Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.Comment: 5 figure

Fragile and Resilient Trust: Risk and Uncertainty in Negotiated and Reciprocal Exchange

Both experimental and ethnographic studies show that reciprocal exchanges (in which actors unilaterally provide benefits to each other without formal agreements) produce stronger trust than negotiated exchanges secured by binding agreements. We develop the theoretical role of risk and uncertainty as causal mechanisms that potentially explain these results, and then test their effects in two laboratory experiments that vary risk and uncertainty within negotiated and reciprocal forms of exchange. We increase risk in negotiated exchanges by making agreements nonbinding and decrease uncertainty in reciprocal exchanges by having actors communicate their intentions. Our findings support three main theoretical conclusions. (1) Increasing risk in nego-tiated exchange produces levels of trust comparable to those in reciprocal exchange only if the partner’s trustworthiness is near-absolute. (2) Decreasing uncertainty in reciprocal exchange either increases or decreases trust, depending on network struc-ture. (3) Even when reciprocal and negotiated exchanges produce comparable levels of trust, their trust differs in kind, with reciprocal exchange partners developing trust that is more resilient and affect-based

On violating one’s own privacy: N-adic utterances and inadvertent disclosures in online venues

Purpose: To understand the phenomena of people revealing regrettable information on the Internet, we examine who people think they’re addressing, and what they say, in the process of interacting with those not physically or temporally co-present. Design/methodology/approach: We conduct qualitative analyses of interviews with student bloggers and observations of five years’ worth of their blog posts, drawing on linguists’ concepts of indexical ground and deictics. Based on analyses of how bloggers reference their shared indexical ground and how they use deictics, we expose bloggers’ evolving awareness of their audiences, and the relationship between this awareness and their disclosures. Findings: Over time, writers and their regular audience, or “chorus,” reciprocally reveal personal information. However, since not all audience members reveal themselves in this venue, writers’ disclosures are available to those observers they are not aware of. Thus, their over-disclosure is tied to what we call the “n-adic” organization of online interaction. Specifically, and as can be seen in their linguistic cues, N-adic utterances are directed towards a non-unified audience whose invisibility makes the discloser unable to find out the exact number of participants or the time they enter or exit the interaction. Research implications: Attention to linguistic cues, such as deictics, is a compelling way to identify the shifting reference groups of ethnographic subjects interacting with physically or temporally distant others. Originality/value: We describe the social organization of interaction with undetectable others. N-adic interactions likely also happen in other on- and offline venues in which participants are obscured but can contribute anonymously.postprin

Team sports performance analysed through the lens of social network theory: implications for research and practice

This paper discusses how social network analyses and graph theory can be implemented in team sports performance analyses to evaluate individual (micro) and collective (macro) performance data, and how to use this information for designing practice tasks. Moreover, we briefly outline possible limitations of social network studies and provide suggestions for future research. Instead of cataloguing discrete events or player actions, it has been argued that researchers need to consider the synergistic interpersonal processes emerging between teammates in competitive performance environments. Theoretical assumptions on team coordination prompted the emergence of innovative, theoretically-driven methods for assessing collective team sport behaviours. Here, we contribute to this theoretical and practical debate by conceptualising sports teams as complex social networks. From this perspective, players are viewed as network nodes, connected through relevant information variables (e.g., a ball passing action), sustaining complex patterns of interaction between teammates (e.g., a ball passing network). Specialized tools and metrics related to graph theory could be applied to evaluate structural and topological properties of interpersonal interactions of teammates, complementing more traditional analysis methods. This innovative methodology moves beyond use of common notation analysis methods, providing a richer understanding of the complexity of interpersonal interactions sustaining collective team sports performance. The proposed approach provides practical applications for coaches, performance analysts, practitioners and researchers by establishing social network analyses as a useful approach for capturing the emergent properties of interactions between players in sports teams

Interaction, Emotion, and Collective Identities

[Excerpt] This chapter poses the question: How do emotional aspects of social interaction affect the emergence and salience of collective identities? I assume that social interaction inherently involves an implicit or explicit joint task—namely to accomplish some result that can only be produced with others. The most fundamental “task” of social interaction can be construed as the coordination and alignment of behavior, such that actors successfully conclude the interact ion episode. Essential to this task is a working consensus about definitions of self and other in the social situation, i.e., consensual self-other identities. A central component of my argument is that social interaction has emotional effects that vary with the success of actors at accomplishing this fundamental task. This paper theorizes the conditions under which emotional effects of social interaction promote collective identities that bridge or transcend self-other role identities

The Value of Reciprocity

The value of reciprocity in social exchange potentially comprises both instrumental value (the value of the actual benefits received from exchange) and communicative or symbolic value (the expressive and uncertainty reduction value conveyed by features of the act of reciprocity itself). While all forms of exchange provide instrumental value, we propose that the voluntary and uncertain nature of recurring reciprocal exchanges, in which actors individually give benefits to each other without formal agreements, make the act of reciprocity itself an important vehicle for conveying symbolic value. We experimentally test the value actors place on partners' voluntary acts of reciprocity—over and above the instrumental benefits obtained—by providing subjects with computer-simulated partners who systematically vary in the instrumental value, probability, and predictability of their reciprocity. Our results show that behavioral preferences are governed primarily by the instrumental value of exchange, while sentiments of trust, affective regard, and solidarity are strongly influenced by the symbolic value of constant reciprocity. We discuss implications for theories of social exchange and social capital. </jats:p