Out of Left Field?:Explaining the Variable Electoral Success of European Radical Left Parties

European radical left parties (RLPs) are gradually receiving greater attention. Yet, to date, what has received insufficient focus is why such parties have maintained residues of electoral support after the collapse of the USSR and why this support varies so widely. This article is the first to subject RLPs to large-n quantitative analysis, focusing on 39 parties in 34 European countries from 1990 to 2008. It uses the ‘supply and demand’ conceptual framework developed for radical right parties to identify a number of socio-economic, political-cultural and party-system variables in the external environment that might potentially affect RLP support. The article finds the most persuasive variables to include political culture (past party success), the level of unemployment, Euroscepticism and anti-globalization sentiment, the electoral threshold and competition from Green and radical right parties. The findings suggest several avenues for future research and provide a framework that can be adapted to explain the electoral success of other party families.  </jats:p

Contrary to popular opinion, there is no populist upsurge in Britain

Taken how often we use the term, we need to be more accurate in who/what we call populist, writes Luke March. In this analysis he defines the term and explains why, despite what is often said, there is no populist upsurge in the UK

Putin’s intervention in Crimea has effectively marginalised his domestic opposition in Russia

What has the impact of the crisis in Crimea been on Vladimir Putin’s domestic political situation? Luke March writes that there has always been a clear distinction between ‘systemic’ opposition parties, who are tolerated by the Kremlin, and ‘non-systemic’ opposition movements, which have little access to the media or state funding. He argues that the net effect of the situation in Crimea has been to marginalise these non-systemic groups and bolster public support for Vladimir Putin’s regime, although it remains to be seen how lasting this effect will be

Beyond Syriza and Podemos, other radical left parties are threatening to break into the mainstream of European politics

Following Syriza’s election victory in Greece in January, and strong polling ratings for Podemos in Spain, are radical left parties becoming a stronger force in European politics? Luke March writes on the electoral performance of the radical left since the financial crisis. He notes that while a Syriza-style ‘surge’ remains unlikely for most radical left parties, there is fertile ground for their policies, with a significant percentage of voters in European countries self-identifying with left-wing political ideologies

Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New ‘Russian Idea’

Focusing on diverse state approaches to nationalism provides a more nuanced view than that of Russian domestic and foreign policies driven directly by revanchist nationalism. The Russian authorities' ‘official nationality’ is moderate in aspiration. However, the effect is less benign because the Kremlin both mobilises extreme nationalism for regime goals and suppresses it when it becomes destabilising. This approach prevents nationalism either of extreme or moderate orientation becoming an influential, independent force in Russian politics. Such conflicting imperatives make Russia a more unpredictable international partner than if its policies were founded on a consistent ideological nationalism.<br/

Opposing Neo-liberal Europe? The Left TNPs and their Groups in the European Parliament

Introduction: This paper aims to contribute to answering this overarching question by comparing the policy and ideological response to the crisis undertaken by the three ‘left’ transnational party federations (TNPs) at European level, the Party of European Socialists (PES), European Green Party (EGP) and European Left Party (EL).2 Comparing the three TNPs is an apposite approach. Although TNPs are ‘timidly rising actors’, relatively weak formations that fall far short of being fully integrated parties, they at the very least aspire to a minimal level of ideological and policy co-ordination (Bardi 2004; cf. Hanley 2008). In short, if there is any EU-wide consensus over the crisis and how to respond to it within a party family, the TNP level is where we might expect to see it reflected most clearly

The Russian left has barely emerged from the shadow of Stalin, but there are significant signs of change.

How do left-wing parties and movements fare in Russian politics? Luke March provides an overview of Russia’s left and its role in the Russian party system. He argues that despite the Russian Communist Party (KPRF) still remaining the second largest political party in the Russian parliament, the Russian left still remains remarkably weak and fragmented. Nevertheless there is some evidence of ‘Europeanisation’ in terms of the Russian left becoming closer to contemporary European patterns, with a stronger social-democratic movement and less reliance on the KPRF

Putin:Populist, anti-populist, or pseudo-populist?

Vladimir Putin’s populism is much contested. There are three research questions. The first is empirical: is Putin a populist, and on what grounds? The second is methodological: can comparative measuring techniques help analyse the presence of populism? The third is theoretical: what (if anything) does the case of this ‘populist icon’ tell us about the populist phenomenon? Four domains of Putin’s politics are analysed: Russia’s support for international populists, Putin’s leadership style, and his leadership ‘strategy’; finally, content analysis is utilized for an in-depth look at the articulation of ideas in Putin’s principal speeches from 1999 to 2023. Putin is not substantively a populist, since the state (not the people) is his central political subject and his ‘populism’ reinforces centralized state authority. Ideationally, he is demotic (people-centrist), but also fundamentally statist, which vitiates this people-centrism. Some populist themes are used instrumentally in foreign policy, but even here the statist impulse predominates. Methodologically, the content analysis works well at showing the limited articulation of populist themes relative to demotic ones. Theoretically, this study is fully consonant with recent movements in populist studies to provide complexity-oriented accounts which avoid reifying and over-emphasizing populism