Pacifica: Poetry International: Revolutions in Tunisian Poetry

A collection of contemporary poetry from Tunisia, including poems in translation with their French and Arabic original texts

Board Composition and ESG Disclosure in Saudi Arabia: The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance Reforms

There is an evolving trend of pursuing the transfer to sustainable development. Owing to this trend, and alongside the increasing monitoring by society, companies are progressively considering this new position in the capital market. Corporate governance mechanisms and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities have received extensive consideration. Using a sample of Saudi listed companies, this study examines the association between board composition (size, independence, and gender diversity) and ESG disclosure moderated by corporate governance reforms. Our reported results confirm that the size of a board and its level of independence have positive and significant impacts on ESG disclosure. Moreover, board gender diversity is found to be positively but insignificantly related with ESG disclosure. When the individual dimensions of ESG are considered, the results verify the significant role of board size and board independence and the insignificant impact of board gender diversity in environmental and social disclosures. Interestingly, all measures of board composition have a positive and significant impact on the governance disclosure score. The results also show that reforms of Saudi corporate governance positively and significantly moderate the board size and board independence–ESG relationship. Our results demonstrate that the enhancement of companies’ corporate governance will increase their ESG disclosures. This study offers perceptions from the outlook of a developing economy, Saudi Arabia, and presents theoretical and managerial implications for policymakers and investors

Do Investor Overconfidence and Loss Aversion Drive Saudi Firm Market Performance? The Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance

This study investigated the impact of investor psychological bias on a firm’s market value. In detail, we examined the effect of investor overconfidence (optimism) and loss aversion (pessimism) on firm market value. We also aimed to investigate the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between investor behavior biases and firm market value. This study used a sample of 143 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange over the period from 2012 to 2021. The results suggest that investor overconfidence affects a firm’s value positively. On the other hand, loss aversion is negatively associated with the firm’s market value. Furthermore, we find that corporate governance (measured by board size and board independence) enhances the positive association between overconfidence and firm market value. In contrast, we find that corporate governance seems to marginally mitigate the negative effect of loss aversion

CEO inside debt and the value of excess cash

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate debt-like compensation and the value of excess cash holdings.Design/methodology/approachThe sample comprises 876 US firms covered by ExecuComp over the period 2006-2013. The authors apply the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998) to examine the marginal value of excess cash as a function of CEO inside debt holdings.FindingsThis paper proposes one hypothesis. The results constitute evidence that the value of excess cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. More interestingly, excess cash holdings contribute less to firm value when shareholders expect their value to be destroyed due to managers’ conservative behavior.Research limitations/implicationsThe sample comprises only US firms, owing to a lack of firms data from other countries. It would be interesting to conduct future research on an international sample.Practical implicationsThis paper contributes to a deeper understanding of investor valuation of excess cash in the presence of CEO inside debt. The findings complement previous studies on US firms by confirming the existence of a relationship between the agency costs of debt and firm policy decisions.Originality/valueThis work is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first to examine the relationship between debt-like compensation and excess cash valuation, and it supports the view that the conflict between shareholders and debtholders largely affects firm cash policy, and hence, cash valuation.</jats:sec