Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash game among profit-seeking firms; (ii) the Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium under social planning, where the industry output is entirely controlled by a benevolent planner aiming at the maximisation of social welfare; and (iii) the Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium in a mixed setup where at least one firm is public, while the others remain profit-seeking agents. Our analysis identifies the conditions whereby having a mixed market as a regulatory instrument suffices to drive the industry to the same output, externality and social welfare as under planning, both along the optimal path and in steady state.

Government Spending Under Non-Separability: a Theoretical Analysis

In this paper we derive analytic implicit form conditions for the qualitative analysis of government spending multipliers and the optimal level of government spending in presence of non-separability between private and public components of aggregate demand. Using the simplest neo-classical flexible price model with no capital accumulation, we show that Edgeworth dependence is not a suitable condition to automatically assess the signs of the consumption and income multipliers, for which a more complex analysis must be carried out. We propose a detailed investigation of the form and the characteristics of the involved utility functions, which are crucial to such evaluation. We also show that if Edgeworth complementarity is strong enough, a public spending stimulus can raise at the same time private consumption and real activity. In order to reconcile our general framework with existing literature, we discuss recent examples of non-separable functional forms from the standpoint of our results, and argue that their consistency relies on specific assumptions about steady- state points.

Open Innovation in a Dynamic Cournot Duopoly

We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly using a differential game approach where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival.

The socially responsible choice in a duopolistic market: a dynamic problem of “ethical product” differentiation

The increasing attention of profit maximizing corporations to corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a new stylized fact of the contemporary economic environment. In our theoretical analysis we model CSR adoption as the optimal response of a profit maximizing firm to the competition of a not for profit corporate pioneer in the presence of a continuum of consumers with heterogeneous preferences towards the social and environmental features of the final good. CSR adoption implies a trade-off since, on the one side, it raises production costs but, on the other side, it leads to accumulation of “ethical capital”.We investigate conditions under which the profit maximizing firm switches from price to price and CSR competition by comparing monopoly and duopoly equilibria and their consequences on aggregate social responsibility and consumer welfare. Our findings provide a theoretical background for competition between profit maximizing incumbents and not for profit entrants in markets such as fair trade, organic food, ethical banking and ethical finance

A Stochastic Optimal Control Model of Pollution Abatement

Link alla rivista: http://www.e-ndst.kiev.ua/v10n2.ht

Pseudorapidity Distribution of Charged Particles in PbarP Collisions at root(s)= 630GeV

Using a silicon vertex detector, we measure the charged particle pseudorapidity distribution over the range 1.5 to 5.5 using data collected from PbarP collisions at root s = 630 GeV. With a data sample of 3 million events, we deduce a result with an overall normalization uncertainty of 5%, and typical bin to bin errors of a few percent. We compare our result to the measurement of UA5, and the distribution generated by the Lund Monte Carlo with default settings. This is only the second measurement at this level of precision, and only the second measurement for pseudorapidity greater than 3.Comment: 9 pages, 5 figures, LaTeX format. For ps file see http://hep1.physics.wayne.edu/harr/harr.html Submitted to Physics Letters