On the relationship between the “default mode network” and the “social brain”

Contains fulltext : 102753.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)The default mode network (DMN) of the brain consists of areas that are typically more active during rest than during active task performance. Recently however, this network has been shown to be activated by certain types of tasks. Social cognition, particularly higher-order tasks such as attributing mental states to others, has been suggested to activate a network of areas at least partly overlapping with the DMN. Here, we explore this claim, drawing on evidence from meta-analyses of functional MRI data and recent studies investigating the structural and functional connectivity of the social brain. In addition, we discuss recent evidence for the existence of a DMN in non-human primates. We conclude by discussing some of the implications of these observations.9 p

Short-latency influence of medial frontal cortex on primary motor cortex during action selection under conflict

Medial frontal cortex (MFC) is crucial when actions have to be inhibited, reprogrammed, or selected under conflict, but the precise mechanism by which it operates is unclear. Importantly, how and when the MFC influences the primary motor cortex (M1) during action selection is unknown. Using paired-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation, we investigated functional connectivity between the presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) part of MFC and M1. We found that functional connectivity increased in a manner dependent on cognitive context: pre-SMA facilitated the motor evoked-potential elicited by M1 stimulation only during action reprogramming, but not when otherwise identical actions were made in the absence of conflict. The effect was anatomically specific to pre-SMA; it was not seen when adjacent brain regions were stimulated. We discuss implications for the anatomical pathways mediating the observed effects

Imagining the future self through thought experiments

The ability of the mind to conceptualize what is not present is essential. It allows us to reason counterfactually about what might have happened had events unfolded differently or had another course of action been taken. It allows us to think about what might happen – to perform 'Gedankenexperimente' (thought experiments) – before we act. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms mediating this ability are poorly understood. We suggest that the frontopolar cortex (FPC) keeps track of and evaluates alternative choices (what we might have done), whereas the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC) compares simulations of possible future scenarios (what we might do) and evaluates their reward values. Together, these brain regions support the construction of suppositional scenarios

Asymmetric projection of introspection reveals a behavioural and neural mechanism for interindividual social coordination

When we collaborate with others to tackle novel problems, we anticipate how they will perform their part of the task to coordinate behavior effectively. We might estimate how well someone else will perform by extrapolating from estimates of how well we ourselves would perform. This account predicts that our metacognitive model should make accurate predictions when projected onto people as good as, or worse than, us but not on those whose abilities exceed our own.We demonstrate just such a pattern and that it leads to worse coordination when working with people more skilled than ourselves.Metacognitive projection is associated with a specific activity pattern in anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC47). Manipulation of alPFC47 activity altered metacognitive projection and impaired interpersonal social coordination. By contrast, monitoring of other individuals’ observable performance and outcomes is associated with a distinct pattern of activity in the posterior temporal parietal junction (TPJp)

Visual neglect after right posterior cerebral artery infarction

This article has been made available through the Brunel Open Access Publishing Fund and is available from the specified link - Copyright © 2006 BMJ Publishing Group.Objectives: To investigate the characteristics and neuroanatomical correlates of visual neglect after right-sided posterior cerebral artery (PCA) infarction.Methods: 15 patients with acute PCA strokes were screened for the presence of neglect on a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests. Extra tests of visual perception were also carried out on six patients. To establish which areas were critically associated with neglect, the lesions of patients with and without neglect were compared.Results: Neglect of varying severity was documented in 8 patients. In addition, higher-order visual perception was impaired in 5 of the 6 patients. Neglect was critically associated with damage to an area of white matter in the occipital lobe corresponding to a white matter tract connecting the parahippocampal gyrus with the angular gyrus of the parietal lobe. Lesions of the thalamus or splenium of the corpus callosum did not appear necessary or sufficient to cause neglect, but may mediate its severity in these patients.Conclusions: PCA stroke can result in visual neglect. Interruption of the white matter fibres connecting the parahippocampal gyrus to the angular gyrus may be important in determining whether a patient will manifest neglect

Self-Other Mergence in the Frontal Cortex during Cooperation and Competition

This is the final version. Available on open access from Elsevier via the DOI in this recordTo survive, humans must estimate their own ability and the abilities of others. We found that, although people estimated their abilities on the basis of their own performance in a rational manner, their estimates of themselves were partly merged with the performance of others. Reciprocally, their ability estimates for others also reflected their own, as well as the others’, performance. Self-other mergence operated in a context-dependent manner: interacting with high or low performers, respectively, enhanced and diminished own ability estimates in cooperative contexts, but the opposite occurred in competitive contexts. Self-other mergence not only influenced subjective evaluations, it also affected how people subsequently objectively adjusted their performance. Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex tracked one’s own performance. Dorsomedial frontal area 9 tracked others’ performances, but also integrated contextual and self-related information. Self-other mergence increased with the strength of self and other representations in area 9, suggesting it carries interdependent representations of self and other.Wellcome Trus

Comparing brains by matching connectivity profiles

The great promise of comparative neuroscience is to understand why brains differ by investigating the relations between variations in the organization of different brains, their evolutionary history, and their current ecological niche. For this approach to be successful, the organization of different brains needs to be quantifiable. Here, we present an approach to formally comparing the connectivity of different cortical areas across different brains. We exploit the fact that cortical regions can be characterized by the unique pattern of connectivity, the so-called connectivity fingerprint. By comparing connectivity fingerprints between cortical areas in the human and non-human primate brain we can identify between-species homologs, but also illustrate that is driving differences between species. We illustrate the approach by comparing the organization of the frontal cortex between humans and macaques, showing general similarities combined with some differences in the lateral frontal pole

Causal role of a neural system for separating and selecting multidimensional social cognitive information

People are multi-faceted, typically good at some things but bad at others, and a critical aspect of social judgement is the ability to focus on those traits relevant for the task at hand. However, it remains unknown how the brain supports such context-dependent social judgement. Here, we examine how people represent multidimensional individuals, and how the brain extracts relevant information and filters out irrelevant information when comparing individuals within a specific dimension. Using human fMRI, we identify distinct neural representations in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior insula (AI) supporting separation and selection of information for context-dependent social judgement. Causal evaluation using non-invasive brain stimulation shows that AI disruption alters the impact of relevant information on social comparison, whereas dmPFC disruption only affects the impact of irrelevant information. This neural circuit is distinct from the one supporting integration across, as opposed to separation of, different features of a multidimensional cognitive space

Risk, Unexpected Uncertainty, and Estimation Uncertainty: Bayesian Learning in Unstable Settings

Recently, evidence has emerged that humans approach learning using Bayesian updating rather than (model-free) reinforcement algorithms in a six-arm restless bandit problem. Here, we investigate what this implies for human appreciation of uncertainty. In our task, a Bayesian learner distinguishes three equally salient levels of uncertainty. First, the Bayesian perceives irreducible uncertainty or risk: even knowing the payoff probabilities of a given arm, the outcome remains uncertain. Second, there is (parameter) estimation uncertainty or ambiguity: payoff probabilities are unknown and need to be estimated. Third, the outcome probabilities of the arms change: the sudden jumps are referred to as unexpected uncertainty. We document how the three levels of uncertainty evolved during the course of our experiment and how it affected the learning rate. We then zoom in on estimation uncertainty, which has been suggested to be a driving force in exploration, in spite of evidence of widespread aversion to ambiguity. Our data corroborate the latter. We discuss neural evidence that foreshadowed the ability of humans to distinguish between the three levels of uncertainty. Finally, we investigate the boundaries of human capacity to implement Bayesian learning. We repeat the experiment with different instructions, reflecting varying levels of structural uncertainty. Under this fourth notion of uncertainty, choices were no better explained by Bayesian updating than by (model-free) reinforcement learning. Exit questionnaires revealed that participants remained unaware of the presence of unexpected uncertainty and failed to acquire the right model with which to implement Bayesian updating

Differential functional connectivity underlying asymmetric reward-related activity in human and nonhuman primates

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is a key brain region involved in complex cognitive functions such as reward processing and decision making. Neuroimaging studies have reported unilateral OFC response to reward-related variables; however, those studies rarely discussed this observation. Nevertheless, some lesion studies suggest that the left and right OFC contribute differently to cognitive processes. We hypothesized that the OFC asymmetrical response to reward could reflect underlying hemispherical difference in OFC functional connectivity. Using resting-state and reward-related functional MRI data from humans and from rhesus macaques, we first identified an asymmetrical response of the lateral OFC to reward in both species. Crucially, the subregion showing the highest reward-related asymmetry (RRA) overlapped with the region showing the highest functional connectivity asymmetry (FCA). Furthermore, the two types of asymmetries were found to be significantly correlated across individuals. In both species, the right lateral OFC was more connected to the default mode network compared to the left lateral OFC. Altogether, our results suggest a functional specialization of the left and right lateral OFC in primates.</jats:p