Letting reality bite

Describes an experiment in teaching undergraduate epistemology, guided by Peirce’s pragmatic maxim

Review of Jon and Susan Josephson, “Abductive Inference”

This article reviews the book '“Abductive Inference” by Jon and Susan Josephson

Naturalism and wonder: Peirce on the logic of Hume’s argument against miracles

How should we proceed when confronted with a phenomenon (or evidence which points towards a phenomenon) which baffles us? The term "miracle" is a convenient term on which to hang this question. It has a religious meaning, and the arguments I will be discussing are applicable to the case of deciding, for example, whether to believe in the Judaeo-Christian God, based on the reports of miracles offered by the Bible. However, one can generalise from this case to deeper issues about our attitude to the apparently inexplicable. By the apparently inexplicable I mean that which contradicts our most well-confirmed beliefs. This general question is the theme of this paper

Commentary on “An alternative to working on machine consciousness”, by Aaron Sloman

A commentary on a current paper by Aaron Sloman where he argues that in order to make progress in AI, consciousness (and other such unclear concepts of common-sense regarding the mind), "should be replaced by more precise and varied architecture-based concepts better suited to specify what needs to be explained by scientific theories". This original vision of philosophical inquiry as the mapping out of 'design-spaces' for a contested concept seeks to achieve a holistic, synthetic understanding of what possibilities such spaces embody and how different parameters might structure them in nomic and highly inter-connected ways. It therefore does not reduce to either "relations of ideas" or "matters of fact" in Hume's famous dichotomy. It is also shown to be in interesting ways the exact opposite of the current vogue for 'experimental philosophy'

What Achilles did and the Tortoise wouldn't

This paper offers an expressivist account of logical form, arguing that in order to fully understand it one must examine what valid arguments make us do (or: what Achilles does and the Tortoise doesn’t, in Carroll’s famed fable). It introduces Charles Peirce’s distinction between symbols, indices and icons as three different kinds of signification whereby the sign picks out its object by learned convention, by unmediated indication, and by resemblance respectively. It is then argued that logical form is represented by the third, iconic, kind of sign. It is noted that icons uniquely enjoy partial identity between sign and object, and argued that this holds the key to Carroll’s puzzle. Finally, from this examination of sign-types metaphysical morals are drawn: that the traditional foes metaphysical realism and conventionalism constitute a false dichotomy, and that reality contains intriguingly inference-binding structures

Peirce's reception in Australia and New Zealand

Although I think it is far to say that in what natives of this part of the world call “downunder,” Peirce is still a minority interest, appreciation of his work appears to be growing slowly but surely

Peirce and Sellars on Nonconceptual Content

Whereas Charles Peirce’s pragmatist account of truth has been much discussed, his theory of perception still offers a rich mine of insights. Peirce presented a ‘two-ply’ view of perception, which combines an entirely precognitive ‘percept’ with a ‘perceptual judgment’ that is located in the space of reasons. Having previously argued that Peirce outdoes Robert Brandom in achieving a hyper-inferentialism (“Making it Explicit and Clear”, APQ, 2008), I now wish to examine his philosophy in the light of inferentialism’s ‘original fount’ – Wilfrid Sellars. Does Peirce’s percept commit him to the Myth of the Given? I argue that it does not, because although the percept is understood as nonepistemic, it is not understood to justify the perceptual judgment. Rather, the perceptual judgement indexes the percept. I explain this original view, then argue that Peirce and Sellars actually have a great deal in common in their rare diachronically mediated yet at the same time direct perceptual realism, and the ‘critical commonsensist’ epistemology to which it gives rise

What is a logical diagram?

Robert Brandom’s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously - as more than a mere “heuristic aid” to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind does exist in Charles Peirce’s conception of iconic signs, but that fully understood, logical diagrams involve a structured array of normative reasoning practices, as well as just a “picture on a page”

Charles Peirce's limit concept of truth

This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough

Peirce, meaning and the semantic web

The so-called ‘Semantic Web’ is phase II of Tim Berners-Lee’s original vision for the WWW, whereby resources would no longer be indexed merely ‘syntactically’, via opaque character-strings, but via their meanings. We argue that one roadblock to Semantic Web development has been researchers’ adherence to a Cartesian, ‘private’ account of meaning, which has been dominant for the last 400 years, and which understands the meanings of signs as what their producers intend them to mean. It thus strives to build ‘silos of meaning’ which explicitly and antecedently determine what signs on the Web will mean in all possible situations. By contrast, the field is moving forward insofar as it embraces Peirce’s ‘public’, evolutionary account of meaning, according to which the meaning of signs just is the way they are interpreted and used to produce further signs. Given the extreme interconnectivity of the Web, it is argued that silos of meaning are unnecessary as plentiful machine-understandable data about the meaning of Web resources exists already in the form of those resources themselves, for applications that are able to leverage it, and it is Peirce’s account of meaning which can best make sense of the recent explosion in ‘user-defined content’ on the Web, and its relevance to achieving Semantic Web goals