Performance criteria guideline for three explosion protection methods of electrical equipment rated up to 15,000 volts AC

The Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior, is reviewing explosion protection methods for use in gassy coal mines. This performance criteria guideline is an evaluation of three explosion protection methods of machines electrically powered with voltages up to 15,000 volts ac. A sufficient amount of basic research has been accomplished to verify that the explosion proof and pressurized enclosure methods can provide adequate explosion protection with the present state of the art up to 15,000 volts ac. This routine application of the potted enclosure as a stand alone protection method requires further investigation or development in order to clarify performance criteria and verification certification requirements. An extensive literature search, a series of high voltage tests, and a design evaluation of the three explosion protection methods indicate that the explosion proof, pressurized, and potted enclosures can all be used to enclose up to 15,000 volts ac

Modulation of Cox-1, 5-, 12- and 15-Lox by popular herbal remedies used in southern Italy against psoriasis and other skin diseases.

Acanthus mollis (Acanthaceae), Achillea ligustica, Artemisia arborescens and Inula viscosa (Asteraceae) are used in Southern Italy against psoriasis and other skin diseases that occur with an imbalanced production of eicosanoids. We here assessed their in vitro effects upon 5-, 12-, 15-LOX and COX-1 enzymes as well as NFκB activation in intact cells as their possible therapeutic targets. All methanol crude extracts inhibited both 5-LOX and COX-1 activities under 200 µg/mL, without significant effects on the 12-LOX pathway or any relevant in vitro free radical scavenging activity. NFκB activation was prevented by all extracts but A. mollis. Interestingly, A. ligustica, A. arborescens and A. mollis increased the biosynthesis of 15(S)-HETE, an anti-inflammatory eicosanoid. A. ligustica (IC50 =49.5 µg/mL) was superior to Silybum marianum (IC50 =147.8 µg/mL), which we used as antipsoriatic herbal medicine of reference. Its n-hexane, dichloromethane and ethyl acetate fractions had also inhibitory effects on the LTB4 biosynthesis (IC50 s=9.6, 20.3 and 68 µg/mL, respectively) evidencing that the apolar extracts of A. ligustica are promising active herbal ingredients for future phytotherapeutical products targeting psoriasis

Dretske on Knowledge Closure

In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and suggest that, in a useful sense, perception is closed, and that, while perceptual knowledge is not closed under entailment, perceptually based knowledge is closed, and so is knowledge itself. On my approach, which emphasizes the safe indication account of knowledge, we can both perceive, and know, that sceptical scenarios (such as being a brain in a vat) do not hold

The Easy Argument

Suppose Ted is in an ordinary house in good viewing conditions and believes red, his table is red, entirely because he sees his table and its color; he also believes not-white, it is false that his table is white and illuminated by a red light, because not-white is entailed by red. The following three claims about this table case clash, but each seems plausible: 1. Ted’s epistemic position is strong enough for him to know red. 2. Ted cannot know not-white on the basis of red. 3. The epistemic closure principle, suitably restricted, is true. Stewart Cohen has called this three-way clash of intuitions the problem of easy knowledge. If we wish to resolve the clash without accepting skepticism, we seem to have two options. According to the hard argument, the best response is to reject 3. The easy argument rejects 2. But there may be a third alternative, the reverse argument, which rejects 1 without ceding a substantial amount of ground to the skeptic. In this essay I criticize recent versions of the reverse argument and the hard argument, thereby lending support to the easy argument

The Moral Standing of the Dead

In choosing to do certain things, we appear to presuppose that we can act in the interests the dead, and that we have a duty to do so. For example, some of us go to great lengths to carry out their final wishes. Given that the dead no longer exist, however, it seems that nothing can be good or bad for them: they lack prudential interests. In that case, it is hard to see how we could owe them anything. They seem to lack moral standing altogether. In this essay, I will rebut this line of thought. I will claim that in some cases things that happen after people die are indeed good or bad for them. Their interests can still be advanced or hindered, so the dead have moral standing

The Anatomy of Aggression

Quite mundane pursuits as well as lofty attempts to achieve the extraordinary turn us against each other in tragic, insidious ways. These pursuits give rise to an invisible hand that, far from guiding people toward, steers them instead toward confrontation and aggression. People end up literally making war in order to secure a good life. My aim here is to lay bare mechanisms by which our undertakings make aggressors of us. I begin with an analysis of competition, aggression, and related phenomena

Posthumous Harm

According to Epicurus (1966a,b), neither death, nor anything that occurs later, can harm those who die, because people who die are not made to suffer as a result of either. In response, many philosophers (e.g., Nagel 1970, Feinberg 1984, and Pitcher 1984) have argued that Epicurus is wrong on both counts. They have defended the mortem thesis: death may harm those who die. They have also defended the post-mortem thesis: posthumous events may harm people who die. Their arguments for this joint view are by now quite familiar, and there is no need to rehearse them here (for a summary, see Luper 2002). Instead, our topic is a third position, which carves out intermediate ground between the other two. The intermediate view takes the mortem thesis for granted, like the critics of Epicurus, but rejects the post-mortem thesis, like Epicurus himself. For Epicurus’ project—the attainment of ataraxia, or equanimity—the intermediate view is almost useless (we are not tranquil if we regard death as a tragedy whose peculiarity is that it frees us from the possibility of any further misfortune); however, it is far more plausible than Epicurus’ own position since it avoids his absurd claim that death cannot harm us, while retaining his view that events occurring while we are dead and gone cannot harm us. According to the proponent of the intermediate view, when we understand the harm death inflicts, we must reject the idea that events following death can be bad for us. The damage death itself does is so severe that people are not subject to harm by any subsequent events. Thus the intermediate view rests on the mortem thesis 2 together with the immunity thesis: death leaves its victims immune from posthumous harm. The immunity thesis is quite plausible. Truly, once death is through with us, very little can be bad for us. However, this essay will show that the immunity thesis faces significant objections. Hence even though the mortem thesis is correct, the intermediate thesis is questionable. The point is important, because of the consequences of the view that posthumous events are harmless to us. One such consequence is that it is irrational to care how our reputations or personal projects will fare after we die. It also follows that keeping our bodies alive after our brains enter a persistent vegetative state is not beneficial to us. Moreover, there is a strong prima facie case for the view that others should feel free to set aside any instructions we might leave behind concerning the disposition of our material possessions

Past Desires and The Dead

I examine an argument that appears to take us from Parfit’s [Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984)] thesis that we have no reason to fulfill desires we no longer care about to the conclusion that the effect of posthumous events on our desires is a matter of indifference (the post-mortem thesis). I suspect that many of Parfit’s readers, including Vorobej [Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) 305], think that he is committed to (something like) this reasoning, and that Parfit must therefore give up the post-mortem thesis. However, as it turns out, the argument is subtly equivocal and does not commit Parfit to the post-mortem thesis. I close with some doubts about Parfit’s case for his indifference thesis

The AMA on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide

The American Medical Association (AMA) opposes physician-assisted suicide (PAS) on the grounds that it “would ultimately cause more harm than good,” because it is “fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer,” and because it “would be difficult or impossible to control and would pose serious societal risks” (AMA 2016, Opinion 5.7). It condemns the practice of euthanasia as conducted by physicians (PE) for these reasons as well, and adds, by way of clarifying the serious risks at hand, that “euthanasia could readily be extended to incompetent patients and other vulnerable populations” (Opinion 5.8). In this essay I will attempt to rebut these charges. I will devote most of my attention to the first one, concerning the harmfulness of PAS and PE. Here the AMA appeals to the moral principle that physicians should not act in ways that will ultimately cause more harm than good, which we can call the “more-harm principle.” However, I will start by discussing another argument against PAS and PE, one that appeals to (what I will call) the “no-harm principle.” While the AMA does not appeal to the no-harm principle in its opinion statement, discussing it is useful for two reasons. One is that the no-harm principle features in many formal and informal criticisms of PAS and PE (e.g., Boudreau and Somerville 2013). Another is that clarifying the no-harm principle will help me to bring the more-harm principle into focus, which in turn will make it easier to assess the AMA’s case

Doxastic Skepticism

In “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” Donald Davidson offers an attempt to refute skepticism, an attempt that is an expansion of the dense argument in part 1 of “The Method of Truth in Metaphysics” for the claim that “massive error about the world is simply unintelligible.”’ To help in his attack, he presses into service tightly interrelated theories about belief and meaning. In particular, he relies on the claim that ideal interpreters, who are fully informed and charitable, must attribute to a speaker what are by their lights largely true beliefs. I argue that this assumption is false, as is his claim to have disarmed skepticism. In fact, 1 shall argue, he only manages to lay the ground for a kind of skepticism that is even worse than the traditional sort. I call it Doxastic Skepticism