Lefebvre-Teillard, Anne, L'école de droit parisienne (fin XII^e–début XIII^e siècle)

Abstract The Parisian School of Law (end of the 12th to the beginning of the 13th century). The lecture of which the text is published below, was presented at the 'International Days' of the Society for the History of Law that was held in Bologna in May 2018. It aims to reflect on the research carried out on the Parisian school since the famous speech by Stephen Kuttner made at the 1937 Journées in Paris on 'The beginnings of the French canonist school'. Born after the publication of Gratian's Decretum, the Parisian school first developed during the long pontificate of Alexander III (1159–1181). Summae, distinctions and quaestiones about the Decretum developed during the 1180s, due to the presence of three very active 'Englishmen' in particular: Rodoicus Modicipassus, Ricardus de Mores (known as 'Ricardus the Englishman') and Honorius de Kent. Without neglecting the theological aspects, all three appeal to Roman law in their works, but also to the new pontifical decretals. The first decade of the thirteenth century was then marked by the publication of two important apparati on the Decretum: Ecce vicit leo and Animal est substantia, whose authors turn resolutely to Roman law. A specific teaching in the latter seems to have emerged during the same period, which sees the flourishing of the ius novum, a new teaching based on the Campilatio prima by Bernardus of Pavia. This dual orientation would then be strongly criticised by some theologians, for whom Paris was their undisputed centre of study. They then obtained a prohibition on the teaching of Roman law in Paris from Pope Honorius III in 1219.</jats:p

A new view of shareholder voting in the nineteenth century: evidence from Brazil, England and France

Conteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editorBusiness corporations in the nineteenth century often imposed limits on the voting rights of large shareholders. Economic historians have generally interpreted these voting restrictions as a contractual mechanism designed to protect small shareholders in a legal environment that afforded insufficient investor protection. This dominant account, however, fails to explain the variation in the incidence of voting restrictions across different industries and firm ownership structures, as well as their eventual disappearance from corporate charters over time. In this Article, we advance an alternative interpretation for these early voting schemes as efforts at consumer protection employed primarily by firms that were local service monopolies and collectively owned by their principal customers, none of whom wished the firm to come under the exclusive control of their competitors or of profit-maximising investors. We explore and test this proposition by analysing data on shareholder voting rights in the nineteenth century in Brazil, England, and France