Concessions to PPC?

Public private cooperation (further PPC) is frequently presented as the solution for budgetary shortages for governments at national and regional level. A PPC invests in infrastructure whereby efficient cooperation enables advantages for both public and private parties is claimed. It proves to be difficult to really interest private businesses for investments in infrastructure. Therefore, the central question, which we answer in this paper, is: 'From a theoretical perspective, is PPC an option for investments in infrastructure?' In this paper, a literature review is presented on the subject of public private cooperation for the development of infrastructure projects. The main findings are that firstly, there is a large diversity in projects that might qualify for PPC. More specific, each infrastructure project is unique, making it even more difficult to implement cooperation. Secondly, the role of the national and regional governments in financing infrastructure is changing. This changing role means that the governments withdraw themselves on core functions and that they strive for private party risk-bearing in infrastructure investments. Thirdly, the theoretical definition of PPC and the more practical definition differ. In Europe, most PPCs are worked out as a concession (and therefore not a real PPC). Fourthly, from a cost point of view it is possible that the government is more efficient in cost terms and the private party is more efficient in terms of turnover. Fifthly, there are several reasons for the government to interfere in economic living. Reasons concerning infrastructure might be the public goods characterise and the external impacts. Sixthly, the public characteristics of infrastructure are decreasing. Seventhly, in general it is unattractively for private parties to invest in infrastructure. In order to make it more attractive, profits can be offered to the private parties. However, this will increase the total costs of the project. Eighthly, process management shows that it is no simple task to turn a PPC into a success. When the participating parties are persuaded of the advantages that the cooperation between public and private parties can offer, have chosen consciously for the PPC, and are prepared to invest in cooperation for the long-term, then PPC can offer means to pursue the defined objectives. If true cooperation is aimed for, costs, risks, and profits must be shared instead of divided. The joint venture can provide insights into the process of sharing. Ninthly, the construction businesses are production ventures, whereas banking services and the government operate in the service industry. Finally, the market of the most important private parties that are involved in PPC is an oligopoly. This suggests quite some market power for the private businesses involved.

Concessions to PPC?

Public private cooperation (further PPC) is frequently presented as the solution for budgetary shortages for governments at national and regional level. A PPC invests in infrastructure whereby efficient cooperation enables advantages for both public and private parties is claimed. It proves to be difficult to really interest private businesses for investments in infrastructure. Therefore, the central question, which we answer in this paper, is: 'From a theoretical perspective, is PPC an option for investments in infrastructure?' In this paper, a literature review is presented on the subject of public private cooperation for the development of infrastructure projects. The main findings are that firstly, there is a large diversity in projects that might qualify for PPC. More specific, each infrastructure project is unique, making it even more difficult to implement cooperation. Secondly, the role of the national and regional governments in financing infrastructure is changing. This changing role means that the governments withdraw themselves on core functions and that they strive for private party risk-bearing in infrastructure investments. Thirdly, the theoretical definition of PPC and the more practical definition differ. In Europe, most PPCs are worked out as a concession (and therefore not a real PPC). Fourthly, from a cost point of view it is possible that the government is more efficient in cost terms and the private party is more efficient in terms of turnover. Fifthly, there are several reasons for the government to interfere in economic living. Reasons concerning infrastructure might be the public goods characterise and the external impacts. Sixthly, the public characteristics of infrastructure are decreasing. Seventhly, in general it is unattractively for private parties to invest in infrastructure. In order to make it more attractive, profits can be offered to the private parties. However, this will increase the total costs of the project. Eighthly, process management shows that it is no simple task to turn a PPC into a success. When the participating parties are persuaded of the advantages that the cooperation between public and private parties can offer, have chosen consciously for the PPC, and are prepared to invest in cooperation for the long-term, then PPC can offer means to pursue the defined objectives. If true cooperation is aimed for, costs, risks, and profits must be shared instead of divided. The joint venture can provide insights into the process of sharing. Ninthly, the construction businesses are production ventures, whereas banking services and the government operate in the service industry. Finally, the market of the most important private parties that are involved in PPC is an oligopoly. This suggests quite some market power for the private businesses involved

Translocation (8;21) in acute nonlymphocytic leukemia delineated by chromosomal in situ suppression hybridization

In situ suppression hybridization with recombinant bacteriophage DNA libraries for chromosomes 8 and 21 was performed in two cases of acute nonlymphocytic leukemia, type FAB M2. In both cases, cytogenetic analysis by conventional G-banding revealed t(8;21)(q22;q22). In situ suppression hybridization was able to prove the reciprocal nature of the translocation in both cases by identifying the terminal end of chromosome 21 translocated to the derivative chromosome 8q−

L’abeille, de mythe en mythe

L’abeille est incontestablement un animal mythique : on ne peut compter les récits, représentations, fictions, et fables diverses qui la mettent en scène. C’est d’abord que la proximité entre l’homme et l’abeille est très ancienne : la première représentation d’une apicultrice, une peinture rupestre que l’on trouve à la Cuva de la Arana, en Espagne, près de Valence, date ainsi de sept à huit mille ans ; elle dépeint une femme recueillant du miel, entourée d’abeilles. On en rencontre également..

L’intelligence individuelle de l’abeille

L’abeille est dotée d’un « mini-cerveau » d’un millimètre cube, composé d’environ 960 000 neurones, soit 100 000 fois moins que le cerveau humain, qui comprend environ cent milliards de neurones. Il est structuré en lobes optiques, lobes antennaires (les antennes permettant à l’abeille de capter les odeurs, les températures, les teneurs en CO2, en oxygène et les vibrations de l’air) et corps « champignons », impliqués dans la mémorisation et le traitement des données – car l’abeille est capab..

La proximité entre l’homme et l’abeille : un point de vue biologique

Que l’on s’attache à mettre en lumière une forme d’humanité chez l’abeille ou que l’on observe dans l’espèce humaine des comportements d’essaims, la volonté de rapprocher les deux espèces est coutumière et récurrente. Ne faut-il voir dans ces déclarations de proximités, cet intérêt et cette fascination pour l’abeille qu’anthropomorphisme simpliste, rêveries champêtres de poètes dominicaux ou fantaisies puériles nourries d’images d’Épinal et de dessins animés japonais ? Le rapprochement n’est ..

Systemic plant protection substances and products: how to assess the risk for bees? A beekeepers point of view

Background: The current plant protection products (PPPs) assessment is no more suitable when applied to systemic substances since systemic chemicals can contaminate nectar and pollen during a long length of time. Largely focused on the acute toxicity, the current assessment scheme does not take into account several elements i.e. the chronic toxicity, the possible synergies between substances, and between pathogens and PPPs. Possible bee contamination through nectar and pollen leads to a specific exposure, mainly oral, concerning the hive bees, including larvae, drones and queens, as well as potentially delayed through the stored honey and pollen consumption. Moreover, regarding the long-term exposure, sublethal chronic effects should be taken into account. Results: For such substances we would take both the chronic toxicity and the acute toxicity measurements into consideration. Therefore the TER should be calculated based on the lowest LD50 and in the case of risk, the PEC/PNEC ratio should be measured and calculated for various behaviours. A larvae test should also be performed. Tunnel tests may be helpful but the exposure to the PPP cannot be proven and the bee behaviour observation is currently inaccurate. Further research on the effect of small doses of PPP on the bee immune system seems more than necessary. Conclusion: A new assessment scheme, which takes these parameters into account, is the core of ourcontribution

Systemic plant protection substances and products: how to assess the risk for bees? A beekeepers point of view

contribution to session II Test and risk assessment Background: The current plant protection products (PPPs) assessment is no more suitable when applied to systemic substances since systemic chemicals can contaminate nectar and pollen during a long length of time. Largely focused on the acute toxicity, the current assessment scheme does not take into account several elements i.e. the chronic toxicity, the possible synergies between substances, and between pathogens and PPPs. Possible bee contamination through nectar and pollen leads to a specific exposure, mainly oral, concerning the hive bees, including larvae, drones and queens, as well as potentially delayed through the stored honey and pollen consumption. Moreover, regarding the long-term exposure, sublethal chronic effects should be taken into account. Results: For such substances we would take both the chronic toxicity and the acute toxicity measurements into consideration. Therefore the TER should be calculated based on the lowest LD50 and in the case of risk, the PEC/PNEC ratio should be measured and calculated for various behaviours. A larvae test should also be performed. Tunnel tests may be helpful but the exposure to the PPP cannot be proven and the bee behaviour observation is currently inaccurate. Further research on the effect of small doses of PPP on the bee immune system seems more than necessary. Conclusion: A new assessment scheme, which takes these parameters into account, is the core of ourcontribution. Keywords: Assessment scheme, chronic toxicity, sublethal toxicity, synergies, larvae test, PEC, PNEC, TER