Abortion And The Personhood Assumption: A New Defense Of Abortion On The Basis Of Self-Defense

In this essay, I offer a new defense of abortion. I argue that even if we assume that the fetus is a person with full moral rights abortion is still generally morally permissible. For this argument, I rely on the concept of self-defense, arguing that abortion is morally permissible as a self-defensive action. In Chapter II, I motivate the personhood assumption by finding and defending the strongest version of Don Marquis’s Future-Like-Ours Argument. In Chapter III, I argue for the rejection of responsibility arguments in favor of the moral permissibility of abortion – the sort of arguments offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson. I argue that she fails to establish that the two partners who create the fetus lack morally responsibility for its creation. In Chapter IV, I offer my new defense of abortion, arguing that the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth are significant enough to justify a self-defensive action from the pregnant woman. However, in responding in self-defense, there are no proportional options for the pregnant woman. Instead, there is only one option for self-defense against the risks/burdens imposed upon the pregnant woman by the continued existence of the fetus – abortion. So, if self-defense is warranted, then abortion is the minimally aggressive response that a pregnant woman can choose. This analysis relies on an intuitive understanding of self-defense, proportionality, and other related concepts. But in support of my defense of abortion, I legislate between six prominent theories of self-defense. While I do not commit myself to any particular theory as clearly correct above all others, I argue that all of the reasonable understandings cohere well with my argument. In Chapter V, I consider three more moderate arguments in defense of abortion on the basis of self-defense. The first concludes that the procurement of an abortion in a standard pregnancy is excused, if not justified. The second concludes that if the fetus is not a person, then abortion is demonstrably morally permissible on the basis of self-defense. And the third concludes that abortion is morally permissible in a certain class of non-standard pregnancies – specifically pregnancies resulting from nonconsensual sexual intercourse

XENOPHANES’ EPISTEMOLOGY: EMPIRICIST, GLOBAL SKEPTIC, OR BOTH?

In this paper, I consider two interpretations of Xenophanes’ epistemology – that he is an empiricist and that he is a global skeptic. I argue that two these interpretations are not mutually exclusive, and that Xenophanes should, in fact, be thought of as both an empiricist and a global skeptic

Zealous and Effective Advocacy: An Assessment of the Constitutional Right to Counsel Within a Drug Court Proceeding

This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I will explain the drug court model by detailing the key components of drug courts in general and by providing an outline of the three predominant drug court models. Additionally, this Part will provide an overview of the right to counsel in traditional criminal proceedings, including probation revocation hearings. Part II will contemplate why the non-traditional stages of a drug court proceeding may constitutionally require counsel and why the defense attorney’s role within the context of drug court is problematic. Using the standards that govern traditional criminal proceedings, Part III will argue that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should attach during all stages of the proceeding including staffings, status hearings, and hearings regarding termination from drug court. Additionally, this Part proposes that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel through zealous and effective advocacy is also constitutionally required during all drug court proceedings

Zealous and Effective Advocacy: An Assessment of the Constitutional Right to Counsel Within a Drug Court Proceeding

This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I will explain the drug court model by detailing the key components of drug courts in general and by providing an outline of the three predominant drug court models. Additionally, this Part will provide an overview of the right to counsel in traditional criminal proceedings, including probation revocation hearings. Part II will contemplate why the non-traditional stages of a drug court proceeding may constitutionally require counsel and why the defense attorney’s role within the context of drug court is problematic. Using the standards that govern traditional criminal proceedings, Part III will argue that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should attach during all stages of the proceeding including staffings, status hearings, and hearings regarding termination from drug court. Additionally, this Part proposes that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel through zealous and effective advocacy is also constitutionally required during all drug court proceedings