Differential Game for Environmental-Regulation in Green Supply Chain

[[abstract]]This paper demonstrates that a proper design of environmental-regulation pricing strategies is able to promote Extended Product Responsibility for green supply chain firms in a competitive market. A differential game model comprising Vidale-Wolfe equation has been established in light of sales competition and recycling dynamics as well as regulation related profit function. Analytic solutions of Markovian Nash equilibriums are provided with the necessary condition derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We found that governments should opt to gradually raise regulation standards so that rational manufacturers will gradually improve its product recyclability, and, in turn, Extended Product Responsibility will get promoted

Environmental-Regulation Pricing Strategies for Green Supply Chain Management

This paper demonstrates that a proper design of environmental-regulation pricing strategies is able to promote Extended Product Responsibility for green supply chain firms in a competitive market. A differential game model comprising Vidale-Wolfe equation has been established in light of sales competition and recycling dynamics as well as regulation related profit function. Analytic solutions of Markovian Nash equilibriums are provided with the necessary condition derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We found that governments should opt to gradually raise regulation standards so that rational manufacturers will gradually improve its product recyclability, and, in turn, Extended Product Responsibility will get promoted

Environmental-Regulation Pricing Strategies for Green Supply Chain Management

This paper demonstrates that a proper design of environmental-regulation pricing strategies is able to promote Extended Product Responsibility for green supply chain firms in a competitive market. A differential game model comprising Vidale-Wolfe equation has been established in light of sales competition and recycling dynamics as well as regulation related profit function. Analytic solutions of Markovian Nash equilibriums are provided with the necessary condition derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We found that governments should opt to gradually raise regulation standards so that rational manufacturers will gradually improve its product recyclability, and, in turn, Extended Product Responsibility will get promoted

Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks

AbstractUnder the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads. Specifically, motivated by the real‐world scenarios and pre‐analysis industrial discussions, we combine a Gioia‐based exploratory case study with an analytical model to seek solutions of cross‐border scarce goods bartering at both the government (public) level and capacity reallocation at the firm (private) level. Furthermore, we conduct post‐analysis industrial discussions with managers of semiconductor companies to validate our theoretical and analytical results. We find that the marginal cost and willingness to barter are two critical factors that jointly affect the focal P–P collaborative dyad's net benefits gained from cross‐border bartering. Moreover, the existence of outside options in a cross‐border bartering increases the negotiating position of the focal dyad when interacting with the negotiated P–P dyad. Insights are generated on how the focal firm should strategically prioritize its global customers in capacity reallocation and meanwhile help its own government obtain the much‐needed scarce‐goods for a triple‐win solution. In particular, the focal firm's market power can be strategically leveraged to enhance the focal government's bargaining power. It acts as a noncoercive strategy to help fulfil the focal P–P collaborative dyad's missions and goals in cross‐border reciprocal bartering. We verify that the marginal cost and willingness to barter are the primary factors influencing, respectively, the decisions of the focal firm and government.</jats:p

Factors influencing follow-on public offering of shippng companies from investor perspective – a hybrid multiple-criteria decision-making approach

The shipping industry transports nearly 80% of the goods worldwide and requires large funding. The shipping industry shifted from debt to equity as the source of funding in the last decade. Because most shipping companies already had their initial public offering before 2013, these companies tend to engage in follow-on equity offerings (FPO). However, the challenge faced by the shipping companies is the lack of knowledge on successful FPO. The purpose of this study is to identify the most influential factors affecting shipping companies’ FPO from the investor perspective. This research applies a hybrid multiple-criteria decision-making model integrating the fuzzy-Delphi method and Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory, processing survey responses covering four dimensions and 16 criteria from 33 investment experts. The results show that financial indicator is the primary cause affecting offering condition, technical indicators. An increase in earnings per share would help the financial performance of the shipping companies to appear most attractive to investors