HAVE THE BENCH AND BAR ANYTHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE TEACHING OF LAW?

The teaching of lawyers is indeed as distinct a vocation from the practice of law, as law is from engineering or science. You have of recent years come practically to recognize it by your increasing insistence upon the teacher\u27s exclusive devotion to his calling, so that I suppose not only has the well-worn practitioner wholly disappeared, who from his semi-antiquation delivers a course of lectures, but the part time teacher even in the prime of his powers is more and more evidently doomed. I cannot see this change as anything but happy and advantageous. If for no other reason I should be glad to rest my case upon the necessarily superficial scholarship of both bench and bar, with the rarest exceptions. The conditions of our calling preclude us from gaining a systematic understanding of the law or even of keeping up with its course. We are predetermined sciolists, compelled to maintain some working acquaintance with the whole field, and consequently incapable of thorough knowledge in any part

IS THERE A COMMON WILL

In New York we have a new police commissioner. He is a gentleman of urbanity and elegant apparel. For years he has officially welcomed all distinguished guests to our city. We have come to regard him, like his chief, as the epitome of many of the brighter aspects of our life. But he conceives himself as far more than a bird of plumage. When he took office he determined to show the city that his administration should have results. There was to be vigorous enforcement of the law. And so he began by rounding up all those of the nether world who were on the black list of the police. These were gathered in large vans, following raids in those parts of the city which they were known to frequent, and they were taken through the streets, with every circumstance of publicity, to the magistrates, where, as there was generally no tenable charge against them they were nearly all immediately released. This, coupled with the announcement of a determination to harry and drive all evildoers from the city was, so far as we could gather, the measure of the achievement

Graham v. Sawaya: Utah\u27s Notice Requirements for In Personam Actions

In Graham v. Sayawa, the Utah Supreme Court held that federal and state constitutional requirements of due process prohibit the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over an absent resident defendant where the only notice of the action is by publication. Graham revitalized the traditional concepts of in rem and in personam for Utah notice purposes, despite the United States Supreme Court\u27s abandonment of those classifications for due process analyses. In effect, Graham prohibits in personam judgments based on published process under rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures and casts doubt on the constitutionality of notice by mail in Utah in personam actions

IS THERE A COMMON WILL

In New York we have a new police commissioner. He is a gentleman of urbanity and elegant apparel. For years he has officially welcomed all distinguished guests to our city. We have come to regard him, like his chief, as the epitome of many of the brighter aspects of our life. But he conceives himself as far more than a bird of plumage. When he took office he determined to show the city that his administration should have results. There was to be vigorous enforcement of the law. And so he began by rounding up all those of the nether world who were on the black list of the police. These were gathered in large vans, following raids in those parts of the city which they were known to frequent, and they were taken through the streets, with every circumstance of publicity, to the magistrates, where, as there was generally no tenable charge against them they were nearly all immediately released. This, coupled with the announcement of a determination to harry and drive all evildoers from the city was, so far as we could gather, the measure of the achievement