Social Inequalities in Higher Education Participation in Trentino from the Bologna Process to the Great Recession (2000-2012)

In this paper, we analyse the role of social origins in the shaping of university participation in the province of Trento (North-East of Italy) from 2000 to 2012. This long-term view gives us the chance to test the role played by the Bologna process and by the economic crisis. More precisely, this setting allows us to analyse its effects on inequality of educational opportunity in the face of two opposite situations. The first, subsequent to the Bologna process, is characterised by a huge increase in the enrolment rate at the university. In the second situation, subsequent to the economic crisis, a huge decline in higher education participation can be observed. Using data on upper secondary school graduates in the province of Trento and applying logistic models, we find that inequality of educational opportunity tends to diminish during educational expansion, while it increases with the persistence of the economic crisis

Non-traditional Students Between Online and Offline: Which Way Forward for Higher Education?

The expansion of higher education has led to a more diverse student population, theorized around the concept of the non-traditional student. This term is used to describe students whose socio-demographic characteristics, motivations, study engagement and experiences differ from those of traditional higher education participants. The non-traditional student population is a highly heterogeneous group in which the individual student presents with specific motivations, needs, and constraints, but a common requirement is for more flexible teaching and learning methods to meet their complex educational needs. We here examine this demand for flexibility through the preferences students express for online teaching methods, and we investigate whether differences between traditional and non-traditional students are mainly due to inequalities, the role of parental education in particular, or on the contrary, whether they are related to certain characteristics such as age, employment and residential status. The data used in this investigation was collected during the period characterized by the containment measures linked to the Covid-19 pandemic from students enrolled at the University of Bologna. The results of the investigation presented below confirm that non-traditional students exhibit a clear preference for online as opposed to face-to-face learning and that parental education is particularly relevant for those under 25

Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?

We study the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies (1975-2009). We find an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months of about one tenth of a standard deviation. A similar effect can neither be detected in established OECD democracies nor in other months. The effect is larger in democracies with many poor and uneducated voters, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and in East-Asia and the Pacific. We argue that the election month monetary expansion is related to systemic vote buying which requires significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before elections. The finely timed increase in M1 is consistent with this; is inconsistent with a monetary cycle aimed at creating an election time boom; and it cannot be, fully, accounted for by alternative explanations

Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive

We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs