review essay shows how Scalia and Garner challenge common law and summarizes the content of their challenge. This article contrasts the methods of Reading Law with the methods of the Continental civil law. It shows that textualism is consistent with modern civil law methods. It also shows, however, that pure textualism, which largely restricts interpretation to grammatical and historical interpretation and excludes non-textual interpretation such as equitable, pragmatic and purposive approaches, is not consistent with modern civil law methods. In modern civil law, textualism and non-textualism coexist. They must, if law is to honor legal certainty, justice and policy