A limit theorem to a time-fractional diffusion

We prove a limit theorem for an integral functional of a Markov process. The Markovian dynamics is characterized by a linear Boltzmann equation modeling a one-dimensional test particle of mass $\lambda^{-1}\gg 1$ in an external periodic potential and undergoing collisions with a background gas of particles with mass one. The object of our limit theorem is the time integral of the force exerted on the test particle by the potential, and we consider this quantity in the limit that $\lambda$ tends to zero for time intervals on the scale $\lambda^{-1}$. Under appropriate rescaling, the total drift in momentum generated by the potential converges to a Brownian motion time-changed by the local time at zero of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.Comment: 35 page

The Causes of Order Effects in Contingent Valuation Surveys: An Experimental Investigation

CV researchers have found that the hypothetical values respondents place on a nested sequence of environmental goods are sensitive to the order in which the goods are presented. Typically, the smallest bundle of goods is valued more highly if presented first than if following more comprehensive bundles. Such effects appear even when each bundle is valued from an "exclusive" list, or as an alternative to any other, so that income and substitution effects are controlled. Order of presentation has also affected the degree to which values are sensitive to scope. We conduct lab experiments where participants are asked to value sequences of nested goods for actual purchase from an exclusive list using the incentive compatible BDM mechanism. We test whether order effects occur in valuation for a) induced value goods, b) actual private goods, and c) identical private goods that are to be donated to charities. We find significant order effects when the goods are valued for own use, but not when they are valued for donation.Order effects; exclusive list; warm glow; contingent valuation

The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test

In one of the most ambitious forms of environmental decision-making, representatives of interested parties – environmentalists, developers, farmers, loggers, miners, etc. - are charged with the responsibility of developing a set of public policies that is acceptable to all of them. Although this approach has become increasingly popular, and has been widely discussed in the academic literature, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached in this type of negotiation. We do not know, for example, whether these outcomes meet the standard criteria for efficiency or equity. In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to test whether a number of axiomatic models of bargaining can predict the behavior of the parties to environmental decision making. In recognition of the multi-dimensional aspect of most public land use conflicts, we ask pairs of subjects to negotiate over two goods, without the possibility of cash side payments. We thus provide one of the first experimental tests of a prediction associated with the Edgeworth Box: that parties with an initial endowment that is Pareto inefficient will make trades until they reach a Pareto efficient allocation. We further test whether parties in particular reach the Nash bargain when it coincides with or conflicts with outcomes that maximise the parties’ joint payoffs and with outcomes at which the parties’ receive equal payoffs. Finally, the effect of providing parties with full or partial information regarding payoffs is also examined.Axiomatic models of bargaining; Experimental tests; Land use conflicts; Collaborative policymaking

Paying Vs. Waiting in the Pursuit of Specific Egalitarianism

We propose an allocation mechanism for publicly providing a private good such that the final allocation is simultaneously independent of income and increasing in strength of preference or need. The "pay or wait" mechanism consists of offering the good for sale at two outlets. The 'queuing' outlet would charge a low money price per unit, but high waiting timer per unit. The 'pricing' outlet would charge a relatively high money price with rapid service. High wage individuals will opt for the pricing outlet, and low wage individuals the queuing outlet. If the policy maker stocks the outlets in proportion to the distribution of high and low wage earners in the population, consumers of both wages will purchase the same amount on average, while those who value the good more relative to other goods will receive more of it. These outcomes are at risk if the good can be privately resold, but may be preserved if the policy maker can create transactions costs associated with resale.In-kind provision; redistribution; specific egalitarianism

The Effect of Neighbourhood Diversity on Volunteering: Evidence from New Zealand

An empirical literature has found that neighborhood heterogeneity lowers people's likelihood of contributing to public goods. We show that the estimated effect of any concave neighborhood characteristic on behavior may be biased when “large” rather than “small” neighborhoods are used. Large boundaries omit the effect of differences between small neighborhoods, biasing a characteristic's total effect even when the omitted differences lack economic effect. We next use three New Zealand census rounds to test whether volunteering rates are lowered by neighborhood heterogeneity by race/ethnicity, birthplace, income or language. We find boundaries matter, with only ethnic/racial heterogeneity robustly associated with lower volunteering.heterogeneity; neighbourhood effects; volunteering

Does Higher Social Diversity Affect People’s Contributions to Local Schools? Evidence from New Zealand

New Zealand is becoming more socially diverse, in common with other Western countries. Primarily U.S. based-evidence suggests that growing diversity may lower people’s participation in society, and their contributions towards public goods. We test whether there is evidence of a similar relationship in New Zealand, specifically between social diversity and voluntary contributions towards local schools. We use data from the New Zealand Ministry of Education and the Census for the years 2001 and 2006 to estimate whether social heterogeneity affects a school’s ability to raise funds locally. Individual school revenue data is matched with measures of the heterogeneity of the neighbourhood in which the school is located. We consider heterogeneity by language, ethnicity, religion and income. After running cross-section and fixed effects regressions which control for other factors, we find only limited evidence that diversity affects the financial support schools receive from their local communities. We do find that higher nominal household income inequality lowers the revenues schools collect from fundraising, but not the revenues they receive from parental contributions or donations.heterogeneity; social capital; school contributions; fundraising

Decoherence rates for Galilean covariant dynamics

We introduce a measure of decoherence for a class of density operators. For Gaussian density operators in dimension one it coincides with an index used by Morikawa (1990). Spatial decoherence rates are derived for three large classes of the Galilean covariant quantum semigroups introduced by Holevo. We also characterize the relaxation to a Gaussian state for these dynamics and give a theorem for the convergence of the Wigner function to the probability distribution of the classical analog of the process.Comment: 23 page