License auctions with exit (and entry) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem

Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the entrant values only the bundle of several units (synergy), incumbents are subject to non-increasing demand. The seller proactively encourages entry and restricts incumbent bidders. In this framework, an English clock auction gives rise to an exposure problem that distorts efficiency and impairs revenue. We consider three remedies: a (constrained) Vickrey package auction, an English clock auction with exit option that allows the entrant to annul his bid, and an English clock auction with exit and entry option that lifts the bidding restriction if entry failed

The Poverty of Wealth and Income in the United States

An alternative poverty rate was calculated using poverty thresholds from the U.S. Census Bureau to assess income poverty and a similar set of thresholds at four months’ of the poverty threshold for annual income to assess wealth (i.e. net worth) poverty. Using point estimates derived from the multiple imputations of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) between the years of 1989 and 2007, the findings revealed the percentage of households in poverty by both measures was 6% in 2007 compared to 11.1% of households experiencing poverty of income only and 22.4% experiencing a poverty of at least one of the measures. The author assessed the demographics of the households experiencing poverty of both income and wealth and found a larger racial gap for African Americans and Hispanics than income poverty alone, support for the lifecycle hypothesis, and the importance of home ownership in lower poverty rates among other factors