Financing local development: Quasi-experimental evidence from municipalities in Brazil, 1980-1991

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of additional unrestricted grant financing on local public spending, public service provision, schooling, literacy, and income at the community (municipio) level in Brazil. Additional transfers increased local public spending per capita by about 20% with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or other revenue sources. The additional local spending increased schooling per capita by about 7% and literacy rates by about 4 percentage points. The implied marginal cost of schooling -accounting for corruption and other leakages- amounts to about US$ 126, which turns out to be similar to the average cost of schooling in Brazil in the early 1980s. In line with the effect on human capital, the poverty rate was reduced by about 4 percentage points, while income per capita gains were positive but not statistically significant. Results also suggest that additional public spending had stronger effects on schooling and literacy in less developed parts of Brazil, while poverty reduction was evenly spread across the country.intergovernmental grants, decentralization, economic development

Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil

We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of irregular local procurement processes by about 17 percentage points. This reduction was driven entirely by irregularities involving mismanagement or corruption. In contrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly provided preventive and primary health care services -measured based on user satisfaction surveys- or compliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program "Bolsa Família".Corruption, Rents, Local Governments, Law Enforcement

Judicial presence and rent extraction

We estimate the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments. We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors. Our unique dataset at the level of individual inspections allows us to separately examine extensive and intensive margins of rent extraction. The identification strategy is based on an institutional rule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research design exploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identical population size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most populous. IV estimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. In contrast, we find no effect on the intensive margin of rent extraction. Finally, our estimates suggest that judicial presence reduces rent extraction only for first-term mayors.Institutions, Corruption, Rents, Local Governments.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usually thought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion in the short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the central and local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates, I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formula were manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent with swing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities with roughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition or conservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus on discretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understate the true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.Bureaucracy, institutions, redistributive politics, electoral competition

Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency model of electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studied here had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expected electoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued by voters.Government spending, voting, regression discontinuity.

The effect of judicial institutions on local governance and corruption

This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance and corruption in local governments. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches in Brazil which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project management, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents

Judicial Presence and Rent Extraction

https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/litschig-stephan/This paper estimates the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments. We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by central government auditors. The identification strategy is based on an institutional rule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research design exploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identical population size from other districts in the same state where they are not the most populous. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent. The effect is concentrated among first-term mayors, suggesting that judicial presence operates through an increased probability of detection and prosecution rather than an increased probability of conviction, which should discipline second-term mayors as well.JEL Classification Codes: D02, D72, D78, H41, H83This is a revised and extended version of the paper “The Short Arm of the Law: Judicial Institutions and Local Governance in Brazil.”technical repor

The Effect of Competition on Corruption: Evidence from Contractors' Internal Records

https://www.grips.ac.jp/list/en/facultyinfo/litschig-stephan/This paper investigates the extent to which competition for public contracts reduces projectlevel rents and bribe payments to public officials. Water supply and sanitation project contractors for the provincial government of Punjab in Pakistan were interviewed on the condition of anonymity and gave access to 237 project-level construction ledgers. Under collusion, contractors pay about 15 percent of the project budget in kickbacks on average. Under competition for the contract, the winning bid and associated available rents go down by about 11 percentage points. Even under competition, public officials take almost 10 percent of the project budget in bribes.JEL Classification Codes: D73, D78, H41, H83, K42We acknowlededge financial support for data collection from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (Kakenhi 25101002, "Emerging State Project SONOBE A01 Group").technical repor

Distortion by audit: evidence from public procurement

Public sector audits are key to state capacity. However, they can create unintended distortions. Regression discontinuity analysis from Chile shows that audits lowered the use of auctions for public procurement, reduced supplier competition, and increased the likelihood of small, local, and incumbent firms winning contracts. Looking inside the black box of the audit process reveals that relative to comparable direct contracts, auctions underwent more than twice as many checks and led to twice as many detected infractions. These findings show that standard audit protocols can mechanically discourage the use of more regulated, complex, and transparent procedures involving more auditable steps

Which Tail Matters? Inequality and Growth in Brazil

We estimate the effect of initial income inequality on subsequent income per capita growth using sub-national data from Brazil over the period 1970-2000. Holding initial income per capita and standard confounders constant, we find that places with higher initial inequality exhibit higher subsequent growth. This effect is entirely driven by the lower tail of the initial income distribution: compared to more equal places, sub-national units with a higher share of income going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile grow more rapidly, while places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the expense of the middle quintile get no growth boost at all. We document that both physical and human capital accumulation in places with higher inequality in the lower tail of the initial income distribution outpace capital accumulation in more equal places, while inequality in the upper tail of the distribution is uncorrelated with subsequent physical or human capital growth. These results are consistent with theories on credit constraints and setup costs for human and physical capital investments.JEL Classification Codes: D3, O1, O4http://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/litschig-stephan/http://doi.org/10.24545/0000166