Understanding students’ learning of technology through interaction supported by virtual reality

Given the profound influence that technology has on society, shaping our behaviours, conversations, and decisions, it is essential to understand its development and nature. Obtaining a complete understanding of technology requires us to explore both the nature of technology and its historical aspects. This study examines how using supportive images in a virtual reality (VR) learning environment, combined with verbal interactions, supports students aged eight and nine in developing an understanding of the nature of technology. Data were collected during an ordinary technology teaching activity and the analysis highlighted that these students, through interactions and VR images, demonstrated knowledge of all dimensions of technology, as described by DiGironimo (2011). The analysis of the findings indicated that the students’ knowledge could be categorized, but there seemed to be more complexity in their utterances than DiGironimo’s model could capture. Additionally, I employed a discursive analysis to achieve a deeper comprehension of the students’ perceptions of the history of technology. Here, the findings indicate that VR images can promote students’ interaction related to the history of technology, which often leads to exploratory conversations. The findings have the potential to support teachers in planning and conducting technology activities in primary schools, where images and verbal interactions could provide decisive support for developing an understanding of the nature of technology, especially the historical dimension of technology

Primary school students’ perception of technology

Research on students’ perceptions and understanding of technology has shown that students have a narrow view of technology: for example, technology is often manifested in students’ descriptions as artefacts or objects. This paper aims at investigating how students develop understanding of how technology is manifested during classroom activities in technology. The study was conducted at a compulsory primary school with eight-year-old students. The data (video and audio recordings) were collected in small-group interactions and whole-class discussions. In the interactions, the students utilised self-taken photographs to visualise their understanding and perception of technology. The analysing process is grounded in Mitcham’s (1994) manifestations of technology: object, activity, volition, and knowledge. Based on the students’ prior knowledge, they perceived technology as contemporary electrical artefacts. The findings indicate that students achieve a more nuanced perception and understanding of technology as objects during classroom activities in technology

Характеристика сили нервових процесів у плавців

OBJECTIVE: Higher levels of the novel inflammatory marker pentraxin 3 (PTX3) predict cardiovascular mortality in patients with chronic kidney disease (CKD). Yet, whether PTX3 predicts worsening of kidney function has been less well studied. We therefore investigated the associations between PTX3 levels, kidney disease measures and CKD incidence. METHODS: Cross-sectional associations between serum PTX3 levels, urinary albumin/creatinine ratio (ACR) and cystatin C-estimated glomerular filtration rate (GFR) were assessed in two independent community-based cohorts of elderly subjects: the Prospective Investigation of the Vasculature in Uppsala Seniors (PIVUS, n = 768, 51% women, mean age 75 years) and the Uppsala Longitudinal Study of Adult Men (ULSAM, n = 651, mean age 77 years). The longitudinal association between PTX3 level at baseline and incident CKD (GFR <60 mL( ) min(-1)  1.73 m(-) ²) was also analysed (number of events/number at risk: PIVUS 229/746, ULSAM 206/315). RESULTS: PTX3 levels were inversely associated with GFR [PIVUS: B-coefficient per 1 SD increase -0.16, 95% confidence interval (CI) -0.23 to -0.10, P < 0.001; ULSAM: B-coefficient per 1 SD increase -0.09, 95% CI -0.16 to -0.01, P < 0.05], but not ACR, after adjusting for age, gender, C-reactive protein and prevalent cardiovascular disease in cross-sectional analyses. In longitudinal analyses, PTX3 levels predicted incident CKD after 5 years in both cohorts [PIVUS: multivariable odds ratio (OR) 1.21, 95% CI 1.01-1.45, P < 0.05; ULSAM: multivariable OR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07-1.77, P < 0.05]. CONCLUSIONS: Higher PTX3 levels are associated with lower GFR and independently predict incident CKD in elderly men and women. Our data confirm and extend previous evidence suggesting that inflammatory processes are activated in the early stages of CKD and drive impairment of kidney function. Circulating PTX3 appears to be a promising biomarker of kidney disease

Glucose challenge metabolomics implicates medium-chain acylcarnitines in insulin resistance

Insulin resistance (IR) predisposes to type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease but its causes are incompletely understood. Metabolic challenges like the oral glucose tolerance test (OGTT) can reveal pathogenic mechanisms. We aimed to discover associations of IR with metabolite trajectories during OGTT. In 470 non-diabetic men (age 70.6 ± 0.6 years), plasma samples obtained at 0, 30 and 120 minutes during an OGTT were analyzed by untargeted liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry metabolomics. IR was assessed with the hyperinsulinemic-euglycemic clamp method. We applied age-adjusted linear regression to identify metabolites whose concentration change was related to IR. Nine trajectories, including monounsaturated fatty acids, lysophosphatidylethanolamines and a bile acid, were significantly associated with IR, with the strongest associations observed for medium-chain acylcarnitines C10 and C12, and no associations with L-carnitine or C2-, C8-, C14- or C16-carnitine. Concentrations of C10- and C12-carnitine decreased during OGTT with a blunted decline in participants with worse insulin resistance. Associations persisted after adjustment for obesity, fasting insulin and fasting glucose. In mouse 3T3-L1 adipocytes exposed to different acylcarnitines, we observed blunted insulin-stimulated glucose uptake after treatment with C10- or C12-carnitine. In conclusion, our results identify medium-chain acylcarnitines as possible contributors to IR

Impact of BMI and the Metabolic Syndrome on the Risk of Diabetes in Middle-Aged Men

OBJECTIVE The existence of an obese subgroup with a healthy metabolic profile and low diabetes risk has been proposed; yet long-term data are lacking. We aimed to investigate associations between combinations of BMI categories and metabolic syndrome and risk of type 2 diabetes in middle-aged men. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS At age 50, cardiovascular risk factors were assessed in 1,675 participants without diabetes in the community-based Uppsala Longitudinal Study of Adult Men (ULSAM) study. According to BMI/metabolic syndrome status, they were categorized as normal weight (BMI &amp;lt;25 kg/m2) without metabolic syndrome (National Cholesterol Education Program criteria, n = 853), normal weight with metabolic syndrome (n = 60), overweight (BMI 25–30 kg/m2) without metabolic syndrome (n = 557), overweight with metabolic syndrome (n = 117), obese (BMI &amp;gt;30 kg/m2) without metabolic syndrome (n = 28), and obese with metabolic syndrome (n = 60). We investigated the associations between BMI/metabolic syndrome categories at baseline and diabetes incidence. RESULTS After 20 years, 160 participants had developed diabetes. In logistic regression models adjusting for age, smoking, and physical activity, increased risks for diabetes were observed in the normal weight with metabolic syndrome (odds ratio 3.28 [95% CI] 1.38–7.81; P = 0.007), overweight without metabolic syndrome (3.49 [2.26–5.42]; P &amp;lt; 0.001), overweight with metabolic syndrome (7.77 [4.44–13.62]; P &amp;lt; 0.001), obese without metabolic syndrome (11.72 [4.88–28.16]; P &amp;lt; 0.001), and obese with metabolic syndrome (10.06 [5.19–19.51]; P &amp;lt; 0.001) categories compared with the normal weight without metabolic syndrome category. CONCLUSIONS Overweight or obese men without metabolic syndrome were at increased risk for diabetes. Our data provide further evidence that overweight and obesity in the absence of the metabolic syndrome should not be considered a harmless condition. </jats:sec

Memory for Stimulus Sequences: a Divide between Humans and Other Animals?

Humans stand out among animals for their unique capacities in domains such as language, culture and imitation, yet it has been difficult to identify cognitive elements that are specifically human. Most research has focused on how information is processed after it is acquired, e.g. in problem solving or ‘insight’ tasks, but we may also look for species differences in the initial acquisition and coding of information. Here, we show that non-human species have only a limited capacity to discriminate ordered sequences of stimuli. Collating data from 108 experiments on stimulus sequence discrimination (1540 data points from 14 bird and mammal species), we demonstrate pervasive and systematic errors, such as confusing a red–green sequence of lights with green–red and green–green sequences. These errors can persist after thousands of learning trials in tasks that humans learn to near perfection within tens of trials. To elucidate the causes of such poor performance, we formulate and test a mathematical model of non-human sequence discrimination, assuming that animals represent sequences as unstructured collections of memory traces. This representation carries only approximate information about stimulus duration, recency, order and frequency, yet our model predicts non-human performance with a 5.9% mean absolute error across 68 datasets. Because human-level cognition requires more accurate encoding of sequential information than afforded by memory traces, we conclude that improved coding of sequential information is a key cognitiv

What changes in trade patterns can be observed in Russian crude oil export from the St. Petersburg region since the beginning of the Russian Ukrainian war in 2022. Three case studies from India, Turkey and Italy.

Historisk importerte EU (Den europeiske union) mesteparten av råoljen som ble eksportert fra St. Petersburg-regionen. Etter Russlands invasjon av Ukraina den 24. februar 2022 ble det imidlertid innført betydelige internasjonale sanksjoner mot Russland, inkludert EUs embargo og pristaket på russisk råolje. Gjennomgangen av litteraturen antyder at India absorberte mesteparten av markedsandelen som EU etterlot seg, og ble den primære importøren av russisk råolje. Interessant nok indikerte noe litteratur at EU-land fortsatte å importere russisk råolje selv etter at embargoen trådte i kraft. Denne studien undersøkte endringer i handelsmønstre for russiske råoljeeksporter fra St. Petersburg-regionen etter invasjonen, med casestudier fokusert på India, Tyrkia og Italia. En kvantitativ metode ble brukt for å analysere havneanløp, endringer i skipenes dypgående og bevegelser for å identifisere endringer i handelsmønstre. Våre funn støtter at India absorberte mesteparten av råoljemarkedet som tidligere ble forsynt til EU. Indias økning i import av russisk råolje ser ut til å være drevet av økonomiske insentiver for å sikre utenlandsk olje for å opprettholde økonomisk utvikling. Videre antyder våre observasjoner at Tyrkia var en betydelig importør av råolje fra St. Petersburg-regionen. På lik linje med India absorberte Tyrkia en del av markedet EU etterlot seg. Det ser imidlertid ut til at mesteparten av Tyrkias raffinerte råolje ble eksportert til EU- og G7-land. Selv om disse handlingene forblir innenfor rammene av internasjonal lov, reiser de spørsmål om effektiviteten av sanksjonene i å begrense strømmen av russisk olje til vestlige markeder. Til slutt foreslår vi at Italias import av råolje fra St. Petersburg-regionen kan tilskrives to årsaker. For det første fant vi at et raffineri i Italia var under russisk eierskap og var avhengig av russiske forsyninger. Raffineriet ble solgt til nye eiere etter sanksjonene mot Russland. For det andre fant vi at på grunn av forstyrrelser i Svartehavet, vendte kasakhstansk olje seg til russiske havner som en midlertidig erstatning for eksportinfrastruktur. Dette gir en plausibel forklaring på hvorfor Italia importerte olje fra russiske havner etter EUs embargo.Historically, the European Union (EU) imported the majority of crude oil exported from the St. Petersburg region. However, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, significant international sanctions were imposed on Russia, including the EU embargo and the price cap on Russian crude oil. Review of the literature suggests that India absorbed most of the market share left by the EU, becoming the primary importer of Russian crude oil. Interestingly, despite the sanctions, some literature indicated that EU nations continued to import Russian crude oil even after the embargo became effective. This study examined the changes in trade patterns of Russian crude oil exports from the St. Petersburg region following the invasion, with case studies focused on India, Turkey, and Italy. A quantitative method was applied to analyse port calls, draft changes and ship movements to determine change in trade patterns. Our findings support that India absorbed most of the crude oil market previously supplied to the EU. India’s surge in Russian crude oil imports appears to be driven by economic incentives to secure foreign oil to sustain economic development. Furthermore, our observations suggest that Turkey was a significant importer of crude oil from the St. Petersburg region. Similar to India, Turkey absorbed a portion of the market left by the EU. However, it seems that most of Turkey’s refined crude oil was exported to EU and G7 countries. While these actions remain within the bounds of international law, they raise questions about the effectiveness of the sanctions in restricting the flow of Russian oil to Western markets. Finally, we suggest that Italy’s import of crude oil from the St. Petersburg region can be attributed to two reasons. First, we found that a refinery in Italy was under Russian ownership that relied on Russian supplies. The refinery was sold to new owners after the sanctions on Russia. Second, we found that due to disruptions in the Black Sea, Kazakhstani oil was turning to Russian ports for temporary substitute export infrastructure. This offers a plausible explanation for why Italy imported oil from Russian ports after the EU embargo

What changes in trade patterns can be observed in Russian crude oil export from the St. Petersburg region since the beginning of the Russian Ukrainian war in 2022. Three case studies from India, Turkey and Italy.

Historisk importerte EU (Den europeiske union) mesteparten av råoljen som ble eksportert fra St. Petersburg-regionen. Etter Russlands invasjon av Ukraina den 24. februar 2022 ble det imidlertid innført betydelige internasjonale sanksjoner mot Russland, inkludert EUs embargo og pristaket på russisk råolje. Gjennomgangen av litteraturen antyder at India absorberte mesteparten av markedsandelen som EU etterlot seg, og ble den primære importøren av russisk råolje. Interessant nok indikerte noe litteratur at EU-land fortsatte å importere russisk råolje selv etter at embargoen trådte i kraft. Denne studien undersøkte endringer i handelsmønstre for russiske råoljeeksporter fra St. Petersburg-regionen etter invasjonen, med casestudier fokusert på India, Tyrkia og Italia. En kvantitativ metode ble brukt for å analysere havneanløp, endringer i skipenes dypgående og bevegelser for å identifisere endringer i handelsmønstre. Våre funn støtter at India absorberte mesteparten av råoljemarkedet som tidligere ble forsynt til EU. Indias økning i import av russisk råolje ser ut til å være drevet av økonomiske insentiver for å sikre utenlandsk olje for å opprettholde økonomisk utvikling. Videre antyder våre observasjoner at Tyrkia var en betydelig importør av råolje fra St. Petersburg-regionen. På lik linje med India absorberte Tyrkia en del av markedet EU etterlot seg. Det ser imidlertid ut til at mesteparten av Tyrkias raffinerte råolje ble eksportert til EU- og G7-land. Selv om disse handlingene forblir innenfor rammene av internasjonal lov, reiser de spørsmål om effektiviteten av sanksjonene i å begrense strømmen av russisk olje til vestlige markeder. Til slutt foreslår vi at Italias import av råolje fra St. Petersburg-regionen kan tilskrives to årsaker. For det første fant vi at et raffineri i Italia var under russisk eierskap og var avhengig av russiske forsyninger. Raffineriet ble solgt til nye eiere etter sanksjonene mot Russland. For det andre fant vi at på grunn av forstyrrelser i Svartehavet, vendte kasakhstansk olje seg til russiske havner som en midlertidig erstatning for eksportinfrastruktur. Dette gir en plausibel forklaring på hvorfor Italia importerte olje fra russiske havner etter EUs embargo.Historically, the European Union (EU) imported the majority of crude oil exported from the St. Petersburg region. However, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, significant international sanctions were imposed on Russia, including the EU embargo and the price cap on Russian crude oil. Review of the literature suggests that India absorbed most of the market share left by the EU, becoming the primary importer of Russian crude oil. Interestingly, despite the sanctions, some literature indicated that EU nations continued to import Russian crude oil even after the embargo became effective. This study examined the changes in trade patterns of Russian crude oil exports from the St. Petersburg region following the invasion, with case studies focused on India, Turkey, and Italy. A quantitative method was applied to analyse port calls, draft changes and ship movements to determine change in trade patterns. Our findings support that India absorbed most of the crude oil market previously supplied to the EU. India’s surge in Russian crude oil imports appears to be driven by economic incentives to secure foreign oil to sustain economic development. Furthermore, our observations suggest that Turkey was a significant importer of crude oil from the St. Petersburg region. Similar to India, Turkey absorbed a portion of the market left by the EU. However, it seems that most of Turkey’s refined crude oil was exported to EU and G7 countries. While these actions remain within the bounds of international law, they raise questions about the effectiveness of the sanctions in restricting the flow of Russian oil to Western markets. Finally, we suggest that Italy’s import of crude oil from the St. Petersburg region can be attributed to two reasons. First, we found that a refinery in Italy was under Russian ownership that relied on Russian supplies. The refinery was sold to new owners after the sanctions on Russia. Second, we found that due to disruptions in the Black Sea, Kazakhstani oil was turning to Russian ports for temporary substitute export infrastructure. This offers a plausible explanation for why Italy imported oil from Russian ports after the EU embargo