Target-based solutions for Nash bargaining

We revisit the Nash model for two-person bargaining. A mediator knows agents' ordinal preferences over feasible proposals, but has incomplete information about their acceptance thresholds. We provide a behavioural characterisation under which the mediator\ud recommends a proposal that maximises the probability that bargainers strike an agreement. Some major solutions are recovered as special cases; in particular, we offer a straightforward interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution

Progress in Artificial Economics

Artificial economics aims to provide a generative approach to understanding problems in economics and social sciences. It is based on the consistent use of agent-based models and computational techniques. It encompasses a rich variety of techniques that generalize numerical analysis, mathematical programming, and micro-simulations. The peer-reviewed contributions in this volume address applications of artificial economics to markets and trading, auctions, networks, management, industry sectors, macroeconomics, and demographics and culture

The power of teams that disagree:team formation in large action spaces

Recent work has shown that diverse teams can outperform a uniform team made of copies of the best agent. However, there are fundamental questions that were never asked before. When should we use diverse or uniform teams? How does the performance change as the action space or the teams get larger? Hence, we present a new model of diversity, where we prove that the performance of a diverse team improves as the size of the action space increases. Moreover, we show that the performance converges exponentially fast to the optimal one as we increase the number of agents. We present synthetic experiments that give further insights: even though a diverse team outperforms a uniform team when the size of the action space increases, the uniform team will eventually again play better than the diverse team for a large enough action space. We verify our predictions in a system of Go playing agents, where a diverse team improves in performance as the board size increases, and eventually overcomes a uniform team

A detailed analysis of a multi-agent diverse team

In an open system we can have many different kinds of agents. However, it is a challenge to decide which agents to pick when forming multi-agent teams. In some scenarios, agents coordinate by voting continuously. When forming such teams, should we focus on the diversity of the team or on the strength of each member? Can a team of diverse (and weak) agents outperform a uniform team of strong agents? We propose a new model to address these questions. Our key contributions include: (i) we show that a diverse team can overcome a uniform team and we give the necessary conditions for it to happen; (ii) we present optimal voting rules for a diverse team; (iii) we perform synthetic experiments that demonstrate that both diversity and strength contribute to the performance of a team; (iv) we show experiments that demonstrate the usefulness of our model in one of the most difficult challenges for Artificial Intelligence: Computer Go

Expected utility without utility

THEORY AND DECISIO

Decision analysis using targets instead of utility functions

DECISIONS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANC

Quando si moltiplicava per gelosia

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