Using Insights from Psychology and Language to Improve How People Reason with Description Logics

Inspired by insights from theories of human reasoning and language, we propose additions to the Manchester OWL Syntax to improve comprehensibility. These additions cover: functional and inverse functional properties, negated conjunction, the definition of exceptions, and existential and universal restrictions. By means of an empirical study, we demonstrate the effectiveness of a number of these additions, in particular: the use of solely to clarify the uniqueness of the object in a functional property; the replacement of and with intersection in conjunction, which was particularly beneficial in negated conjunction; the use of except as a substitute for and not; and the replacement of some with including and only with noneOrOnly, which helped in certain situations to clarify the nature of these restrictions

Raising argument strength using negative evidence: A constraint on models of induction

Both intuitively, and according to similarity-based theories of induction, relevant evidence raises argument strength when it is positive and lowers it when it is negative. In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that argument strength can actually increase when negative evidence is introduced. Two kinds of argument were compared through forced choice or sequential evaluation: single positive arguments (e.g., “Shostakovich’s music causes alpha waves in the brain; therefore, Bach’s music causes alpha waves in the brain”) and double mixed arguments (e.g., “Shostakovich’s music causes alpha waves in the brain, X’s music DOES NOT; therefore, Bach’s music causes alpha waves in the brain”). Negative evidence in the second premise lowered credence when it applied to an item X from the same subcategory (e.g., Haydn) and raised it when it applied to a different subcategory (e.g., AC/DC). The results constitute a new constraint on models of induction

The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief-logic conflict.

According to the default interventionist dual-process account of reasoning, belief-based responses to reasoning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by default, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful, Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims. In three experiments, we presented participants with a reasoning task that was to be completed while they were generating random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43, 2011), which required participants to make judgments based upon either the validity of a conditional argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These findings were replicated in Experiment 3, in which we controlled for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that both instructional sets require some effortful processing. However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive resources may be required for each type of judgment. We discuss the implications of our findings for the default interventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an alternative interpretation for our findings

Atypicalities in Perceptual Adaptation in Autism Do Not Extend to Perceptual Causality

A recent study showed that adaptation to causal events (collisions) in adults caused subsequent events to be less likely perceived as causal. In this study, we examined if a similar negative adaptation effect for perceptual causality occurs in children, both typically developing and with autism. Previous studies have reported diminished adaptation for face identity, facial configuration and gaze direction in children with autism. To test whether diminished adaptive coding extends beyond high-level social stimuli (such as faces) and could be a general property of autistic perception, we developed a child-friendly paradigm for adaptation of perceptual causality. We compared the performance of 22 children with autism with 22 typically developing children, individually matched on age and ability (IQ scores). We found significant and equally robust adaptation aftereffects for perceptual causality in both groups. There were also no differences between the two groups in their attention, as revealed by reaction times and accuracy in a change-detection task. These findings suggest that adaptation to perceptual causality in autism is largely similar to typical development and, further, that diminished adaptive coding might not be a general characteristic of autism at low levels of the perceptual hierarchy, constraining existing theories of adaptation in autism.16 page(s

Rationality and the experimental study of reasoning

A survey of the results obtained during the past three decades in some of the most widely used tasks and paradigms in the experimental study of reasoning is presented. It is shown that, at first sight, human performance suffers from serious shortcomings. However, after the problems of communication between experimenter and subject are taken into account, which leads to clarify the subject's representation of the tasks, one observes a better performance, although still far from perfect. Current theories of reasoning, of which the two most prominent are very briefly outlined, agree in identifying the load in working memory as the main source of limitation in performance. Finally, a recent view on human rationality prompted by the foregoing results is described

Categorial Compositionality III: F-(co)algebras and the Systematicity of Recursive Capacities in Human Cognition

Human cognitive capacity includes recursively definable concepts, which are prevalent in domains involving lists, numbers, and languages. Cognitive science currently lacks a satisfactory explanation for the systematic nature of such capacities (i.e., why the capacity for some recursive cognitive abilities–e.g., finding the smallest number in a list–implies the capacity for certain others–finding the largest number, given knowledge of number order). The category-theoretic constructs of initial F-algebra, catamorphism, and their duals, final coalgebra and anamorphism provide a formal, systematic treatment of recursion in computer science. Here, we use this formalism to explain the systematicity of recursive cognitive capacities without ad hoc assumptions (i.e., to the same explanatory standard used in our account of systematicity for non-recursive capacities). The presence of an initial algebra/final coalgebra explains systematicity because all recursive cognitive capacities, in the domain of interest, factor through (are composed of) the same component process. Moreover, this factorization is unique, hence no further (ad hoc) assumptions are required to establish the intrinsic connection between members of a group of systematically-related capacities. This formulation also provides a new perspective on the relationship between recursive cognitive capacities. In particular, the link between number and language does not depend on recursion, as such, but on the underlying functor on which the group of recursive capacities is based. Thus, many species (and infants) can employ recursive processes without having a full-blown capacity for number and language

Reasoning from connectives and relations between entities

This article reports investigations of inferences that depend both on connectives between clauses, such as or else, and on relations between entities, such as in the same place as. Participants made more valid inferences from biconditionals—for instance, Ann is taller than Beth if and only if Beth is taller than Cath—than from exclusive disjunctions (Exp. 1). They made more valid transitive inferences from a biconditional when a categorical premise affirmed rather than denied one of its clauses, but they made more valid transitive inferences from an exclusive disjunction when a categorical premise denied rather than affirmed one of its clauses (Exp. 2). From exclusive disjunctions, such as Either Ann is not in the same place as Beth or else Beth is not in the same place as Cath, individuals tended to infer that all three individuals could be in different places, whereas in fact this was impossible (Exps. 3a and 3b). The theory of mental models predicts all of these results