Judging Fund Managers by the Company They Keep

We develop a performance evaluation approach in which a fund manager's skill is judged by the extent to which his investment decisions resemble the decisions of managers with distinguished performance records. The proposed performance measures are estimated more precisely than standard measures, because they use historical returns and holdings of many funds to evaluate the performance of a single fund. According to one of our measures, funds with significantly positive ability considerably outnumber funds with significantly negative ability at the end of our sample. Simulations demonstrate that our measures are particularly useful in ranking managers. In an application that relies on such ranking, we find only weak persistence in the performance of U.S. equity funds after accounting for momentum in stock returns.

The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and Asset Prices

This paper uses geography to shed light on the role of asymmetric information in asset pricing. Demonstrating that investors possess significant informational advantages in evaluating nearby investments, we find that active mutual fund managers overweight proximate firms in their portfolios and earn substantial abnormal returns in local holdings. These findings are more pronounced among funds which are small, have few holdings, and operate out of remote locations. Aggregating across all funds, we use the fraction of a stock's shares held by local investors as a measure of the information asymmetry in its investor base. We find that a firm's degree of local ownership is positively related to the cross-section of expected returns, even when controlling for other factors known to explain return variation. The results document new evidence of informed trading and establish a link between such trading and asset prices.

Can Individual Investors Beat the Market?

We document strong persistence in the performance of trades of individual investors. Investors classified in the top 10 percent place other trades that on average earn excess returns of 15 basis points per day. A rolling-forward strategy of going long firms purchased by previously successful investors and shorting firms purchased by previously unsuccessful investors results in excess returns of 5 basis points per day. These returns are not confined to small stocks nor to stocks in which the investors are likely to have inside information. Our results suggest that skillful individual investors exploit market inefficiencies to earn abnormal profits, above and beyond any profits available from well-known strategies based upon size, value, or momentum.Individual Investors, Market Efficiency, Performance Persistence

Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?

This paper employs a new empirical approach for identifying the impact of government spending on the private sector. Our key innovation is to use changes in congressional committee chairmanship as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures. In doing so, we show that fiscal spending shocks appear to significantly dampen corporate sector investment and employment activity. These corporate reactions follow both Senate and House committee chair changes, are present among large and small firms and within large and small states, are partially reversed when the congressman resigns, and are most pronounced among geographically-concentrated firms. The effects are economically meaningful and the mechanism - entirely distinct from the more traditional interest rate and tax channels - suggests new considerations in assessing the impact of government spending on private sector economic activity.

Sudden Financial Arrest

This paper was presented as the Mundell-Fleming Lecture at the Tenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference at the International Monetary Fund in Washington held November 5–6, 2009.There are striking and terrifying similarities between the sudden failure of a heart and that of a financial system. In the medical literature, the former is referred to as sudden cardiac arrest. By analogy, I refer to its financial counterpart as a sudden financial arrest. In this article I describe the latter and its treatment guided by its medical counterpart

What Drives Home Bias? Evidence from Fund Managers' Views

A survey of fund managers reveals home bias for these sophisticated investors in an unrestricted setting. Proximity, perceived informational advantage and higher expected returns are confirmed as accompanying factors. In addition, the home bias of equity managers is also related to institutional, informational and behavioral characteristics. The perceived informational advantage does not seem to be valid. Multivariate analyses indicate that home bias is mainly related to relative return optimism, non-fundamental information and peculiar behavior towards risk. We interpret these as characteristics of less than fully rational behavior. It is consistently found that this pattern does not apply to bond managers.Eine Befragung von Fondsmanagern offenbart die Heimatverzerrung (sog. Home Bias) dieser erfahrenen Investoren in unbegrenzten Rahmenbedingungen. Nähe, empfundene Informationsvorteile und höhere erwartete Renditen werden als Begleitumstände bestätigt. Zusätzlich ist der Home Bias von Aktienfondsmanagern mit institutionellen und informatorischen Gegebenheiten sowie mit bestimmten Verhaltensmustern verbunden. Der empfundene Informationsvorteil scheint sich jedoch nicht zu bewahrheiten. Multivariate Analysen zeigen, dass der Home Bias hauptsächlich mit relativem Renditeoptimismus, der Nutzung nicht-fundamentaler Informationen und besonderem Risikoverhalten verbunden ist. Wir interpretieren diese Eigenschaften als unvollkommen rationales Verhalten. Konsistent zeigt sich, dass dieses Muster nicht für Rentenfondsmanager gilt

Good day sunshine: Stock returns and the weather.

Abstract Psychological evidence and casual intuition predict that sunny weather is associated with upbeat mood. This paper examines the relation between morning sunshine at a country's leading stock exchange and market index stock returns that day at 26 stock exchanges internationally from 1982-97. Sunshine is strongly significantly correlated with daily stock returns. After controlling for sunshine, rain and snow are unrelated to returns. There were positive net-of-transaction costs profits to be made from substantial use of weather-based strategies, but the magnitude of the gains was fairly modest. These findings are difficult to reconcile with fully rational price-setting

Market Failures and Regulatory Failures: Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises

The paper analyzes the financial crisis of through the lens of market failures and regulatory failures. We present a case that there were four primary failures contributing to the crisis: excessive risk-taking in the financial sector due to mispriced government guarantees; regulatory focus on individual institution risk rather than systemic risk; opacity of positions in financial derivatives that produced externalities from individual firm failures; and runs on the unregulated banking sector that eventually threatened to bring down the entire financial sector. In emphasizing the role of regulatory failures, we provide a description of regulatory evolution in response to the panic of 1907 and the Great Depression, why the regulation put in place then was successful in addressing market failures, but how, over time, especially around the resolutions of Continental Illinois, Savings and Loans crisis and Long-Term Capital Management, expectations of too-big-to-fail status got anchored. We propose specific reforms to address the four market and regulatory failures we identify, and we conclude with some lessons for emerging markets